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Abstract 
 
At the end of the proceedings of the federal constitutional convention, the delegates 
appointed the Committee on Style and Arrangement to bring together the textual provisions that 
the convention had previously agreed to and to prepare a final constitution. Pennsylvania delegate 
Gouverneur Morris was assigned to draft the document for the committee, and, with few revisions 
and little debate, the convention subsequently adopted the Committee’s proposed constitution. For 
more than two hundred years, questions have been raised as to whether Morris as drafter covertly 
made changes in the text in order to advance his constitutional vision, but the legal scholars and 
historians studying the convention have concluded that Morris was an honest scrivener. No prior  
article, however, has systematically compared the Committee’s draft to the previously adopted 
resolutions or discussed the implications of those changes for constitutional law.  This article 
reveals how many changes Morris made to the text delegates had previously agreed to and how 
important those changes were (and are).  It shows that many of the central elements of the 
Constitution (including the Preamble; the basic Article I, Article II, and Article III structure; and 
the contract clause) were wholly or largely the product of the Committee’s work. In total, Morris 
made twelve significant changes to the Constitution, and these textual changes advanced his 
constitutional goals, including strengthening the national government, the executive, and the 
judiciary; protecting private property; and fighting the spread of slavery. Finally, it shows that, in 
central debates in the early republic, Federalists, and, notably, fellow committee member 
Alexander Hamilton repeatedly drew on language crafted by the Committee as they fought for 
their expansive vision of the Constitution. In revising the constitutional text, Morris created the 
basis for what was to become the Hamiltonian reading of the Constitution.   
 
This history has significant implications for modern constitutional law. While the Supreme 
Court has never been presented with a case that reveals the extent of the Committee’s changes, in 
four cases it has confronted situations in which the Committee’s text arguably had a different 
meaning than the provision previously adopted by the convention, and the Court has consistently 
treated the Committee’s work as substantively meaningless and concluded that the prior 
resolutions were controlling.  That approach should be rejected because it is at odds with the 
majoritarian premise of constitutional ratification by “the people.” The text that was ratified is 
controlling.  At the same time, in most circumstances, Morris’s language was ambiguous. A 
modern public meaning originalist approach leads to the conclusion that Morris’s revisions made 
possible alternate readings of the Constitution: it supported what was to become the Federalist 
approach, but did not prevent Republican textualist readings.  On important contemporary issues, 
focus on Morris’s text makes us aware of originalist understandings of the text that have been 
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frequently dismissed or wholly forgotten; although it does not eliminate the originalist basis for 
narrower readings, that focus provides new originalist support for broad understandings of 
congressional, judicial, and presidential power and for protection of private property.  
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Gouverneur Morris, the Committee of Style, and the Creation of the Federalist 
Constitution 
  
William Michael Treanor 
 
Introduction 
 
That document [the Constitution] was written by the fingers, which write this letter. 
Gouverneur Morris to Timothy Pickering, December 22, 18143 
 
The finish given to the style and arrangement of the Constitution fairly belongs to the pen 
of Mr. Morris; the task having probably been handed over to him by the Chair of the Committee, 
himself a highly respected member and with the ready concurrence of others. A better choice 
could not have been made, as the performance of the task proved. 
 James Madison to Jared Sparks, April 8, 18314  
 
“Gouverneur Morris was probably the most brilliant member of the Pennsylvania 
delegation and of the convention as well.  Sharp-witted, clever, startling in his audacity, and with 
a wonderful command of language, he was admired more than he was trusted. . . .” 
Max Farrand, Framing of the Constitution (1913).5 
 
“Gouv. Morris. . . . Celebrated attorney, one of the great minds of the continent, but 
without morals and, if one believes his enemies, without principles. . . .” 
 French Embassy, “List of Members of Congress, with notes of the most interesting 
people in different states” (1788)6 
 
There is a voluminous body of scholarly literature that grapples with framers’ intent in 
drafting the Constitution and what that intent should mean for modern constitutional 
                                               
 33 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 420 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press rev. ed. 
1986). 
43 FARRAND 499. 
5Max Farrand, Framing of the Constitution 21 (1913). 
63 Farrand 236 (my translation from the French). 
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interpretation. But there has been no serious study of framer’s intent and what that intent means 
for constitutional adjudication today. Although largely forgotten today, the framer was 
Gouverneur Morris, a brilliant, commanding, and linguistically gifted member of the Pennsylvania 
delegation. Morris was the delegate who spoke most often at the convention, and, at a convention 
marked by compromises on critical issues, he, more than any other delegate (including Alexander 
Hamilton), championed positions that were to become the Federalist constitutional position in the 
early republic: he fought for a national government with expansive powers, he wanted a strong 
executive and a strong federal judiciary, he pressed for strong protection for private property, and, 
among the delegates, he stood alone in his fierce denunciation of slavery.  
 
Morris became the framer through his work on the Committee of Style. At the end of the 
proceedings of the federal constitutional convention, following more than a month of debate on 
the previous draft of the Constitution, the delegates elected “a Committee of five to revise the style 
of and arrange the articles agreed to by the House.”7 With Morris working as the draftsmen, the 
Committee over the course of three days produced a new draft Constitution, and, with minor 
changes, that draft was adopted and became the Constitution submitted to the states and ratified. 
 
In 1798, in the course of a House debate, Congressman Albert Gallatin charged that Morris 
in drafting the Constitution had deceptively (and subtly) changed the text of the general welfare 
clause, converting a comma into a semicolon in order to convert a limitation on the taxing 
authority into a broad positive grant of power, but that Roger Sherman had caught the "trick" and 
restored the original punctuation.  
 
Morris’s enemies had long before the convention viewed him as lacking integrity, and 
Gallatin’s charge has been noted by a range of scholars.  It has been analyzed in the context of 
academic work on individual clauses.8 Although some scholars have contended in interpreting 
particular clauses that Morris altered language to achieve some substantive end, the prevalent 
opinion is that Gallatin was mistaken and that Morris was an honest scrivener.9 But, remarkably, 
no scholarly work has systematically compared the provisions referred to the Committee of Style 
with the draft the Committee produced in order to assess the importance of the Committee’s 
changes. More broadly, despite the fact that the Committee of Style had the “pen” as the final draft 
of the Constitution to be considered by the convention was prepared, there has been no serious 
academic study of the Committee’s work as a whole, including how its members were selected, 
what the relationships between them were, and their visions of the Constitution. This article offers 
that analysis.      
 
                                               
72 Farrand 547. 
8See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281, 286 
n.25 (1987) (noting charge); David Engdahl, The Basis of the Spending Power 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 215, 252-4 
(1995) (general welfare clause); Phillip Hamburger, The New Censorship, 2004 S. CT. REV. 271, 354 n.111 (same); 
Vasan Kesavan and Michael Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 291 (2002) (new states 
clause); James Pfander, History and State Suability, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1292 (engagements clause).  For 
further discussion, see infra part V. 
9Clinton Rossiter, RICHARD BROOKHISER, GENTLEMAN REVOLUTIONARY: GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, THE RAKE 
WHO WROTE THE CONSTITUTION 92 (2003); WILLIAM ADAMS, GOUVERNEUR MORRIS (2003) 
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The Committee of Style was unlike any other committee at the constitutional convention: 
while other committees had been divided among delegates with different perspectives, the 
Committee of Style was dominated by strong nationalists. Comparison of the document the 
Committee produced with the text previously approved by the Convention reveals a series of 
crucial (if largely subtle) changes.  “We, the People of the United States” – the opening words of 
the Preamble and undoubtedly the most famous phrase in the document – were the creation of the 
Committee, as were the Preamble’s substantive ends – “in order to form a more perfect union, to 
establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the 
general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty. . . .”   The Committee re-inserted the 
contracts clause into the Constitution – it had been rejected on the floor – and altered the clause’s 
scope, providing a textual basis for it reach public contracts.  It created the familiar structure of 
the Constitution – Article I (Congress), Article II (Executive), and Article III (the Judiciary).  It 
revised the vesting clauses of Article I so it was different from the vesting clause of Article II 
different.  It altered, in important (although not obvious) ways, the language of the law of the 
land clause, the engagement clauses, the qualifications clause, and the new states clause. The 
Committee removed the word “justly” from the fugitive slaves clause. 
 
Each of those changes were consequential.  As drafter, Morris placed into the 
Constitution text that could be used to advance ends that he had unsuccessfully supported on the 
convention floor – strengthening the executive, the judiciary, and Congress, establishing judicial 
review, protecting private property, expanding the types of “offenses” for which the President 
could be impeached, allowing Congress to add eligibility requirements for service in Congress, 
expanding the power of the national government to assume state debts, limiting the creation of 
new states and fighting slavery. 
 
Significantly, in the great constitutional debates in the Washington and Adams 
administration, Federalists repeatedly invoked language that Morris had placed in the Constitution.  
Morris in 1787 created the playbook that Federalists were to turn to again and again in the critical 
constitutional controversies of the 1790’s.  
 
Recognition of the extent of Morris’s changes leads to the question what impact that text 
should have on constitutional adjudication today, and this article analyzes that problem from the 
perspective of public meaning originalism, the dominant originalist approach.   
 
Since no previous work has analyzed the Committee of Style’s work, the Supreme Court 
has, obviously, never had occasion to examine this question in its full context.  But on four 
occasions it has adjudicated cases in which text crafted by the Committee of Style arguably had a 
different meaning than the text previously adopted by the convention.  In each case, it simply 
disregarded the Committee’s text, holding, in the language of Powell v. McCormack, that the 
“Committee [of Style] . . had no authority from the Convention to make alterations of substance 
in the Constitution as voted by the Convention, nor did it purport to do so.”10  Only Justice 
                                               
10395 U.S. at 538-39 (quoting Charles Warren, supra, at 422 n.1). See also Utah v Evans, 536 U.S. 452 
(2002) (Census Clause); United States Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (Qualifications Clause); United 
States v. Nixon, 506, U.S. 224 (1993) (Impeachment Clause). 
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Thomas has disagreed with this approach, observing in dissent in Utah v. Evans that he considered 
the Committee of Style’s language binding because it was the language that was ratified and “I 
focus on the words of the adopted Constitution.”11  
 
 As Justice Thomas’s dissent suggests, the Court’s approach is at odds with democratic 
theory. “We, the People” ratified the constitutional text that the Convention ultimately adopted; 
the ratifiers not only did not adopt, they never saw the provisions referred to the Committee of 
Style, which were not made public until generations after ratification.  At the same time, Justice 
Thomas’s approach misses the fact that, in general, Morris’s text did not have one clear meaning 
(and that is why it largely escaped controversy when the Committee completed its work – the 
newly created Federalist readings were not obvious as the convention hurriedly reviewed the 
entire document). Morris devised text that Federalists could rely on, but that text was sufficiently 
ambiguous so that Jeffersonian Republicans could draw on it, as well. Morris’s text had multiple 
meanings. 
 
  The Jeffersonian Republican readings of the text have become originalist orthodoxy. It 
is  the conventional wisdom that, from an originalist perspective, the Preamble is not a grant of 
authority, that the text of the Constitution does not authorize judicial review, that Congress is not 
constitutionally obligated to create lower federal courts, and that the contracts clause does not 
cover contracts with state governments. Similarly, the argument that the difference between the 
vesting clauses of Article I and II means that presidential powers should be read broadly is widely 
attacked as at odds with the original understanding.   
 
But, in the most important constitutional controversies of the early republic, Federalists 
relied on text created in the Committee of Style to advance a dramatically different conception of 
the Constitution. Under the Federalist approach, the Preamble is a grant of almost plenary 
authority, judicial review is grounded in the Constitution’s text, Congress has an obligation to 
create lower federal courts, the difference between the two vesting clauses evidences a broad grant 
of “executive power” to the President, and the contracts clause applied to contracts with states.  
 
Recognition of those readings means that broad understandings of executive, congressional 
and judicial power, although contested at the time of the founding, are all grounded in the 
document’s original public meaning.  Equally important, countervailing narrow readings are also 
grounded in the document’s original public meaning. Similarly, some in the founding generation 
read the text of the contracts clause to extend to state contracts - and others rejected this view. 
 
Much of contemporary originalist debate reflects the assumption that there is one reading 
of constitutional text.  Because of Morris, however, critical textual elements of the Constitution 
are ambiguous. They supported both High Federalist and Republican readings. With respect to the 
clauses Morris changed, a public meaning originalist should therefore find multiple textualist 
readings. Resolution of questions in contemporary adjudication requires examination of non-
originalist sources. To use the terminology of Professor Larry Solum, these clauses are in the 
“construction zone,” where originalists have to rely on non-originalist tools, such as precedent or 
                                               
 
11536 U.S. at 496. 
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constitutional structure, to choose between two originalist meanings to resolve modern 
constitutional law questions.12   
.   
This article begins, in Section I, with an overview of the Committee of Style’s work, 
Morris’s career, and Gallatin’s charge. Section II examines the treatment by historians of the 
Committee (they have portrayed Morris as an honest scrivener), Section III looks at the Supreme 
Court case law, and Section IV discusses the treatment in the law review literature (where scholars 
have focused, almost completely, on individual clauses and, with the exception of a brief 
discussions by Professor Paulsen, Vasan Kesavan, and Dean Manning, ignored the larger 
theoretical question of what weight should be given textual changes made by Morris). As noted, 
although there are brief treatments of the topic, no work of scholarship has focused on the changes 
made by the Committee. Section V discusses Morris’s constitutional positions at the convention 
prior to the work of the Committee and the ways in which the constitutional text that had been 
adopted before the Committee of Style began its work was at odds with Morris’s vision. Section V 
then shows how Morris changed the Constitution’s text in ways that advanced the central elements 
of his constitutional vision, and it also shows that Federalists – in particular, Alexander Hamilton 
and James Wilson, who had participated in the Committee’s preparation of the Constitution – 
relied on Morris’s text in virtually all of the great constitutional debates of the Early Republic.  
Finally, Section VI discusses the significance the Committee’s text should have for modern 
originalists.  It argues that attention to the Committee’s work and the subsequent reliance on it by 
Federalists reveals a Federalist vision of the Constitution that modern originalists have largely 
missed. Although there was a competing Republican vision of the text, Morris created the basis for 
a Federalist understanding of the Constitution that modern originalists should recognize and that 
means that originalism does not provide clear answers to central constitutional questions that have 
been treated as having, from the perspective of originalists, clear answers.  
 
 
I. The Committee of Style and Morris’s Constitution 
 
With Morris serving as penman, the Committee of Style crafted the final draft of the 
Constitution considered by the Convention. This section discusses the Committee’s mandate, the 
selection of its members, Morris’s career, the questions about his integrity, and his role as 
draftsmen.  This section concludes with an analysis of the convention’s consideration of the 
Committee of Style’s draft Constitution, with a focus on its review of the “general welfare clause” 
and the “offenses against the law of nations” clause, the only two clauses whose meaning Morris 
had changed that were discussed at the convention.  The discussion of the “general welfare” 
clause highlights Congressman Gallatin’s charge about Morris’s revision of the clause. 
  
a. The Mandate and Selection of the Committee 
                                               
12See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 453, 458 
(2013) (construction zone applies when "the constitutional text does not provide determinate answers to constitutional 
questions").  See also Randy Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and Spirit: A Unified Theory of Originalism, 
107 Geo. L.J. 1, 6 (2018) (“We argue that, in what Lawrence Solum has termed the "construction zone," judges should 
identify the original functions of individual clauses and structural design elements to formulate rules that are 
consistent with the Constitution's letter and calculated to implement its spirit.”). 
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On September 8, 1787, as the work of the constitutional convention drew to a close after 
almost four months of often bitter debate, there was still no Constitution. The draft constitution 
produced by the Committee of Detail on August 6 had been subject to more than a month of 
debate. A host of significant additions and deletions had been voted in floor discussion. Moreover, 
in that month, five committees had been formed to resolve a series of issues.  Not only was there 
no working draft Constitution, but, while the Journal of the Convention had recorded the relevant 
resolutions and votes, there had not even been an effort to bring together a compilation of what the 
delegates had in fact agreed to. 
 
Seeking to bring their deliberations to a conclusion and coherence to the provisions that 
had been approved, the members of the constitutional convention created a committee “to revise 
the style of and arrange the articles which had been agreed to by the House,”13 to quote Madison’s 
notes, and, following Madison, the committee has come to be known as the Committee of Style 
and Arrangement.  But, as will be discussed below, much of the Committee’s work manifested a 
vision of the Constitution very different from the vision Madison was to embrace in the years after 
ratification, and Madison therefore had an incentive to minimize the legitimacy of any substantive 
changes the committee made, both in his notes and in the letter to Sparks that appears at the head 
of this article (where he credits Morris with the document’s “finish”).  The only other notes from 
a delegate to discuss the creation of the committee – the notes of Dr. McHenry’s - stated that the 
panel was “to revise and place the several parts under their proper heads.”14 Similarly, the 
committee’s formal name was the committee "to revise the style of and arrange the articles,"15 
and the Secretary called it the "Committee of revision."16 Arguably, the reference to “revision” 
suggest that the Committee had a mandate that ran beyond mere style.17 
 
  The delegates elected to the committee Alexander Hamilton, William Johnson, Rufus 
King, James Madison, and Gouverneur Morris.18 It appears that James Wilson, although not a 
committee member, worked informally with the Committee as it prepared its draft.19  
 
Narrative accounts about the constitutional convention center on the floor debates and 
particularly on the fierce debates about whether representation would be based on population and 
about the protection the Constitution would provide for slavery. But much of the actual work of 
the convention took place, not on the floor, but in the committees which were delegated a series of 
                                               
132 FARRAND 553. 
14Cite to Farrand 
151 DHC 191. 
161 DHC 193-96. 
17See Mary Sarah Bilder, How Bad Were the Official Records of the Federal Convention?, 80 G.W. L.J. 
1620, 1648 (2012) (suggesting that Madison’s constitutional vision gave him an incentive to frame the committee’s 
work as limited to style and that McHenry and the official records reference to it as a committee of revision more 
accurately captured its mandate).  Madison’s reframing of the committee’s mandate would have been consistent with 
his revision of his notes in light of later controversies, revisions convincingly detailed in Bilder’s Madison’s Hand: 
Revising the Constitutional Convention (2015). 
182 Farrand 553 
193 Farrand 170 
 10 
major responsibilities, including, in order, the Committee to “devise and report some compromise” 
(which fashioned the compromise on representation), the Committee of Eleven (which framed the 
Constitution’s sections on the slave trade and navigation laws), the Committee of Detail (which 
wrote a draft Constitution), the Committee on Postponed Matters (which fashioned the method for 
electing the President and expanded his powers), and, finally, the Committee of Style and 
Arrangement.20 
 
The composition of the Committee of Style and Arrangement was unlike the composition 
of any of the committees that went before.  
 
Historian John Vile has observed, “[T]he method of committee selection was formulated 
with a view of facilitating . . . compromise.”21  Prior committees had reflected a balance between 
advocates of nationalism and champions of states and between delegates from the various regions 
(deep South, the upper South, the mid-Atlantic states, and New England). For example, the 
Committee of Detail – the committee that had drafted the previous draft of the Constitution – had 
one strong nationalist (Pennsylvania’s Wilson), two moderate nationalists (Connecticut’s Oliver 
Ellsworth and Massachusetts’ Nathaniel Gorham), a champion of the states (South Carolina’s John 
Rutledge, who served as chair) and one delegate who ultimately refused to sign the Constitution 
(Virginia’s Edmund Randolph), and it had geographic balance, with one representative from the 
deep South, one from the upper South, one from the mid-Atlantic region, and two from New 
England. The draft produced by the Committee of Detail reflects this orientation – it limited the 
powers of the national government (substituting the Virginia plans open-ended grant of powers to 
the national government with an enumeration of limited powers) and a series of protections for 
slavery. 
 
In contrast, the Committee of Style was, to an astonishing degree, nationalist in orientation. 
For example, in historian Forrest McDonald’s analysis of the delegates, 14 of the 55 delegates are 
categorized as strong nationalists.22 Of this group, four were on the Committee of Style: 
Hamilton, King, Madison, and Morris. Wilson, the committee’s informal advisor, also numbers 
among the 14. Only William Johnson of Connecticut, the Committee’s chair, was not a strong 
nationalist, and he falls in the category of moderate nationalist.   
 
Even more important, not only was the Committee composed of nationalist voices, it was – 
                                               
20While scholarship has traditionally focused on the floor debates, recent articles by two scholars illumatingly 
examine the work of the Committee of Detail.  See William Ewald, The Committee of Detail, 28 Constitutional 
Commentary 197 (2012); John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, 102 Georgetown Law Journal (2014 
forthcoming).  Because of this focus on the importance of committee drafting, Professors Ewald’s and Mikhail’s 
project parallels this one in moving from floor debates in studying constitutional construction, although they examine 
the work of a different committee.  Similarly, while modern scholarship has focused on Farrand’s record of floor 
debates, Mary Sarah Bilder has recently defended the historical value of the official records (which Farrand 
disparaged).  See Mary Sarah Bilder, How Bad Were the Official Records of the Constitutional Convention?, 80 
George Washington L.Rev. 1220 (2012).  Thus, like this essay, Bilder is seeking to expand the focus of  modern 
scholarship on the drafting of the Constitution beyond Farrand’s record of the floor debates. 
 
21Vile at 151. 
22FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM:  THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 186-
187 (1985). McDonald 186-87. 
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very precisely – composed of the leading nationalist voices at the convention. Thus, historian 
William Gienapp has recently written of the federal constitutional convention: 
 
The current system [the Articles of Confederation] appeared to have reached a 
breaking point and many national leaders favored dramatic reform.  Accordingly, when 
the delegates assembled, Madison and his fellow nationalists – especially George 
Washington, Alexander Hamilton, James Wilson, Gouverneur Morris, and Rufus King – 
expanded the scope of the project.  Rather than merely revising the Articles – as some 
believed they had been instructed to do – they opted to construct a brand new 
constitutional order.23  
 
In light of Gienapp’s observation, the committee’s membership merits highlighting.  
Washington, as President of the Convention, did not serve on any committee and thus presumably 
was not considered for the committee.24  Remarkably, the other five leading nationalists at the 
convention – Morris, Madison, Hamilton, King, and Wilson – all participated in the work of the 
Committee of Style. Since committees at the convention generally had only one delegates from the 
same state,25 the convention could only have placed Morris or Wilson on the committee, since 
both were Pennsylvanians.  The delegates picked Morris, but Wilson nonetheless served as a de 
facto committee member. The only counterweight to the strong nationalists was a moderate 
nationalist (Johnson).   
 
At the convention, the committee members (with the exception of Johnson) had served as a 
united block fighting for a strong national government.  On the first day of the convention, 
Governor Randolph of Virginia introduced what has come to be known as the Virginia Plan, 
which envisioned a strong national government.  That proposal had been prepared in a week of 
informal meetings before the convention’s start that had involved, not only the members of the 
Virginia delegation (with Madison apparently playing the dominant role), but Wilson and 
Gouverneur Morris.26 After Randolph presented the plan on the floor of the convention, Morris 
successfully moved for the adoption of its core principles.  Morris, Wilson, and Madison then 
went on to become, in a literal sense, the dominant voices at the convention – with Morris 
speaking more than any delegate (173), Wilson the second most (168) and Madison the third most 
(161).27  In addition to speaking frequently, Morris proposed more resolutions than any other 
delegate (39) and had more adopted than any other delegate (22); Wilson was second in motions 
passed (18 – tied with Randolph) and third in terms of motions made (31, following Morris and 
Madison). Madison made more motions than anyone but Morris (35), although he had a lower 
pass rate than his fellow nationalist leaders (13, placing him after Gouverneur Morris, Wilson, and 
Randolph, and tied with Gerry.28  King spoke less often than the first three, but was consistently 
                                               
23Gienapp at 1200 to 1201. 
24Vile at 151. 
25The sole exception to this rule was the Committee on Original Apportionment of Congress, which had two 
members from Massachusetts, King and Gorham.  There is no evidence as to why Congress, in selecting that 
committee, departed from its otherwise uniform practice. 
26Ellis 
27Rossiter at 252. 
28Keith L. Dougherty and Jac Heckelman, A Pivotal Voter from a Pivotal State: Roger Sherman at the 
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an advocate of a strong national government.  Hamilton was, surprisingly, the least significant 
floor presence of the five, perhaps because he was stymied by the fact that the other two New 
York delegates were opposed to revision of the Articles of Confederation.  But his most 
significant speech – his six hour long oration on August 16 – was the most nationalist speech at 
the convention, more nationalist than even the Virginia Plan.  
 
Thus, as the final draft of the Constitution was being prepared, strong nationalists held the 
pen.   
 
There was also a tilt in the regional representation on the Committee, though this was less 
dramatic and less consequential than the shift on nationalism.  Where other committees had 
representation from New England, the mid-Atlantic region, the Upper South and the Deep South, 
the Committee had four members from the North (two from mid-Atlantic states – Morris and 
Hamilton – and three if one counts Wilson – and two from New England (King and Johnson), only 
one from the Upper South (Madison), and no one from the Deep South. In a convention that had 
fought bitterly over slavery, the drafting committee had the two members of the convention who 
had most strongly attacked the Constitution’s protections for slavery (Morris and King, with 
Morris being by far the strongest voice) and the chair of the New York anti-slavery society 
(Hamilton).  Nonetheless, the Committee membership promised substantial protection for 
slavery.  Madison had defended slavery during the debates, although he had recognized slavery’s 
immorality.  Not only did Connecticut’s Johnson own slaves, but he had, when a member of 
Congress, sold one of his slaves who disobeyed him to a South Carolina congressman, and, at the 
convention, endorsed South Carolina’s and Georgia’s proposal to allow the importation of slaves 
for twenty years.29 
 
The make-up of the committee reflected the selection process for committee members.  
Until recently, in all the academic studies of the convention, there has been little analysis of how 
the committees were selected.  The convention records simply note that committee election was 
“by ballot” but provide no other information on the method for choosing committee members.30  
In 2018, however, historian and legal scholar David Stewart provided the first detailed analysis of 
the subject.  He has convincingly argued that the convention had two different types of 
committee, and there were different selection processes for the different types.31  The committees 
of eleven handled specific issues that the convention as a whole could not resolve – such as the 
structure of the presidency or the balance between large states and small states. Each state had a 
representative, and each states’ delegation chose its own representative.32 In contrast, the two 
                                               
Constitutional Convention, 100 Am. Poli. Sci. Rev. 297, 301 (2006) (chart of motions made and passed at the 
convention). 
29King’s, the Revolution and Slavery Chapter Five (columbiaandslavery.columbia,edu) 
301 Farrand 12 (“ Committees shall be appointed by ballot; and the members who have the greatest number 
of ballots, altho’ not a majority of the votes present, shall be the Committee. . .” (resolution of the Rules Committee). 
31David O. Stewart, Who Picked the Committees at the Constitutional Convention?, Journal of the American 
Revolution (September 13, 2018).  For a competing view, see Rakove at 379 n.38 (each delegate voted as individuals 
for all committees).  Both the Rakove and the Stewart view lead to the same conclusion for the Committee of Style: 
delegates voted individually to select that  committee members. 
32Id. Rhode Island did not send delegates, and two of New York’s three delegates departed early (leaving 
Hamilton as the sole delegate and two delegates were necessary for a state to vote).  Thus, the committees of eleven 
 13 
drafting committees – the Committee of Detail and the Committee of Style –  each had five (as 
opposed to eleven) members, which meant that not all states were represented, and the members 
were chosen by the votes of individual delegates (rather than having a state’s delegate chosen by 
the state’s representatives). 
 
As the convention drew towards the close and the adoption of a Constitution of some type 
came to seem inevitable, delegates who were ambivalent or hostile to the Constitution began to 
head home. 13 of the 55 delegates were no longer attending in the last month, and the delegates 
who had returned home were primarily proponents of the view that the national government 
should be weak. Only one delegate who had been absent returned at the end of the proceedings, 
and that delegate was the strong nationalist, Alexander Hamilton. The percentage of voters who 
were nationalists was higher than at any previous point in the proceedings, so it is not surprising 
that the Committee of Style was dramatically more nationalist than any of the prior convention 
committees. 
 
Moreover, adoption of the Connecticut compromise – which gave each state a seat in the 
Senate – had decisively altered the perspective on nationalism of the small states of the mid-
Atlantic region: Maryland, Delaware, and New Jersey.  For most of the convention’s 
proceedings, representatives of these states had largely opposed a strong national government.  
But once these states secured a strong voice in the national government through the Connecticut 
Compromise, they embraced a government with expansive power.  And these states had a 
comparatively large number of delegates.  The convention allowed each state to send as many 
delegates as it chose (although delegations had to consist of at least three members).  Because 
Philadelphia was close to home for the mid-Atlantic states, which made service at the convention 
easier and transportation costs less, the mid-Atlantic states had the most sizeable delegations, other 
than Virginia’s. Thus, at the time the vote was taken for the Committee of Style, of the 42 
delegates, 15 came from the now-pro-nationalist small states of the mid-Atlantic.33  When these 
voters were combined with the seven Pennsylvania delegates – who had been pro-nationalist 
throughout the proceedings – a near majority of the voters when the Committee of Style was 
selected were from the nationalist, mid-Atlantic block.  When these mid-Atlantic votes were 
combined with pro-nationalist votes of delegates in the other regions, the fact that the final 
committee, the Committee of Style, was more nationalist than any that had gone before was 
inevitable. 
 
In addition to their shared constitutional philosophy, there were strong ties between the 
members of the committee.   
 
One of the great divisions at the convention was between delegates who spent the 
revolutionary period in state government and those who had served in the national government (in 
the military, the Continental Congress, the departments of the national government or some 
combination of these roles).  Not surprisingly, the former group tended to favor strong state 
governments, and the latter tended to favor a strong national government.34 All the members of 
                                               
represented each of the delegations that could vote. 
33Cite to Mikhail and show break-down of states. 
34Ellis 
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the committee fell into the latter category.  Indeed, they had all served together.  In the years 
immediately preceding the convention, Johnson, Madison, King, Wilson, and Hamilton were in 
the Continental Congress, and Morris (who had earlier served in the Congress) was Assistant 
Superintendent of the Treasury.  Thus, the group had working relationships that predated the 
convention. 
 
There were also strong personal connections between the nationalists on the committee.  
Hamilton and Madison had worked together closely as members of the Continental Congress. In 
the years before the constitutional convention, they were a familiar sight on the streets of 
Philadelphia, walking together and developing strategies to strengthen the national government.  
They had been two of the twelve delegates at the 1786 Annapolis Convention, which had issued 
the call for what was to become the federal constitutional convention, and their close working 
relationship was to continue during the ratification debates as they became the two principal 
authors of the Federalist. 
 
Hamilton and King were close friends.  Their ties were so close that, after ratification, 
Hamilton convinced King to move to New York, where King re-launched his political career and, 
because of Hamilton’s backing, was elected to the United States Senate.35 Hamilton was tied to 
Johnson through Columbia College.  Hamilton was a member of the Board, and Johnson the 
recently named President. 
 
Morris and King were close friends.  Morris and Wilson had an important professional 
relationship. They had been co-counsel on what was, other than the early judicial review cases, the 
most important legal matter in the revolutionary era: the argument before the Pennsylvania 
legislature’s against the proposed termination of the corporate charter of the Bank of the United 
States. 
 
The closest tie on the committee, however, was between Morris and Hamilton. There was a 
natural bond between the two, outgoing, witty New Yorkers, both lawyers, both educated at 
Columbia, with similar politics and a common interest in finance (although, as will be discussed, 
very different personal backgrounds). The two had first worked together during the Revolutionary 
War when Hamilton was aide de camp to Washington and Morris a member of the Continental 
Congress inspecting the military. Hamilton revered the slightly older Morris for his intelligence 
and presence, and the two established a strong friendship.  They worked closely together when 
Hamilton was in Congress and Morris the Assistant Superintendent of Finance.        
 
They both had deep ties to Washington, and the relationship of each with the future 
President has been compared to a father-son relationship, although father-son relationships of very 
different types. Hamilton’s career was in large part based on his work for Washington, during the 
war on the General’s staff, as Secretary of Treasury, and as Major General under Washington 
during the Whiskey Rebellion.  
                                               
35Chernow.  Hamilton support for King ultimately had disastrous consequences, since the angered rival 
candidate, Robert Livingstone, ultimately came to support the Jeffersonian Republicans, and that support was critical 
to the election of President Jefferson and Vice President Burr in 1800.     
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Morris’s relationship with Washington had begun at the start of the Revolutionary War, 
when the 25 year old Morris had been the New York Provincial Congress’ liaison with the 
General, and their relationship evolved into a strong social one.  Washington and Morris were in 
many ways polar opposites. Morris was irreverent, irrepressible, talkative, given to bombast, 
obviously brilliant, and frequently sarcastic.  Washington, dignified, self-controlled, insecure 
about his education, and careful in speech, enjoyed his company. During the course of the 
convention, Washington traveled around Philadelphia and to Valley Forge with Morris on two 
weekends when delegates were meeting, and, when the convention concluded, Washington 
departed Philadelphia with Robert Morris (with whom Washington had been staying) and 
Gouverneur Morris.   
 
The Washington-Morris relationship did, however, have limits.  In the most famous (if 
probably apochryphal) story involving Morris at the convention, Hamilton dared Morris to clap 
Washington on the back, offering to host a large dinner if Morris took the dare. Morris did (or so 
the story goes).  He reported to Hamilton that Washington had responded to the clap on the back 
with a withering stare.  “I would give anything in my power to undo that act,” Morris said, 
“Never has a dinner proved so costly.”   
 
As the Washington clap-on-the- back story suggests, there was a playful side to the Morris-
Hamilton relationship. There were, however, suspicions that the relationship between the two had 
a darker side.  As will be discussed subsequently, there is strong evidence that both encouraged 
the Newburgh Conspiracy, a planned mutiny of Revolutionary Army officers in 1783, in the hopes 
that the mutiny would force the Continental Congress to expand its authority. 
 
The close relationship between Morris and Hamilton was to be life-long.  After the 
convention concluded, Hamilton beseeched Morris to join with him and Madison and Jay in 
writing The Federalist.  (Morris, for reasons that are unclear but that are probably because he 
wanted to focus on business concerns, declined.) Later, Hamilton asked Morris join him in writing 
a history of the world.  (Again, Morris declined, and the project never came to fruition.)                
 
When Burr shot Hamilton and Hamilton lay dying, Eliza Hamilton called for Morris. “You 
are his dearest friend in the world,” she said. And when Hamilton was buried, Morris gave the 
eulogy at his widow’s request. “I fear,” his moving extemporaneous address at the funeral began, 
“that instead of the language of a public speaker, you will hear only the lamentations of a 
bewailing friend.”   
 
The four strong nationalists on the committee were also bound together by age.  They 
were in the same cohort – all in their thirties.  
 
And the Federalist Papers is one final indication of the ties among them.  When Morris 
turned down the offer to join Hamilton and Jay as Publius, Hamilton turned to Madison.  
Madison accepted, and suggested King as “a proper auxiliary.”36 While Hamilton held King in 
                                               
36See Madison’s Detached Memoranda, WMQ, 3d ser., III [1946], 564-65 (Elizabeth Fleet, ed.) 
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high regard, he advised Madison that King’s talents were not “altogether of the sort required for 
the task in view.”37  And so the four members of the Committee of Style (other than Johnson) 
were the two primary authors of the Federalists and two near-authors. 
 
Thus, when the convention selected Johnson, Hamilton, Madison, Morris and Hamilton for 
the Committee of Style and Arrangement, they placed a strongly nationalist group in charge of 
crafting the final document.  When Wilson was informally added to group, its nationalist cast 
was strengthened even further.  The men were linked not only by approach to the Constitution, 
but the strong nationalists had worked together during the proceedings.  And there were 
important personal ties between the committee members, particularly between Morris and 
Hamilton. 
 
When the Committee convened, Johnson, the chair, asked Morris (“with the ready consent 
of the others,” Madison observes) to prepare a draft Constitution.38 Given Morris’ strength and 
experience as a wordsmith and a legislative drafter and the respect in which he was held, he was 
an obvious selection even among a very talented group, but his reputation was complicated.  
 
b. Gouverneur Morris   
 
 There is a great irony to Morris’s place in history: he is both largely forgotten and 
seemingly unforgettable. Even apart from his role at the constitutional convention, he led a life 
crowded with incident and work of profound consequence.  
 
Morris was a descendant of one of the most politically prominent and wealthiest families 
in the colony of New York. His grandfather, Lewis Morris, had served as Governor of New 
Jersey, and was, to quote the eminent historian Bernard Bailyn, “the least egalitarian of men,”39 a 
description that could also be applied to Gouverneur. Lewis Morris, Jr., Gouverneur’s father, 
served for decades as a British Vice Admiralty Judge and owned Morrisania, 1920 acres of what is 
now the South Bronx, one of the largest manors in the New York City region. Sarah Morris, 
Gouverneur’s mother, was Lewis, Jr.’s second wife and also came from a prominent and wealthy 
family.  The couple had five children.  Gouverneur was the last child and first boy. Gouverneur 
was his mother’s maiden name.   
 
Lewis’s father died when Gouverneur was ten. He had already left home, having been 
enrolled at Benjamin Franklin’s Academy in Philadelphia. He proved a prodigy. At 12, he began 
his studies at Columbia College, the youngest in his class by three years. He was a success in his 
studies, graduating second in his class (although, admittedly, there only seven graduates) and 
delivered the commencement address, in which he presciently spoke of “the glorious title of free 
born American[s].” 40He read law and was admitted to the bar at 19. Despite his youth, he rapidly 
established himself as a successful lawyer commanding high fees, while also becoming a real 
estate speculator.  
                                               
37Id. 
383 Farrand 499. 
39Bernard Bailyn, Origins of American Politics, 
40Kiershce at 30. 
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         As the Revolution approached, Morris became involved in politics. He initially 
supported seeking accommodation with the Crown, but by 1775 Morris had become a powerful 
voice in favor of Revolution. He also enlisted in the New York militia, serving as a Lieutenant 
Colonel.41  In May 1776, as a 24 year-old member of New York’s Provincial Congress, he 
delivered a memorable three hour calling for independence and introduced a motion for the 
election of a new body that would establish a new government for New York State. A week later, 
the Provincial Congress adopted his motion.42 
 
In aligning himself with the Patriot cause, Morris decisively broke with most of his family. 
His elder step-brother Staats Long Morris served as a British General, married a Duchess, and 
eventually became a member of Parliament.43  Even more notably, his mother Sarah Morris was 
an outspoken Tory, never abandoned her support of the crown, and remained on her estate in what 
was, for most of the war, Loyalist controlled New York.44 Morris never saw his mother after the 
war began, and, with the exception of one letter that he wrote when his sister died, he severed all 
ties with her until her death in 1783.45 
  
In 1777, at the age of 24, Morris was one of the three principal drafters of the New York 
State Constitution (along with John Jay (another close friend) and Robert Livingston). That year, 
he was elected as one of New York’s representatives to the Continental Congress, where he signed 
the Articles of Confederation.46 He served one term in Congress, but was not re-elected.  Most 
historians think he was not reelected because he was not supportive of New York’s interests in its 
territorial disputes with Vermont.  From 1781 through 1784, he was the nation’s Assistant 
Superintendent of Finance, serving under his close friend and eventual business partner Robert 
Morris, the Secretary of Finance (and no relation). The two Morrises administered the finances of 
the government and “carried out daring, outrageous strategies to keep the country afloat to the end 
of the war,” ensuring the funding that the army needed despite the national government’s lack of 
taxing authority and the states refusal to honor Congress’s request for support.47  From 1784 to 
1787, with the conclusion of the war, he focused on his business activities, which were principally 
with Robert Morris.    
 
Gouverneur Morris was surprised at the Pennsylvania legislature’s decision to name him to 
its delegation at the constitutional convention.  He was a New Yorker, so he was not an obvious 
candidate for selection to represent Pennsylvania.  Moreover, he had announced that he did not 
want to be named to the Pennsylvania delegation and was in Trenton on business when the 
legislature voted.  It appears that the politically powerful Robert Morris convinced the legislature 
to add Gouverneur to its delegation, although it was a close thing. Of the seven delegates named, 
                                               
41Kiersche at xi. 
42Kiersche at 43, 52. 
 
43Adams 143. 
44See Kiersche at 38 for a complete listing of the family’s allegiances. 
45Kiersche. 
46Kiersche at 107. 
47Adams x-xi. 
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Gouverneur received the fewest votes.  (James Wilson received the next fewest votes, so two of 
the three most prominent delegates at the convention were narrowly elected).   
 
Morris was physically unforgettable and had a vivid personality.  Like Washington, he 
stood almost 6 foot 4, and the two towered over most of their fellow delegates.  (Indeed, the two 
men were of such similar size and build that the sculptor Houdin used Morris as his model when 
he created the statues of Washington that now stand outside Independence Hall and the state 
capitol in Richmond.) By comparison, Madison was 5 feet 4 inches, and Alexander Hamilton was 
5 feet 7 inches. Morris had a peg leg, and his right arm had been badly scalded in a childhood 
accident.  He was irreverent48 and witty.49 He was gregarious and had a gift for friendship.  He 
was also arrogant with a tendency to be bombastic, and, to an extent unique at the convention, he 
spoke his mind. He seems never to have stopped talking. The fact that he was the most frequent 
speaker at the convention is particularly remarkable because he left Philadelphia for three weeks in 
the midst of the debates to attend to business matters (whereas Wilson and Madison, the second 
and third most frequent speakers, attended every session.) His nickname in New York political 
circles captured his combination of size, talkativeness, buoyancy and lack of self-restraint: he was 
the “Tall Boy.” He had many friends, and he had many critics.    
 
His great gifts were evident.  In his private character sketches of his fellow delegates, 
Georgia’s William Pierce wrote: 
 
Mr. Gouverneur Morris is one of those Genius’s in whom every species of talents combine 
to render him conspicuous and flourishing in public debate: He winds through all the 
mazes of rhetoric, and throws around him such a glare that he charms, captivates, and leads 
away the senses of all who hear him.50 
 
Like Pierce, Madison and Hamilton both chose the same word to describe Morris: they 
called him a “genius.”  Historians have repeatedly reached the same conclusion.  Theodore 
Roosevelt, in an early biography of Morris, wrote, “There has never been an American statesmen 
of keener intellect or more brilliant genius,” adding that Morris had the capacity to “have stood 
among the two or three very foremost” statesmen in the history of the United States.51 Max 
Farrand, the great historian of the conventional convention, described Morris as “probably the 
most brilliant member of the Pennsylvania delegation and of the convention as well.” 52Morris 
was, William Gienapp has recently observed, “dazzlingly talented.”53   
 
Morris had a gift with words and a background in drafting that made him the logical choice 
to serve as the committee’s drafter. Unlike any of the other committee members, he had 
                                               
483 Farrand (slapping Washington). 
49See Rossiter at 248-49 (describing convention speeches).  His fellow delegate William Pierce wrote, “No 
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503 Farrand 92. 
51Roosevelt at 3284. 
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experience in writing a constitution (having served as one of the principal drafters of the New 
York Constitution of 1777) and that experience alone would have made him the obvious candidate 
to prepare the draft.  Even apart from that experience, however, he had a strong background as a 
drafter of legal documents.  During his career in the New York legislature, Continental Congress, 
and assistant superintendent of finance, he had been called upon to write literally hundreds of 
reports and statutes, including such major documents as Congress’s 1778 response rejecting Lord 
North commissioner’s entreaty to begin peace negotiations.54  Indeed, Morris’s most influential 
contribution to the English language is arguably not “We the People of the United States.” As 
assistant superintendent of finance, in a report on the national monetary system, he invented the 
word “cent” – in connection with his plan that the nation’s monetary system be based on the 
decimal system – and argued that the Spanish term “dollar” should be adopted as the basic unit of 
currency.55  At the convention, he had already been enlisted to draft the Brearley Committee 
report, which introduced the electoral college. 
 
Equally relevant to his selection as drafter, he was eloquent.  His speeches at the 
convention read differently than those of his fellow delegates.  Madison and Wilson are, for 
example, typically dry and careful, and they appealed to reason.  Not surprisingly, their favorite 
readings were works of history, philosophy, and law. In contrast, Morris, to again quote fellow 
delegate Pierce, “winds through all the mazes of rhetoric, and throws around him such a glare that 
he charms, captivates, and leads away the senses of all who hear him.”56  He loved literature and 
wrote poetry throughout his life, and his speeches reflect great literary gifts.  He could be 
funny,57 and he could be threatening.58 His speech rebuking delegates who thought of themselves 
as representatives of states and demanding that they think first of the nation - “I am an American,” 
he proclaimed – and his powerful denunciation of slavery and the three-fifth clause are in my 
opinion the strongest speeches at the convention.  The fact that Eliza Hamilton asked him to 
deliver Hamilton’s eulogy at Trinity Church and that Martha Washington asked him to deliver the 
eulogy for Washington in the Senate reflected, not just the closeness of his ties to Hamilton and 
Washington, but acknowledgement of his gifts as an orator. Most strikingly, Hamilton’s request 
that he join in the writing of The Federalist reflects recognition of his power with words.59  His 
decision to not join in the effort was a loss. As biographer Richard Brookhiser has observed,  
“[T]he Federalist Papers [Hamilton, Madison, and Jay] wrote are clear, earnest, and intelligent, 
often ringing, but they made their way without Morris’s sparkle.”60 
 
People in the revolutionary era and early republic repeatedly turned to Morris when words 
mattered. Equally significant, for Morris words mattered more than they did for most, and perhaps 
all, of his fellow delegates.  
 
                                               
54Kiersch at ——. 
55Roosevelt at 107. 
563 Farrand 92. 
57Vice President speech and other speech cited by Rossiter. 
58Early speech suggesting that we must part if small states insist on equal representation. 
593 Farrand 421 (“I was warmly pressed by Hamilton to assist in writing the Federalist, which I declined.”) 
60Brookhiser 92. 
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As Professor Gienapp has written, “Prior to 1787, American judges and lawyers tended to 
interpret constitutions according to their spirit, structure, and purpose.  Rarely did they consider a 
constitution’s language to be constitutive of its meaning or its defining feature.”61 This approach 
reflected colonial heritage.  The British constitutional system lacked a written constitution, and 
the words of documents of constitutional stature, like the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right of 
1628, and the Declaration of Rights of 1689, as well as the words of colonial charters, were only 
one source of constitutional meaning. The various bills of rights “possessed authority . . . because 
they articulated fundamental liberties or had been reinforced by custom,”62 Professor Gienapp has 
observed.  “The written compacts . . . blended seamlessly into a complex, dynamic whole defined 
as much by custom, history, and constitutional practice.”63         
 
Even as Americans in the revolutionary era adopted state constitutions, the older approach 
to constitutional understanding, in which text did not fully determine legal meaning and words 
could be trumped by other concerns, continued to shape interpretation. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, there was a substantial body of judicial review caselaw in the revolutionary era and early 
republic prior to Marbury v. Madison, 64 - more than thirty cases in which courts invalidated 
statutes – and it is striking how little attention courts in these cases paid to precise constitutional 
wording.65 An illustrative example is Commonwealth v. Caton,66 the 1782 Virginia case which 
was the first judicial review decision in the state, and a case in which a host of critical figures 
(including Madison, Randolph, and, probably, Marshall, who according to legend was in the 
courtroom when the decision was announced) .  
 
The case involved three prisoners who had been granted a pardon by the lower house of the 
state legislature. While the Virginia Treason Act required that both houses had to approve a 
pardon, the state constitution seemed to make a pardon by one house sufficient.  The defense 
maintained that “the act of the assembly was contrary to the plain declaration of the constitution; 
and therefore void.”67 Edmund Randolph, then the state attorney general, countered that in 
interpreting the constitution, “the liberality necessary to capture its spirit, must be adopted.”  The 
influential Chief Justice Pendleton concurred. In ruling against the prisoners, he proclaimed that 
the case “should be decided according to the spirit, and not by the words of the constitution.” 
Consistent with Pendleton’s approach, both early decisions upholding statutes and those striking 
them down are strikingly atextual.  In particular, courts in a majority of the early judicial review 
decisions struck down statutes that they deemed inconsistent with the right to a jury trial or 
judicial independence even though there was no apparent inconsistency between the statutes and 
the constitutional text.68 
 
                                               
61Gienapp at 1106. 
62Gienapp at 2131. 
63Gienapp at 455. 
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65Cite to dissertation, Stanford, Against Textualism. 
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Consistent with this approach, convention delegates focused on structure and for the most 
part devoted surprisingly little attention to precise wording. The central debates at the convention 
– the debates about state representation in Congress and about the 3/5th clause - were about 
structure.  In contrast, much of the text that subsequently became of central importance to 
constitutional law was ambiguous even to the drafters.  The drafting history of the direct taxes 
clause, the declare war clause, and the commerce clause – perhaps the three most contested 
clauses in the Constitution – is illustrative.  Immediately after the direct taxes clause was 
adopted, Rufus King asked his fellow delegates, “What is a direct tax?” Madison’s notes indicate 
that no one responded, and the delegates simply moved onto the next topic.  When the declare 
war clause was adopted, the drafters were primarily motivated by their unhappiness with the 
Committee of Detail’s proposal that Congress have the power to “make war.”  There was little 
discussion about what “declare war” meant, and no discussion of the fact that the term “declare 
war” had a meaning in international law – formalizing a state of hostility between nations in ways 
that provided protections to the nation’s citizens – that was very different from what the drafters 
apparently wanted to do, which was to give Congress the power to decide to initiate conflict.  
Towards the end of the relatively short debate about the commerce clause, Madison observed that 
the word “commerce” was “vague.”                
 
Textual imprecision was, in part, the product of a rapid drafting process, as well as a desire 
to paper over disagreement in order to achieve support for the Constitution.  But, even more 
fundamentally, it reflected the fact that, as Gienapp has written, “delegates largely refused to 
imagine the writing of a constitution through a textual prism.  For most, constitutionalism still 
meant balancing powers and interests – building a functioning system of constituent political 
relationships, not policing linguistic barriers.”69   
 
Some delegates went farther than not focusing on text.  To quote Gienapp again, they 
“openly disparaged the idea of reducing constitutions to text.”70  Madison was the leading 
advocate of this view, stating that, [i]f a Constitutional discrimination of the departments on paper 
were a sufficient security to each [against] encroachments of the others . . .  all further provisions 
would be superfluous.”71 Madison’s concern was not simply with the efficacy of text to control 
action, but with its determinacy.  As he was to write in Federalist 37, “When the Almighty 
himself condescends to address mankind in their own language, his meaning, luminous as it must 
be, is rendered dim and doubtful, by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated.”  
 
Madison’s concerns about language were a major reason for his championing 
(unsuccessfully) the proposal that Congress could veto state legislation “in all cases 
whatsoever.”72 Madison firmly believed that such an open-ended power was necessary because no 
written constitutional limits could check state abuses.  He wrote Jefferson that, regardless of how 
“ample the federal powers may be made, or however Clearly their boundaries may be delineated 
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71Gienapp at 1295. 
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on paper . . . they will be easily and continually baffled.”73 Madison’s failure to secure this 
congressional veto over state legislations, a proposal for which he and Wilson had repeatedly 
fought, was the major reason why, at the end of the convention, he was deeply disappointed with 
the final document. 
 
Morris was at the opposite end of the spectrum in terms of his approach to text.  He 
treated wording as profoundly significant.  Where Madison and Wilson fought for a 
congressional veto, he opposed it – one of the few subjects involving national power in which he 
disagreed with his fellow nationalists. Morris argued that the proposal was not only anathema to 
states, but it was unnecessary.  He asserted that judicial review was “sufficient” to limit state 
authority. Unlike Madison and Wilson, he thought textual limits were adequate to check states. 
 
Throughout the convention (even apart from his role as Committee of Style drafter), 
Morris was deeply attentive to word choice and to the ways in which text would be construed, and 
his consistent attention to wording and construction was unmatched among the delegates.  For 
example, in framing the scope of congressional power, he proposed (unsuccessfully) that Congress 
have the “police” power, the only delegate to use this broad term in connection with congressional 
power.  He again used a term that no one else used when, in connection with his work on the 
Committee of Style, he wrote the letter transmitting the Constitution to the Continental Congress – 
a letter which Professor Daniel Farber has referred to as the Constitution’s “cover letter.” The 
letter asserts that the Constitution is a “consolidation” of power – a word that was anathema to 
Anti-Federalists and that had, literally, not been uttered at the convention.  Morris inserted the 
word in the Constitution’s “cover letter” in a way that provided support for a nationalist 
construction of the Constitution. 
 
His attentiveness to future construction is indicated as well by his understanding of the 
general welfare clause, as indicated by delegate James McHenry’s notes.  In his notes for 
September 4, McHenry observes:  “Upon looking over the constitution it does not appear that the 
national legislature can erect light houses or clean out or preserve the  navigation of harbours … 
This to be further considered. A motion to be made on the light house etc, to-morrow." 
While McHenry did not make that motion, in his notes for September 6 he wrote: "Spoke 
to Gov Morris Fitzimmons and Mr Goram to insert a power in the confederation enabling the 
legislature to erect piers for protection of shipping in winter and to preserve the navigation of 
harbors - Mr Gohram [sic] against. The other two gentlemen for it ...." McHenry's notes continue: 
"Mr Gov: thinks it may be done under the words of the I clause I sect 7 art. amended - and provide 
for the common defence and general welfare."  McHenry was aghast: "If this comprehends such 
a power, it goes to authorise the legisl. to grant exclusive privileges to trading companies etc." 
 
A particularly powerful example of Morris’s attentiveness to text and how it would be 
construed (as well as his capacity for deception) is the new states clause.  As will be discussed 
later, Morris wanted to limit the number of new states and their political power, a position that no 
other delegate appears to have shared, and he covertly secured constitutional language to advance 
this end.   
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Towards the end of the convention, as the delegates worked through the Committee of 
Detail’s drafted and turned to its provision on new states, Morris rose to propose an alternate 
provision.  Madison’s notes report:   
 
Mr Govr Morris moved to postpone this [discussion of the new states provision] in order to 
take up the following. "The Legislature shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules 
and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the U. States; and nothing in 
this constitution contained, shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims either of the U-- S-- or 
of any particular State."74 
 
There was no substantive discussion of the meaning of the clause, except that Maryland’s 
Luther Martin proposed the addition of a provision that any claims could be litigated in the 
Supreme Court, which Morris responded was “unnecessary, as all suits to which the U.S. – are 
parties – are already to be decided by the supreme Court of the U – States.”75 Without further 
debate, Morris’s addition of this clause on territorial governance was adopted, with Maryland 
alone dissenting.76 
  
While the clause was thus adopted without discussion of its import, Morris saw it as 
profoundly consequential.  Writing a letter to Henry Livingston 1803, at the time of the 
Louisiana Purchase, he boasted that he had crafted the territories clause in such a way that it 
barred newly acquired territories from becoming states, but that he had hidden the clause’s 
meaning so that his fellow framers would fail to realize what the clause meant. Livingston has 
asked Morris “whether the. Congress can admit, as a new State, territory, which did not belong to 
the United States when the Constitution was made.”77  Morris answered, “In my opinion they 
cannot.”78  
 
Morris took credit for having proposed the relevant language: “I always thought that, when 
we should acquire Canada and Louisiana it would be proper to govern them as provinces, and 
allow them no voice in our councils. In wording the third section of the fourth article [of the 
Constitution], I went as far as circumstances would permit to establish the exclusion. Candor 
obliges me to add my belief, that, had it been more pointedly expressed, a strong opposition would 
have been made.”79 
 
Morris was playing with extraordinary skill and foresight a high stakes interpretive game 
that his fellow delegates were largely unaware was afoot.  Where they were often casual in 
framing text, he approached the task with seriousness and attention to the goals he sought to 
advance. 
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So, when Johnson selected Morris, he picked a drafter of substantial political experience, a 
leading voice at the convention, someone whose great intelligence commanded respected, and 
someone who was both skilled with words and who took words seriously. 
 
At the same time, he picked someone whose integrity was widely questioned. “The world 
in general allows greater credit for his abilities than his integrity,” Hamilton’s good friend John 
Laurens wrote in a 1779 letter.80  Delegate William Pierce said he is “fickle and inconstant.”81  
According to a confidential report prepared by the French embassy, he was “without morals and, if 
one believes his enemies, without principles. . . .”82  Morris’s deceptive crafting of the new states 
clauses suggests such challenges to his integrity were warranted. His reputation as lacking 
integrity had three different grounds.   
 
One was his personal life.  He was, to quote one recent historian, “a consummate 
philanderer.”83 and one of his leading biographers gave his book about Morris the subtitle: “The 
Rake who Wrote the Constitution.”84  His biographers disagree about whether he had a peg leg 
because his leg had been jumping out of a window to evade a husband or whether it was the 
product of a carriage accident, but the prevalence of the former story reflects his reputation.  
Fellow delegates and other political leaders were well aware of his numerous affairs. Even his 
allies were troubled by his promiscuity.85  Others considered him immoral.  John Adams and 
Samuel Adams “despised him”86 Connecticut delegate Roger Sherman wrote a friend, “[W]ith 
regard to moral character I consider him [Morris] an irreligious and profane man. . . .  I am 
against such characters.”87 
 
Second, there was widespread belief that he and Robert Morris had used their posts as 
Assistant Superintendent of Finance and Superintendent of Finance to enrich themselves 
improperly.  Modern scholarship indicates that these charges were unwarranted and that Robert 
Morris, in fact, spent a substantial amount of his personal funds in support of the war efforts.  
Nonetheless, the suspicions about both Morrises were widespread. 
 
Third, and most consequentially, it was widely believed that, acting with the goal of 
forcing Congress to assert greater authority over the states, in 1783, he had secretly encouraged 
federal army officers to mutiny.   
 
The planned mutiny is known as the Newburgh Conspiracy. As the war drew to a close, 
army officers were generally owed years of salary, and there was widespread anger.  A group of 
officers devised a plan to assemble troops, march on the Continental Congress in Philadelphia, and 
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demand Congress provide them the compensation they were owed.  Washington learned of the 
plot.  He dramatically and unexpectedly appeared at a meeting of his officers where they were 
discussing the potential mutiny. Invoking his own personal sacrifices in the cause of the 
Revolution, he convinced them to abandon the plot.88 
 
It is, at the very least, clear from surviving correspondence that, regardless of whether or 
not Gouverneur Morris was actively conspiring with the mutineers, he was aware of the possibility 
of a mutiny and welcomed it, believing a mutiny could be used to push a weak Congress to expand 
its powers. In a coded letter, he wrote John Jay: “The army have Swords in their hands. . . . I am 
glad to see Things in their present Train.  Depend on it good will arise from the Situation to 
which we are hastening.”89  
 
Beyond such enthusiasm, there is strong circumstantial evidence from his correspondence 
that Gouverneur Morris not only welcomed the mutiny but that he worked with its leaders to plan 
it.  While there is disagreement among scholars, the weight of historical authority is that 
Gouverneur was an active participant and that he drafted the letter secretly circulated among 
officers urging them to join the mutiny. There is, in addition, strong evidence that Hamilton was 
assisting the mutineers, as well.90 
 
Washington believed that Morris was central to the mutiny.  Morris, Washington wrote, 
was “at the bottom of this.”91  Washington’s suspicions led to a break between the two men.  
Washington did not communicate with Morris for two years, although (for reasons that are 
unknown) they had re-established their ties before the constitutional convention. 
 
Thus, Morris brought to his work as drafter not only great gifts, but a reputation that gives 
credibility to Gallatin’s charge and that warrants a close examination of his work as drafter. 
 
c. Morris’s draft and the work of the Committee 
 
We have limited historical information about the committee’s deliberations. Unlike with 
the Committee of Detail, the Committee of Style’s drafts were not preserved, and, as Jared Sparks, 
Morris’s first biographer wrote, Morris left “hardly a scrap of paper on the subject of the 
constitution.”92 We do know, however, from letters written by Morris and Madison that Morris 
was the Committee’s drafter. Madison described Morris’s work as stylistic, rather than 
substantive, and Morris asserted that he had only tried to change the Constitution’s meaning in one 
area.  Each, however, had reasons to state that Morris had not changed the meaning of the text. 
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Morris addressed the work of the Committee in a December 22nd, 1814 letter to Timothy 
Pickering.  He began with a slap at Madison and Madison’s notes (which were not to be 
published until after Madison’s death):     
 
While I sat in the Convention, my mind was too much occupied by the interests of our 
country to keep notes of what we had done. Some gentlemen, I was told, passed their evenings in 
transcribing speeches from shorthand minutes of the day. They can speak positively on matters, of 
which I have little recollection. My faculties were on the stretch to further our business, remove 
impediments, obviate objections, and conciliate jarring opinions.93 
 
Thus, Morris is implicitly contrasting his active engagement in the work of the convention 
with Madison’s, suggesting the latter was more a passive transcriber than an engaged participant. 
 
Morris next dismissed the relevance of drafting history for constitutional interpretation and 
championed, instead, a textualist approach: “[W]hat can a history of the Constitution avail towards 
interpreting its provisions. This must be done by comparing the plain import of the words, with the 
general tenor and object of the instrument.”94 Such an approach is not surprising for someone 
who, this article shows, selected words to advance his own constitutional goals, rather than the 
views of the delegates as a whole.  He is elevating text, rather than drafting history, because the 
text he drafted departed from framers’ intent. 
 
Morris then proclaimed that he had written the Constitution and that he had been (largely) 
an honest scrivener: 
 
That instrument [the Constitution] was written by the fingers, which write this letter. 
Having rejected redundant and equivocal terms, I believed it to be as clear as our language would 
permit; excepting, nevertheless, a part of what relates to the judiciary. On that subject, conflicting 
opinions had been maintained with so much professional astuteness, that it became necessary to 
select phrases, which expressing my own notions would not alarm others, nor shock their selflove, 
and to the best of my recollection, this was the only part which passed without cavil. 
 
Madison described Morris’s role on the Committee of Style in an April 18, 1831 letter to 
Jared Sparks. Sparks, who was writing Morris’s biography, had written to Madison to ask about 
what role Morris had played at the convention.  Madison responded: 
 
The finish given to the style and arrangement of the Constitution, fairly belongs to the pen 
of Mr. Morris; the task having, probably, been handed over to him by the Chairman of the 
Committee, himself a highly respectable member, and with the ready concurrence of the others. A 
better choice could not have been made, as the performance of the task proved. It is true that the 
state of the materials, consisting of a Reported draft in detail, and subsequent resolutions 
accurately penned, and falling easily into their proper places, was a good preparation for the 
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symmetry and phraseology of the Instrument: but there was sufficient room for the talents and 
taste stamped by the author on the face of it. The alterations made by the Committee are not 
recollected. They were not such as to impair the merit of the Composition. Those, verbal & others, 
made in the Convention, may be gathered from the Journal, and will be found also to leave that 
merit altogether unimpaired.95 
 
Madison is here both giving Morris credit for the drafting and treating his contributions as 
merely stylistic.  He underscored the word “finish.” At the end of the letter, Madison portrayed 
Morris as someone willing to cede to the sentiment of the majority when he lost a debate: 
 
It is but due to Mr. M. to remark that to the brilliancy & fertility of his genius, he added 
what is too rare, a candid surrender of his opinions when the lights of discussion satisfied him that 
they had been too hastily formed, and a readiness to aid in making the best of measures in which 
he had been overruled.96 
 
This comment accords with the idea that Morris was an honest scrivener bowing to the 
decisions of the whole.  Morris was “read[y] to aid in making the best of measures in which he 
had been overruled.” 
 
A third primary source bearing on authorship comes from the diary of Ezra Stiles, the 
President of Yale College.  Stiles reported that he had been visited by Connecticut delegate 
Abraham Baldwin, shortly after the convention had concluded.  Baldwin gave Stiles a summary 
of the convention’s proceedings and concluded with a discussion of the work of the Committee of 
Style.  Stiles records Baldwin as telling him: 
 
Finally a Committee of 5 viz, Mess. Dr Johnson, Governeur Morris. Wilson, —— These 
reduced it to the form in which it was published. Messrs Morris & Wilson had the chief hand in 
the last Arrangt & Composition. This was completed in September.97 
 
Stiles’ diary is the historical evidence of Wilson’s participation, even though Wilson was 
not a member of the committee.  It also indicates that delegates beyond the committee were 
aware of Morris’ leadership role.  
 
Stiles’ account is the only one that equates Wilson’s role with Morris’s.  It is, however, 
hearsay from a delegate who was not on the committee (Baldwin) (and who erred in listing the 
committee membership). Morris and Madison are both clear that Morris was the drafter.  
(Gallatin’s account, to be discussed later in this section,98 also implicitly identifies Morris as the 
drafter.)  
 
Both Madison and Morris minimized Morris’s substantive contributions.  Madison 
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declared  Morris gave the document its “finish,” and he underlined the term in the letter he wrote 
about the Committee’s work.  Morris suggested that the only time he had shifted the meaning of 
the Constitution was with respect to the judiciary. (His comment about the judiciary is similar in 
nature to his comment about the new states clause. In both cases, he writes of revising text to 
change meaning, but not doing so so clearly as to be caught.)   
 
Nonetheless, as will be discussed, Morris made a series of subtle textual changes of great 
import. So, why did Madison and Morris both minimize the Committee’s work? 
 
They both had good reasons for doing so. 
 
Breaking with his constitutional jurisprudence at the time of the convention, by the time 
Madison wrote his letter about the Committee (in 1831), he had adopted a constitutional vision 
that involved a national government of limited powers and a constrained role for the executive and 
the judiciary.  Indeed, Madison largely came to embrace that vision in the 1790s.  Morris’s 
changes were inconsistent with the vision that Madison’s championed in the 1790s and for the 
remainder of his career: Morris’s text provided support for a broad role for the national 
government and the power of the President and the federal courts and Madison’s ultimate 
constitutional vision was at odds with Morris’s at each point.  As will be seen, in critical fights in 
the 1790s, Madison battled Hamilton and other Federalists about how to read the Constitution, and 
he had advanced readings of the text that treated Morris’s text as having no legal consequence. 
Thus, his assertion that Morris had only given the Constitution its “finish” was consistent with the 
way he had read that text.  Equally significant, he was in a real sense boxed in.  If Morris had 
written text that altered the Constitution’s meaning, Madison, as a committee member, was either 
complicit in the change or he had failed to pay attention with potentially dire consequences.  
Both as a champion of a particular constitutional vision and as a politician protecting his 
reputation and legacy, Madison had to treat Morris’s changes as merely stylistic.   
   
Morris also had reason to minimize his contributions.  If he had acknowledged that he 
had intentionally crafted text to change the constitution’s meaning, that assertion would have 
undermined the legitimacy of his work.  It would have provided support for those who took a 
competing view of the constitution, indicating their view was the consensus view of the delegates 
and that Morris’s changes were illegitimate.  The one area in which he acknowledged seeking to 
alter the constitution’s meaning was with respect to the judicial role, but this was also the one area 
in which he had a record to contend with.  When he was a Senator, he argued in 1802 that the 
Preamble was a constitutional bar to the Jeffersonian attempt to eliminate federal courts of 
appeals.  The Committee of Style’s Preamble was dramatically different than the Preamble that 
had been drafted by the Committee of Style, and Morris, in invoking the Preamble as supporting a 
strong federal judiciary, had clearly relied on language he had drafted.  Similarly, in that speech, 
he relied on language from the judicial powers clause that he had also drafted.  Thus, writing in 
1814, Morris would have found it hard to deny that language he had crafted had provided support 
for a strong federal judicial role.  But there was no other area in which he had relied on his text to 
defend a view of the constitution, and he was thus free to claim that, except with respect to the 
judicial role, his drafting had only had stylistic effect. 
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There is no direct evidence of the committee’s deliberations. The one subject on which, 
according to a number of historians, Morris’s fellow committee members had prevailed on Morris 
is with respect to the contract clause.  In earlier debates at the convention, the contract clause had 
been voted down, and Morris had been the leading voice in opposition.  King, in contrast, had 
proposed the inclusion of the clause, and Hamilton had endorsed it. Thus, historians Clinton 
Rossiter and Forrest McDonald have suggested that King or Hamilton must have prevailed on 
Morris and led him to resurrect the previously rejected clause.  But, as will be discussed, 
Morris’s early opposition to the contract clause had been based on his objection to King’s 
formulation, not to the idea of a contract clause per se, and the contract clause as contained in the 
Committee of Style draft accorded with Morris’s constitutional views about the importance of 
protecting private property and his earlier role on behalf of the Bank of the United States. Thus, 
the contract clause in the committee’s draft reflected Morris’s constitutional vision.  Equally 
important, the contract clause is unlike any of the other changes made by the Committee: while 
every other change is not obviously legally consequential, the addition of the contract clause is.  
It is unlikely the delegates would have missed this addition when reviewing the Committee of 
Style draft.  Thus, there is good reason to think there was an agreement among delegates not 
reflected in Madison’s notes to add the contract clause to the Constitution.  In other words, 
contrary to the prevailing view among historians, it is unlikely that the contract clause is in the 
Constitution because his fellow committee members convinced Morris to insert the clause. 
 
There is no evidence of Morris having discussed with any of his fellow committee 
members the substantive import of his textual changes. Madison clearly did not engage in such 
discussions, or at least did not admit to have been part of them.  Moreover, as will be discussed, 
with respect to the one substantive change in the draft document that, according to Madison’s 
notes, the convention as a whole discussed, Madison flagged Morris’s change as a printing error 
and Wilson opposed the change, which reinforces the view that Madison, and perhaps Wilson, was 
not aware of the substantive changes effected by the new draft.  At the same time, in the years 
after the convention, Wilson and, more frequently, Hamilton made constitutional arguments that 
drew on Morris’s texts. Wilson’s uses of the text were fairly straightforward, and he may simply 
have been reading the text without any knowledge of Morris’s goals.  Hamilton’s use of the text 
were less obvious.  Given his closeness to Morris, Hamilton’s uses may reflect an awareness of 
what Morris was doing.  Moreover, the evidence that both were implicated in the Newburgh 
conspiracy suggests that the two were comfortable engaging in manipulation in order to advance 
goals of critical importance to them. 
 
In any event, the Committee’s work was rapid.  The Committee was selected on 
September 8. On September 12, it delivered its report to the convention.   
 
d.  The Convention’s Consideration of the Committee of Style’s draft 
 
The convention spent three days reviewing the Committee’s draft and discussing other 
matters (primarily the possibility of a Bill of Rights) before voting in favor of the Constitution on 
September 15.  The weary delegates were quickly going through the document in order to bring 
the proceedings to a close, and, for the most part, Morris’s changes were not scrutinized.  There 
was, however, focus on two clauses that had been revised by Morris: the delegates debated the 
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offences against the law of nations clause; there was also, apparently, scrutiny of the general 
welfare clause, although this is not reflected in Madison’s notes.  In both cases, Morris’s changes 
were subtle: one punctuation mark was substituted for another in the general welfare clause; 
through editing, a new verb became applicable to the offences against the law of nations clause. 
Despite their subtlety, these changes had powerful legal significance: the punctuation change 
(which the convention reversed in favor of the earlier version) would arguably have converted a 
limited taxing power into a broad grant of power to the federal government; the verb change 
(which was left in place by a narrow vote) gave Congress the power to criminalize acts against the 
law of nations. In each case, Morris’s language advanced his vision of the appropriate scope of 
powers of the federal government.  
 
i. Offences against the law of nations clause 
 
Proceedings of the Convention Referred to the Committee of Style and Arrangement 
Article VII, Sect. I: The Legislature shall have power to . . . define and punish piracies and 
felonies committed on the high seas, to punish the counterfeiting of the securities, and current coin 
of the United States, and offences against the law of nations; 
 
Report of the Committee of Style 
Article I, Sect. 8: The Congress . . . shall have power. . . . 
<<f>> To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of 
the United States. . . .  
<<k>> To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and 
offences  against the law of nations. 
 
In drafting the Committee of Style’s Constitution, Morris separated what had been in the 
Committee of Detail’s draft a grant of congressional power concerning piracies and felonies on the 
high seas, counterfeiting, and offences against the law of nations into two separate clauses - one 
concerning counterfeiting and one concerning piracies and felonies on the high seas and offenses 
against the law of nations. The clause about counterfeiting is pulled out from between the clauses 
about “piracies and felonies” and about “offences against the law of nations” and given a separate 
home.  
 
While the word shift appears stylistic and sensible - it puts into two different clauses two 
congressional powers of different kinds - it is consequential because the verb(s) linked with the 
phrase “offences against the law of nations” change when the middle clause is removed. In the 
Committee of Detail’s version, Congress simply has the power “to punish . . . offences against the 
law of nations. . .” But, when the middle clause is removed, the verbs linked with “offences 
against the law of nations” become to “define and punish.” As a result, Congress now has the 
power to “define . . . offences against the law of nations.” 
 
In reviewing the printed version of the Committee of Style’s report, Madison spotted the 
change.  He marked on his copy of the report that there had been “a typographical omission” of 
the word “punish.”99 Madison inserted “punish” into his copy of the printed version, and when 
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Congress turned to consider the grant of power on September 14, the text before it apparently 
adopted the Madisonian view of what the text should be: “To define and punish piracies and 
felonies committed on the high seas, and ‘punish’ offences against the law of nations.”100  The 
second punish is in quotes in the minutes, which suggests that there was some recognition that the 
second punish was not in the broadside version of the draft constitution.   
 
Immediately after the clause as “corrected” by Madison was read, Morris took the floor.  
Without commenting on the history of the verbiage, he made the argument that the word “punish” 
should be removed from the clause under consideration: “Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out 
‘punish’ before the words ‘offences against the law of nations.’ so as to let these be definable as 
well as punishable, by virtue of the preceding member of the sentence.”101 He is thus arguing on 
substantive grounds for a reversion to the text in the printed version. 
 
Wilson rejected Morris’s view: “To pretend to define the law of nations which depended 
on the authority of all the Civilized Nations of the World, would have a look of arrogance, that 
would make us ridiculous.” 102   
 
Morris then closed the debate (he and Wilson were the only speakers) by defending his 
position: “The word define is proper when applied to offenses in this case; the law of (nations) 
being often too vague and deficient to be a rule.” 103 
 
Morris’s motion was then put to a vote, and it narrowly carried - six states to five. 
Although individual votes were not recorded, in light of the record of the state vote and the report 
of the debates, we have some evidence of how the Committee of Style members voted. Virginia 
voted against the motion, which suggests that Madison probably voted against Morris (although 
not necessarily, since he was only one vote of what was at this point a five person delegation). 
Wilson had announced his opposition to the Committee’s text, and Pennsylvania’s five person 
delegation sided with Wilson, rather than Morris.  Since Hamilton was the only New York 
delegate at this point and only states with two delegates present could vote, we do not know what 
Hamilton’s views were.  Connecticut’s two person delegation voted in favor of the Committee of 
Style’s proposal, which means that Committee of Style Chair William Johnson voted in favor of 
his committee’s draft.  Massachusetts’ three person delegation voted against the Committee of 
Style draft.  It is unclear what King’s vote was, because he could have voted in favor of the 
Committee’s proposal and been outvoted by his fellow delegates or, alternately, he could have 
voted against the Committee’s proposal. 
 
This September 14 debate was the only time “the offenses against the laws of nations” 
clause was discussed on the convention floor. The clause has not been discussed in the literature 
on whether the Committee of Style made substantive changes and the scholarly literature on it 
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overall is small,104 but it is significant to a consideration of the work of the Committee of Style.  
First, it is an example of a very subtle textual shift in the committee’s draft that caused the clause 
to have the normative meaning that Morris wanted (and a different meaning than the original text). 
Second, at least in this instance (the general welfare clause was a different story), in revising the 
text, Morris was probably not consciously defying what he saw as the majority sentiment. He was, 
instead, being risk averse - rather than risking loss, he tried to achieve his end through stealth. 
Third, it provides relevant evidence bearing on the question whether Morris acted with others. The 
fact that, in the only reported discussion we have of a change Morris had made, Wilson opposed 
the change and Madison believed it a typographic error (and probably opposed it) suggests that, 
even though Madison, Wilson, and Morris had worked together through the convention to push for 
a strong national government, Wilson and Madison were not privy to any plan Morris had to 
change the meaning of the text.   
 
ii. The General Welfare Clause 
 
Proceedings of the Convention Referred to the Committee of Style and Arrangement 
Article VII, Sect. 1: The Legislature shall have power to law and collect taxes, duties, 
imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of 
the United States.   
 
Report of the Committee of Style 
Article I, Sect. 8:  The Congress . . . shall have power. 
<<a>> To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; to pay the debts and provide 
for the common defence and general welfare of the United States.   
 
The difference between the two versions lies in punctuation, and it is this clause that 
Congressman Gallatin invoked in his attack on Morris and his integrity as drafter.  
 
In the version of the clause sent to the Committee, Congress is granted the taxing power 
(and the power to impose duties, imposts, and excises) to provide money to pay for “the common 
defence and general welfare.” Although there is room for disagreement,105 the standard 
understanding is that reference to “the common defence and welfare” is a limitation on the taxing 
authority, not a separate grant of congressional authority. Thus, to the extent that Congress 
otherwise has power to legislate for the “common defence and general welfare,” the clause 
provides Congress with a way to pay for relevant expenditures. At the same time, the provision 
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deliberate practice seems for many years to have settled the construction that those words should be considered not as 
a grant of power, but a limitation of the power . . .”). 
1052 Farrand 379. 
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limits the ends that can be pursued through the use of the congressional taxing power: money from 
taxes (and duties, imposts, and excises) can only be used to pay debts and to pay for “the common 
defence and welfare.”106 
 
In the printed report of the Committee of Style, the comma that follows the word “excises” 
in the provisions referred to the Committee has become a semi-colon. While the Committee of 
Style’s version has some ambiguity, the semicolon at the very least makes possible the argument 
that the language about the “common defence and welfare” should be understood as a separate 
grant of power to Congress to legislate for “the common defence and welfare.” Thus, Article I, 
section 8 would provide for three separate grants of power to Congress: “[t]o lay and collect taxes, 
duties, imposts and excises”; “to pay the debts . . . of the United States”; to “provide for the 
common defence and general welfare of the United States.”107 
 
Somehow - and the records of the convention provide no details - the punctuation 
changed back in the version of the Constitution that was finally adopted by the delegates. 
Madison’s notes reveal no discussion of the punctuation on the floor. When the Constitution was 
engrossed, however, the semicolon in the Committee of Style’s report had become a comma 
again. 
 
While there is no record of debate on the topic in 1787, the punctuation shift became the 
subject of public notice in 1798 when Congressman Albert Gallatin gave a speech in the House 
about the meaning of the “defence and general welfare” clause and denounced what he declared 
an unsuccessful “trick” to make it into a grant of power; he accused Morris (by implication) of 
being the perpetrator. Gallatin, who had not attended the Philadelphia convention, stated that “he 
was well informed that those words had originally been inserted into the Constitution as a 
limitation on the power of laying taxes.” He added: “After the limitation had been agreed to, and 
the Constitution was completed, a member of the Convention (he was one of the members who 
represented the state of Pennsylvania) being one of a committee of revisal and arrangement, 
attempted to throw these words into a distinct paragraph, so as to create not a limitation, but a 
distinct power.” He is clearly referring here to Morris, the only Pennsylvanian on the Committee 
of Style.  (Wilson was not a member, although he reviewed the document.)  Gallatin 
concluded by observing that the ploy had proven unsuccessful and the original language 
restored: “The trick, however, was discovered by a member of Congress from Connecticut, now 
deceased, and the words restored as they now stand.” 108 The heroic proofreader of Gallatin’s 
account is Roger Sherman, the only member of the Connecticut delegation no longer living in 
1798. 
 
Madison discussed the punctuation issue at the end of his life, at a time in which the 
question whether the general welfare clause was a grant or a limitation was again a topic of great 
moment, in a memorandum that he wrote (although did not publish) about the general welfare 
clause. He declared, “[I]t was not the intention of the general or of the State Conventions to 
                                               
106See Madison Federalist 41. 
107On this reading, see McDonald, Novus Ordo Seclorum at 264-65; Akhil Reed Amar, Our Forgotten 
Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 Yale L.J. 281, 286 n. 25 (1987). 
1082 Farrand 379. 
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express, by the use of the terms common defence and general welfare, a substantive and 
indefinite power.”109 He acknowledged that some published editions of the Constitution had a 
semicolon after the word “excises,” but he asserted that this was a mistake because the engrossed 
copy of the Constitution, the copy of the Constitution sent by the Philadelphia convention to the 
Continental Congress, the copies of the Constitution sent by Congress to the states, and the 
surviving copies of the official versions of the Constitution printed by the ratifying states all had 
a comma after “excises”.110 He then turned to the punctuation in the Committee of Style’s 
Report: “The only instance of a division of the clause afforded by the journal of the Convention 
is in the draught of a Constitution reported by a committee of five members, and entered on the 
12th of September.” He strikingly is distancing himself here from the Committee of Style; he 
gives no indication that he was one of the five. His analysis is purely textual, without any 
mention of his personal experience.   He dismisses the significance of the “division of the 
clause” – i.e., the semicolon – in the Committee of Style’s report. He notes that, in the provision 
referred to the Committee of Style, “the parts of the clause are united, not separated.”111 The 
punctuation in the Committee of Style’s draft “must have been an erratum of the pen or of the 
press.”112 Thus, where Gallatin sees a “trick,” Madison sees a transcription error. As in his letter 
to Sparks about Morris contributions as drafter of the Committee of Style, Madison is taking the 
position that the Committee did not try to change the substantive meaning of the Constitution. 
 
Morris never commented on the evolution of the general welfare clause, but he both 
wanted the general welfare clause to be a broad grant of power and understood it to be so. It 
should be noted that he may well be responsible for the fact that the provision that went to the 
Committee of Style had a clause giving Congress the power to “provide for the common Defence 
and general Welfare.” The language “common Defence and Welfare” had been devised by the 
Committee of Eleven, on which Morris had served, and it is plausible that he introduced the 
language while he served on that committee.113 Regardless of whether he had crafted the initial 
version of the clause, however, it is clear that he wanted the national government to have broad 
power to legislate, and, throughout his time at the convention, he repeatedly pushed for 
capacious grants of power to the federal government. The relevant evidence with respect to the 
general welfare clause comes from the previously discussed notes of Delegate James McHenry 
of Maryland of his informal conversation with Morris, Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts, and 
Thomas Fitzsimons of Pennsylvania on September 6, a few days before the Committee of Style 
began its work. McHenry wanted the addition of a clause empowering Congress to erect piers.  
Morris told the others that “it may be done under the words of I clause I sect 7 art. amended - 
>and provide for the common defence and general welfare.”114 But none of the other three 
                                               
1093 Farrand 491.  
1103 Farrand 492.   
1113 Farrand 492.  
1123 Farrand 492. 
113Hoffer at 73. The phrase was, however, used at the convention from the start.  The Virginia Plan had 
called for a government that would accomplish the objectives of “common defense, security of liberty, and general 
welfare.”  Moreover, the Articles of Confederation had enumerated the objectives of “general welfare”, “common 
defense” and protecting “liberties.” 
1142 Farrand 529.  
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thought the general welfare clause conferred such substantive power.115 Thus, the punctuation 
change would have advanced the reading Morris wanted the clause to have. 
 
As will be discussed in the next section, the general view among historians of the 
convention is that Morris was an honest scrivener.  The authors of the two principal accounts of 
the history of the general welfare clause have reached a similar conclusion with respect to that 
clause and rejected the charge that Morris tried to change its meaning. Professor David Engdahl 
describes McHenry as “a man of limited ability,”116 who misunderstood Morris (who only 
meant that Congress had a broad power to spend under the general welfare clause, not that it had 
plenary power).  He dismisses Gallatin’s charge as “hearsay.”117  Engdahl concludes, 
“Gallatin’s aspersion on Morris was dubious at best and deserves no further credit among fair 
minded historians.”118 For similar reasons, Robert Natelson has concluded that it is “unlikely”119 
that Morris was a “villain”120 who attempted to covertly alter the meaning of the general welfare 
clause. “McHenry was likely confused”121 about Morris’s meaning, Natelson concludes, and the 
idea that Morris would think he could slip the punctuation change by his fellow delegates is 
incredible:  “The story assumes that Morris thought he was playing with fools, easily 
hoodwinked--at the Philadelphia convention, the ‘assembly of demigods!’”122 
 
Nonetheless, two leading constitutional historians have taken a different view.  Max 
Farrand was unsure whether Morris had tried to change the meaning of the general welfare 
clause.  Farrand compiled the provisions sent to the Committee of Style and compared his 
compilation with the committee’s draft constitution.  That comparison, he wrote, “would lead 
one to think that no undue liberties had been taken.”  On the other hand, he noted Morris’s 
claim about his changing the meaning of the new states clause, the “stories that were whispered 
about in the years following the adoption of the new constitution,” Gallatin’s charge, and the 
punctuation in the Committee of Style’s proposed constitution.  In light of this evidence, 
Farrand concluded, “just a little suspicion attaches to the work of Morris in preparing this last 
draft of the constitution.”  Where Farrand was unclear whether Morris had tried to change the 
clause’s meaning, Forrest McDonald was certain: he believed that Morris secretly changed the 
punctuation when he found that McHenry and Gorham disagreed with his reading of the general 
welfare clause.123  Morris was “audacious.”124 
 
                                               
115McHenry thought a specific grant of power to Congress (to allow it to authorize piers) was needed. 
Gorham has opposed to the grant of power.  Fitzsimons seems to have been in agreement with McHenry. 
116David Engdahl, The Basis of the Spending Power, 18 Seattle U. L. Rev. 215, 251 (1995) (quoting 
Farrand at 36). 
117Id. at 252. 
118Engdahl discusses the charge at length253 n. 192  See id. at 251-56.      
119Robert Natelson, The General Welfare Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original 
Understanding, 52 Kan. L. Rev. 1, 28 (2003). 
120Id. 
121Id. 
122Id. 
123McDonald at 265. 
124McDonald at 272. 
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In an assessment of whether Morris attempted to change the meaning of the general 
welfare clause it is significant that the separate data points merge seamlessly into a coherent and 
plausible account.  McHenry’s notes show that Morris’s reading of the general welfare clause 
was different than the reading other delegates were giving it and that others would have opposed 
a revision that would have given the clause the scope that Morris wanted.  The printed report of 
the Committee of Style’s proposal then has a punctuation change that would have strengthened 
Morris’s reading.  In the engrossed version of the Constitution, the punctuation has been 
changed back. Gallatin’s speech offers an explanation for the reversion – Sherman’s catching the 
change – and Sherman was one of the delegates who viewed Morris as immoral, so he would 
have been a likely person to look closely at the Committee’s proposal.  And the fact that 
Gallatin does not mention McHenry is notable.  There is evidence of which Gallatin was 
presumably unaware (McHenry’s notes had not been published and if Gallatin had known of the 
McHenry episode he would have likely mentioned it as part of his attack) which is consistent 
with his charge.  And, as McDonald, observes, Morris was “audacious.”   
 
The most important question, however, is not whether Morris was surreptitiously 
changing the meaning of the general welfare clause, but whether the change he made there and 
the change he made in the offences against the law of nations clause were part of a larger pattern 
of surreptitiously making small changes that profoundly altered the constitution’s meaning to 
reflect his vision of what the constitution should provide. Examining Morris’s constitutional 
philosophy and the Committee of Style’s changes, this article argues that this is in fact what 
happened.  But first it will look at what previous historians and legal scholars have written 
about the Committee of Style and it will examine the Supreme Court case law addressing the 
question whether changes made by the Committee of Style are legally significant. 
 
II. Historians’ views of the Committee’s work 
 
Despite the fact that the first challenge to Morris’s integrity as drafter came more than 
two hundred years ago and the fact that there is (to put it mildly) a substantial body of historical 
and legal scholarship closely probing the constitution’s text, there has, remarkably, not been a 
single study systematically examining the changes that Morris made in order to determine 
whether he was an honest scrivener. There have been a small number of articles that have 
examined individual clauses and the Committee of Style’s changes to them,125 and these articles 
will be discussed in Section V, which discusses how particular clauses were changed to reflect 
Morris’s constitutional vision. But the closest we have to larger discussions of Morris’s role on 
the Committee are his biographies and the histories of the convention.  That scholarship will be 
discussed in this Section.  Analysis of this works shows a near-consensus that Morris was an 
honest126 scrivener and that he and the Committee faithfully carried out the limited mandate of 
                                               
125Flaherty (vesting clause); Pfander (debt clause); Turley (impeachment clause). 
126Robertson, The Original Compromise (2013) does not note the Gallatin charge or concerns about 
Morris’s integrity.  In a footnote, he mentions the Committee of Style’s addition of a semicolon to the general 
welfare clause and erroneously suggests that Luther Martin “thought [the change] broadened national powers.”  Id. 
at 290 n.82 (citing Luther Martin, Observations, in 4 Farrand at 292. Robertson does not recognize that the 
Committee of Style’s semicolon was removed and Martin’s objection was to the clause as ultimately adopted by the 
Convention.   See 4 Farrand at 492. Catherine Drinker’s classic Miracle at Philadelphia (1966) does not note the 
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making stylistic changes and putting the document in a final form. Where scholars have departed 
from the consensus, they have focused on a single change of limited importance.  No one has 
argued that there was a pattern of departures.  
 
Recent years have seen a serious focus on the drafting history of the constitutional 
convention, with three important studies by David Stewart, Richard Beeman, and Michael 
Klarman.  None of these studies, however, discusses the controversy about whether Morris, as 
drafter, attempted covertly to alter the Constitution’s meaning.  They simply see Morris and the 
Committee as successfully executing the important, but non-substantive and limited, task of 
producing a coherent constitution from the Committee of Detail’s draft, the work of the five 
subsequent committees, and the various floor votes over the previous month. David Stewart 
observes, “This draft [the Committee of Style’s draft] had to be faithful to the Convention’s 
actions.  Morris could be trusted to do that.”127 Morris had a “cooperative spirit,” and he 
produced a “masterful final draft of the Constitution,”128 The Committee “put the finishing 
touches of the Constitution,” according to Michael Klarman.129  The Committee “was working 
to provide the ‘last polish’ to the document,” Richard Beeman reports.130  Gallatin’s charge has 
disappeared from recent accounts of the convention.   
 
In contrast, earlier historians of the constitutional convention acknowledged Gallatin’s 
charge and Morris’s statements with respect to the new states clause and the Committee of 
Style’s treatment of the judiciary and considered whether Morris was an honest scrivener.  In 
his classic 1967 study, 1787: The Grand Convention, Clinton Rossiter concluded that Morris had 
not departed from the intent of his fellow delegates.  Rossiter writes: “Although Morris liked to 
think in his later years, as did some of his enemies in the Jeffersonian ranks, that he had taken 
certain ‘liberties’ in order to give the national government even more strength and tone, the fact 
is that he was a faithful servant of the committee and the committee of the Convention.”131 He 
concludes, “The report of the committee of style was an adroit and tasteful rendering of the will 
of the framers.”132   
 
However, as noted in the previous section, Max Farrand in his Framing the Constitution 
was skeptical of Morris. While he did not closely analyze the Committee of Style’s draft and his 
treatment of the issue is brief, Farrand noted Gallatin’s charge and Morris’s admissions, and he 
suggested that “just a little suspicion attaches to the work of Morris in preparing this last draft of 
the constitution.”   
                                               
charge that Morris was dishonest.  She does, however, observe: “In one instance at least, Morris made a final 
attempt to twist a clause to his own thinking – and failed.  It was the third section of Article IV, about excluding 
new territories, in wording which, Morris later confessed, he ‘went as far as circumstances would permit to establish 
the exclusion.’”  Morris’s comment, however, pertained to an earlier motion on the convention floor, not his work 
on the Committee of Style.  See infra at ——.      
127Stewart at 233. 
128Stewart at 179. 
129Klarman at 256. 
130Beeman at 345. 
131Rossiter at 228-29. 
132Rossiter at 228. 
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As has also been noted, Forrest McDonald also challenged Morris’s integrity.  His 
Novus Ordo Seclorum is an analysis of political ideology at the time of the founding, rather than 
a history of the convention.  He briefly notes the charge that Morris altered the meaning of the 
general welfare clause, observes that McDonald was “audacious,” and accepts the charge as 
legitimate.  But McDonald’s focus in his account is simply on the one clause, rather than on 
Morris’s overall integrity as a drafter.  Although he never wrote a scholarly study on the topic, 
McDonald did, however, believe that Morris was not an honest scrivener. When testifying about 
Congress in 1999 about the impeachment clause and whether the Committee of Style had 
changed its meaning, McDonald said, “We have heard several people comment that the 
Committee of Style would not have taken liberties with the resolutions to the Convention.  They 
don’t understand Gouverneur Morris . . .”133 
 
Morris has been the subject of three biographies in the past fifteen years.  Only one 
biographer, Richard Brookhiser, looks at the question whether Morris tried to alter the 
Constitution’s meaning as drafter of the Committee of Style proposal. “Did the careful scribe try 
to smuggle in an argument for nationalism?”134 Brookhiser asks.  After noting Gallatin’s 
charge, Brookhiser dismisses it out of hand: “At the time the charge was made, Sherman was 
dead, and Morris was out of the country.  Morris was not above sleight of hand, but he made his 
convictions explicit elsewhere.”135 Thus, Brookhiser concludes that Morris did not try to change 
the constitution’s meaning, although such manipulation would not have been out of character. 
 
In short, the Gallatin charge has often been ignored (including in the leading recent 
convention histories and most of the recent Morris biographies), and both historians who have 
considered the charge and those who have not have concluded that Morris tried to be true to the 
intent of his fellow delegates. The only dissenters are Farrand, who indicates that it is unresolved 
whether Morris tried to shift the constitution’s meaning, and McDonald, who sees him as having 
tried to alter the scope of the general welfare clause (and who was generally suspicious of 
Morris, although he did not explore those suspicions, outside of the general welfare clause, in his 
scholarship). 
 
In addition to the question whether Morris was generally an honest scrivener, there are 
two specific changes that the Committee made that have received attention from scholars, and 
some have seen these provisions as departing from the intent of the convention: the Committee 
revised the Preamble; it added the contracts clause, which had been criticized and passed over 
when it had been the subject of debate on the convention floor. 
 
When the Committee of Style began its work, the Constitution’s Preamble, which had 
been written by the Committee of Detail, read: 
 
                                               
133Turley at note 100.  House Hearings at 23.  
134Brookhiser at 90. 
135Brookhiser at 90. 
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We the People of the States of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode-Island and 
Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare and 
establish the following Constitution for the Government of Ourselves and our Posterity. 136             
 
The Committee of Style dramatically re-wrote the Preamble to be: 
 
We, the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, to establish 
justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general 
welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish 
the Constitution for the United States of America.   
 
The convention did not debate the Committee of Style’s Preamble (or at least Madison’s 
notes do not indicate that the Preamble was debated), and it was approved as drafted by the 
Committee (except that, presumably for reasons of parallelism, the word “to” was deleted from 
“to establish justice”). It was, however, subject to intense debate during the ratification process, 
with Patrick Henry memorably declaring, “Sir, give me leave to demand, what right had they to 
say, We the People.  My political curiosity, exclusive of my anxious solicitude for the public 
welfare, leads me to ask who authorized them to speak the language of We the People instead of 
We the States?”137 
 
While the two preambles are dramatically different, many historians have treated the 
alterations in the Preamble as the product of pragmatic concerns, rather than a substantive 
reconceptualization.138 While they have recognized that “We the People of the United States” 
has a nationalist tone and appeal that the enumeration of states does not, they have concluded 
that, to quote Rossiter, “[w]e ought not attach too much significance to this change.”139 On 
August 31, shortly before the Committee of Style began its work, the Convention had decided 
that the new government would come into being if nine states ratified the Constitution. Rossiter 
writes, “Since no one could tell for certain which states would ratify and which would stall or 
even refuse flatly to join, the sensible course was to leave out any mention at all of New 
Hampshire and her twelve sisters.”140 Any “contribution to the cause of American nationalism” 
                                               
1362 Farrand 565. 
137Cite.  For discussion of the debate over the Preamble, see Hoffer, 83-91; Welch and Helpern [USC] at 
1050-61. 
138Rossiter at 221.  
139CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787:  THE GRAND CONVENTION 229 (1966); accord 1 JOHN VILE, THE 
CONSTITUIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787:  A COMPREHENSIVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING (2005); 
Stewart; FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM:  THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(1985); see also Madison ( A constructive ingenuity and interpretation of Preamble).  
140CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 229 (1966).  Accord, Stewart at 234 (“A practical 
reason helps explain the change.”); Farrand at 2200 (Committee “cleverly avoided” the problem created by the 
possibility that some states might not ratify; as a result, “the preamble loses something of the importance often 
ascribed to it.”) McDonald argues that, despite that the Preamble invocation of “We the People” as opposed to 
listing states “does not prove anything” and he offers as evidence the fact that the Constitution consistently refers to 
United States in the plural. FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM:  THE INTELLECUTAL ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 281 N.37 (1985).  As I have previously argued, however, the reference to United States in the plural 
does not prove anything: in the late eighteenth century, spelling rules dictated that nouns ending in “s” were paired 
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was “largely unintentional.”141  And weight should not be accorded to the objectives of the 
Preamble, which was simply a “polished statement of the purposes of the Constitution, for which 
Morris had drawn on traditional sources,”142 including the Articles of Confederation’s 
enumeration of the objectives of “general welfare”, “common defense” and protecting 
“liberties.”  While the revised preamble.   
 
Others take a different approach.  Richard Beeman takes the position that, “though not 
definitive in its articulation,” Morris intentionally re-cast the Preamble in order to “suggest that 
the people of the nation possessed that sovereign power.”143 Biographer Brookhiser sees “We 
the people of the United States” as Morris’s “statement of nationalism.”144  Biographer Adams 
argues that “We the People of the United States” “set[] out the high command of a responsible 
national government.”145 
 
But, if there is a disagreement about the weight that should be accorded to “We the 
People of the United States” as a symbolic matter, none of the leading historians of the 
convention or Morris biographers has argued that Morris hoped that the Preamble would, as a 
matter of law, expand the powers of the national government.  They have not seen the Preamble 
as legally enforceable.  
  
In addition to the revisions to the Preamble, the other obvious change made by the Committee of Style is its 
insertion of the contract clause.   
 
On August 28, Rufus King had proposed adding “in the words used in the Ordinance of 
Congs establishing new States, a prohibition on the States to interfere in private contracts.”146  
The contract clause of the Northwest Ordinance, to which King was referring, provided: 
 
And, in the just preservation of rights and property, it is understood and declared, that no 
law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said territory, that shall, in any manner whatever, 
interfere with or affect private contracts or engagements, bona fide, and without fraud, 
previously formed.147 
 
Morris responded, criticizing the proposal: 
                                               
with plural verbs. “United States” took a plural verb; so did “news.” William Michael Treanor, Taking Text too 
Seriously:  Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and the Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487 
(2007). 
Klarman does not discuss the Preamble.    
141Rossiter at 229. 
142Rossiter at 229. Accord, Stewart at 234 (“the balance of Morris’s preamble . . .  Distillate the purposes 
of government.  Many constitutions have been written since . . .  Yet none surpasses – and few rival – Morris’s 
preamble.”)   
143Beeman at 6511. 
 
144Brookhiser at 91. 
145Adams at 163. 
1462 Farrand 439. 
147Northwest Ordinance Article II. 
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This would be going too far. There are a thousand laws relating to bringing actions — 
limitations of actions & which affect contracts— The Judicial power of the U— S— will be a 
protection in cases within their jurisdiction; and within the State itself a majority must rule, 
whatever may be the mischief done among themselves.148 
 
Mason voiced opposition, echoing Morris: 
 
This is carrying the restraint too far. Cases will happen that can not be foreseen, where 
some kind of interference will be proper, & essential— He mentioned the case of limiting the 
period for bringing actions on open account — that of bonds after a certain (lapse of time,) — 
asking whether it was proper to tie the hands of the States from making provision in such 
cases?149  
 
Madison records brief speeches by himself and Wilson and Rutledge’s proposal that a 
clause on bills of attainder and retrospective laws be substituted for King’s motion: 
 
Mr. Wilson. The answer to these objections is that retrospective interferences only are to 
be prohibited.  
 
Mr. Madison. Is not that already done by the prohibition of ex post facto laws, which will 
oblige the Judges to declare such interferences null & void.  
 
Mr. Rutlidge moved instead of Mr. King’s Motion to insert — “nor pass bills of attainder 
nor retrospective* laws” . . .150  
 
Rutledge’s motion passed, seven states in favor and three opposed, and thus the 
prohibition on bills of attainder and retrospective laws was substituted for the proposed contract 
clause.  The contract clause was not discussed on the floor of the convention again until the 
Committee of Style submitted its draft where the contract clause somehow reemerged.  When 
the convention considered the Committee’s draft, its focus on the contracts clause was brief.  
There was (at least according to Madison’s notes) no recognition that the clause had been 
previously opposed and not adopted.  The only comment was Gerry’s.  He suggested that the 
prohibition on interference with contracts should be extended to the federal government, but no 
one seconded him.  The Committee’s proposal was adopted with a modification (the words 
“altering, or” were dropped, although there is no indication why), and the convention adjourned 
for the day and did not revisit the clause in its following discussions.151   
 
Of the recent histories of the convention, only Stewart’s account mentions the contracts 
clause at all.  In a brief treatment, he notes that inclusion of the clause was the “single point [on 
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1512 Farrand 619.  For further discussion, see infra at ____ 
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which] the Committee of Style departed from the Convention’s efforts.”152  He observes that, in 
“[r]eviving the issue in the committee room, King met greater success” than he had on the 
convention floor.  He does not mention Morris’s opposition to the clause during the floor debate 
nor how the convention wound up reversing itself on the contracts clause issue.  Neither 
Beeman nor Klarman, the authors of the two other recent accounts of the convention, mentions 
the contracts clause at all.     
 
The leading older accounts note the re-emergence of the clause in the Committee of 
Style’s work, but their treatment is brief.  Rossiter writes that the clause was an “intentional”153 
“contribution to the cause of American property.”154  He credits King with the re-emergence of 
the clause: “Rufus King, having failed to persuade his colleagues on the floor in late August of 
the usefulness of some restarting on the power of states to ‘interfere in private contracts,’ now 
persuaded his colleagues on the floor to add such a clause.”155 Farrand’s treatment of the issue is 
similar, also concluding that King was responsible for the clause’s reemergence.156 
 
Strikingly, none of these accounts deals with why, according to Madison’s notes, the 
convention did not recognize that they had previously considered the contracts clause and none 
notes that Morris had initially opposed the clause.  McDonald, however, discusses both issues.  
He suggests that either King or Hamilton must have prevailed in the committee meetings and 
secured inclusion of the clause in the constitution.  He also argues that, because records of the 
convention were poorly kept, the delegates, when they reviewed the Committee of Style’s draft, 
may have failed to realize that they had previously considered the clause and had decided not to 
include it in the constitution.  As a result, they did not closely scrutinize the clause then it 
emerged in the Committee of Style draft. 
 
Similarly, the contracts clause receives little treatment in Morris’s biographies.  
Brookhiser does not mention it.  Without any comment on Morris’s views on the clause, Adams 
simply notes that the Convention “accepted without discussion the committee’s new language 
that no state could pass any ‘law impairing the obligation of contracts.’”157 
 
In short, where the scholarly literature discusses the drafting of the contracts clause, it 
acknowledges that the committee of style’s draft represented a departure from what the 
convention had previously decided, but there is no suggestion that the clause represented 
Morris’s view.  It is seen as a victory for King or Hamilton. 
 
Thus, the dominant position in the limited body of work on the Committee of Style is that 
Morris was an honest scrivener.  With the exception of Farrand’s broad assertion that Morris’s 
                                               
152Stewart at 235. 
153Rossiter at 230. 
154Rossiter at 229-30. 
155Rossiter at 230. 
156Farrand at 2171 (“Prohibition of state laws impairing the obligation of contracts, formerly asked for 
unavailingly by Rufus King, had been inserted by the committee of style of which he was a member and was now 
accepted by the convention without question.”).  
157Adams at 164. 
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integrity as a drafter is open to question, those scholars who have suggested that Morris made 
changes to advance his own goals have made very specific claims – that he altered the Preamble 
to give it a more nationalist tone or that he altered the punctuation in the general welfare clause 
to confer broader powers on Congress.  No study presents a systematic analysis of the changes 
the committee made, and no scholar has argued that Morris constructed a series of changes to 
advance his constitutional aims.   
 
III. The Significance of the Committee of Style’s Changes: The Supreme Court Caselaw 
 
On four occasions within the last 45 years, the Supreme Court has decided cases 
involving constitutional language written by the Committee of Style which arguably had a 
meaning different than the language of the provision referred to the Committee and where the 
legal significance of the Committee’s work was at issue. In none of the cases is there an 
acknowledgement that Morris was the drafter and that his integrity as drafter has been 
questioned. In each case, the Court has held that the Committee of Style “‘had no authority from 
the convention to alter the meaning’” of the draft Constitution submitted for its review and 
revision.”158  Only Justice Thomas has disagreed with this approach, observing in dissent in 
Utah v. Evans that he considered the Committee of Style’s language binding because it was the 
language that was ratified and “I focus on the words of the adopted Constitution.”159 At the same 
time, in cases where the language at issue was created by the Committee of Style, but where the 
parties did not highlight the fact that the language was devised by the committee, the Court has 
given legal effect to language written by the Committee, and there is a tension between the 
Court’s approach in the Committee of Style cases (with its focus on drafters’ intent) and modern 
originalist jurisprudence.    
 
The Court first considered the significance of changes made by the Committee of Style in 
Ex parte Grossman.160 At issue in the case was the scope of the pardon clause and, specifically, 
the weight to be given the words “for offenses against the United States,” which the Committee 
of Style had added to the clause.161 The Court stated, “We have given the history of the clause to 
show that the words ‘for offences against the United States’ were inserted by a Committee on 
Style, presumably to make clear that the pardon of the President was to operate upon offenses 
against the United States as distinguished from offenses against the States. It can not be supposed 
that the Committee on Revision by adding these words, or the Convention by accepting them, 
intended sub silentio to narrow the scope of a pardon from one at common law or to confer any 
different power in this regard on our Executive from that which the members of the Convention 
had seen exercised before the Revolution.”162  
                                               
158Utah v Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 474 (2002) (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 538-39 (1969).   
  
159536 U.S. at 496.. 
160267 U.S. 87 (1925) 
161The pardon clause referred to the Committee provided: "He shall have power to grant reprieves and 
pardons except in cases of impeachment." 2 Farrand 575.  The Committee on Style reported this clause in the form 
adopted by the convention: "and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United 
States except in cases of impeachment.” 
162267 U.S. at 113. 
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Thus, the Court in Ex Parte Grossman concluded that the Committee of Style’s changes 
did not alter the meaning of the constitutional text.  The four modern cases adopt a similar 
approach.  The lead case of the four is Powell v. McCormack,163 Congressman Adam Clayton 
Powell’s successful constitutional challenge to the House of Representatives’ refusal to seat him. 
A central issue in the case was the meaning of the qualifications clause.  The clause provides: 
"No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five 
Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be 
an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen."164 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice 
Warren observed that the House had argued that this text should be interpreted “in light of what 
they regard as a very significant change made in Art. I, § 2, cl. 2, by the Committee of Style. 
When the Committee of Detail reported the provision to the Convention, it read: 
 
‘Every member of the House of Representatives shall be of the age of twenty five years at 
least; shall have been a citizen of [in] the United States for at least three years before his election; 
and shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of the State in which he shall be chosen.’ Id., at 
178. 
 
However, as finally drafted by the Committee of Style, these qualifications were stated in 
their present negative form.”165   
 
The House argued that the Committee of Style’s shift from the formulation of the 
qualifications in a positive form to a negative form reflected a decision that the House could 
additional qualifications for membership in the House beyond age, citizenship, and residency.  
Warren rejected this argument, holding that the Committee of Style did not have authority to 
change the text’s meaning:          
Respondents’ argument misrepresents the  function of the Committee of 
Style. It was appointed only ²to revise the stile of and arrange the articles which 
had been agreed to.² 2 Farrand 553. ²The Committee . . . had no authority from 
the Convention to make alterations of substance in the Constitution as voted by 
the Convention, nor did it purport to do so; and certainly the Convention had no 
belief . . . that any important change was, in fact, made in the provisions as to 
qualifications adopted by it on August 10.²166 
 
Warren’s underlying premise is that the Committee’s work must be understood against 
the background of the Convention’s procedural rules. The Committee, the Chief Justice writes, 
was created by the convention ²to revise the stile of and arrange the articles which had been 
agreed to.²  He adds, “The Committee . . . had no authority from the Convention to make 
alterations of substance in the Constitution as voted by the Convention . . .” This statement 
indicates that, had the Committee sought to change the Constitution’s meaning, such an act 
would have been ultra vires and without legal effect.  Warren then bolsters his position by 
                                               
163395 U.S. 486 (1969).  
164Article I, § 2, cl. 2. 
165395 U.S. at 537. 
166395 U.S. at 538-39 (quoting Charles Warren, supra, at 422 n.1). 
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observing that the Committee had not informed the Convention that it was “purport[ing]” to 
change the meaning of the clause and “certainly the Convention had no belief . . . that any 
important change was, in fact, made.”  
 
There is an irony to Warren’s treatment of the convention – and an underlying issue he 
fails to address.  As the Chief Justice recounts the drafting history, he invokes Madison’s 
opposition to “the delegation to the Congress of the discretionary power to establish any 
qualifications”167 and repeatedly refers to one delegate who disagreed with Madison and the 
majority view that the House should not have discretion over whom to seat: Gouverneur Morris.  
Warren quotes Morris’s statement that “[h]is intention was ‘to leave the Legislature entirely at 
large.’"168  He notes that Morris made a motion to that effect and that the Convention rejected 
it.169. The Chief Justice reports that, in order to limit the House’s discretion in expelling in its 
members, Madison successfully made a motion that 2/3 of the House should be required to 
expel, rather than ½.  Warren notes that Madison’s motion was passed unanimously, with only 
one state not voting because the delegation was divided. One delegate, however, “voiced his 
opposition”: Morris.170   
 
Thus, the leading case that establishes the principle that the Committee of Style’s 
changes are without legal effect is one involving a clause where Morris seems not to have been 
an honest scrivener.  He wanted the House to have the authority to add qualifications, he lost 
when the Convention made its decisions, but, by shifting the clause’s formulation from positive 
to negative, he provided textual support for those who wanted the House to have that authority.  
The opinion fails to see that the drafter of the text being interpreted is someone whose goals 
were inconsistent with the convention’s decisions. Perhaps if he had seen this the Chief Justice 
would have thought it irrelevant to the outcome, but there is no acknowledgement of the tension 
between the text – with words presumably chosen by Morris to permit House discretion or at 
least provide an argument for such discretion – and the framers’ intent not to give the House 
discretion.  In other words, Warren treats framers’ intent as decisive without having to grapple 
with the tension between text and framers’ intent and the need to decide between them. 
 
In 1995, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this interpretation of the Qualifications clause 
and the Powell approach to the Committee of Style in United States Term Limits v. Thornton.171  
Thornton presented the question whether Arkansas could impose term limits on members of the 
United States House of Representatives. As the House did in Powell, in Thornton, the state 
argued that the negative phrasing of the Qualifications clause “suggests that they were not meant 
to be exclusive.”172 The Thornton Court reviewed the Powell Court’s examination of the 
drafting history, including the Convention’s rejection of Morris’s proposal that the House be 
                                               
167Id. at 534. 
168Id. At 534 (quoting 2 Farrand at 249-50). 
169Id. At 534. 
170Id. at 536.  For further discussion, see infra at —-. 
171514 U.S. 779, 792 n. 8 (1995). 
172Id. at 815, n.27.  
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able to add qualifications.173  It found that treatment of the history convincing: “We thus 
conclude now, as we did in Powell, that history shows that, with respect to Congress, the 
Framers intended the Constitution to establish fixed qualifications.174 With respect to the 
negative phrasing issue, the Court cited the segment of the Powell opinion on the Committee of 
Style and stated, “This argument [the negative phrasing argument] was firmly rejected in 
Powell, see 395 U.S. at 537-539, and n. 73; see also Warren 422, n. 1, and we see no need to 
revisit it now.”175    
 
While relying on Powell, Nixon v. United States176 involved the most nuanced approach 
to the Committee of Style in this line of cases. Judge Walter Nixon contested the Senate’s 
conviction of him, which followed impeachment by the House. As part of his argument that 
convictions by the Senate were judicially reviewable, he contended that the word “sole” in the 
impeachment clause – which provides, “The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all 
Impeachment.” -177 - was without legal significance because it had been added by the 
Committee of Style.  Rejecting this argument, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, 
stated: 
 
Nixon asserts that the word "sole" has no substantive meaning. To support this 
contention, he argues that the word is nothing more than a mere "cosmetic edit" added by the 
Committee of Style after the delegates had approved the substance of the Impeachment Trial 
Clause. There are two difficulties with this argument. First, accepting as we must the 
proposition that the Committee of Style had no authority from the Convention to alter the 
meaning of the Clause, see 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 553 (M. Farrand ed. 
1966) (hereinafter Farrand), we must presume that the Committee's reorganization or rephrasing 
accurately captured what the Framers meant in their unadorned language. See Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. at 538-539. That is, we must presume that the Committee did its job. 
This presumption is buttressed by the fact that the Constitutional Convention voted on, and 
accepted, the Committee of Style's linguistic version. See 2 Farrand 663-667.  We agree with 
the Government that "the word 'sole' is entitled to no less weight than any other word of the 
text, because the Committee revision perfected what 'had been agreed to.'" Brief for 
Respondents 25. Second, carrying Nixon's argument to its logical conclusion would constrain us 
to say that the second to last draft would govern in every instance where the Committee of Style 
added an arguably substantive word. Such a result is at odds with the fact that the Convention 
passed the Committee's version, and with the well-established rule that the plain language of the 
                                               
173Id. at 791. 
174Id. at 792-93. 
175Id. at 815, n.27. 
176506 U.S. 244 (1993). 
177The impeachment clause provides: 
 
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be 
on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no 
Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present. 
Art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
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enacted text is the best indicator of intent.178 
 
There is a significant shift in focus here from Powell.  In Powell, the Court treated the 
language sent to the Committee of Style as dispositive.  The Constitution’s negative 
formulation is treated as irrelevant.  In Nixon, in contrast, the Court parses the Committee of 
Style’s text (which had been adopted by the convention) and rejects the idea “that the second to 
last draft would govern in every instance where the Committee of Style added an arguably 
substantive word.”  The Court embraces the presumption that the text sent to the committee 
and the committee’s proposal have the same meaning.     
 
Critically, the Court in Nixon (and in the other cases in the Powell line) did not confront 
the question of how to construe the constitution if the framer (Morris) was opting for language 
that did not reflect the Convention’s conclusions – if, in other words, “the Committee did [not 
do] its job.” The Court simply assumes that the Committee of Style was seeking to “accurately 
capture[] what the Framers meant in their unadorned language.”  The dishonest scrivener 
presents a situation in which the two goals animating the Court – construing the “plain meaning 
of the text”   giving effect to the convention’s intent – are at odds, and the opinion does not 
suggest how the Court would resolve that tension. 
  
In Utah v Evans,179 the Court’s most recent confrontation with the Committee of Style, 
it returned to the approach in Powell. The question before the Court was whether the Census 
Bureau’s use of sampling violated the Census Clause, which states in relevant part: “The actual 
Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the 
United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by 
Law direct.” In holding that sampling was permissible, Justice Breyer made two arguments. 
One was a textual argument that the term “actual enumeration” was consistent with sampling.180  
 
The second argument, the relevant argument for this article, focuses on the fact that the 
words “actual enumeration” were added by the Committee on Style:  
 
In arguing that sampling was impermissible, Utah relies on the words “actual 
enumeration,” which has been added by the Committee on Style. The history of the 
constitutional phrase supports our understanding of the text. The Convention sent to its 
Committee of Detail a draft stating that Congress was to "regulate the number of representatives 
by the number of inhabitants, . . . which number shall . . . be taken in such manner as . . . 
[Congress] shall direct." 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 178, 
182-183 (rev. ed. 1966) (hereinafter Farrand). After making minor, here irrelevant, changes, the 
Committee of Detail sent the draft to the Committee of Style, which, in revising the language, 
added the words "actual Enumeration." Id., at 590, 591. Although not dispositive, this strongly 
suggests a similar meaning, for the Committee of Style “had no authority from the Convention 
                                               
178Id. at 231-32. 
179536 US 452 (2002). 
180Id. at 474 (“The final part of the sentence says that the ‘actual Enumeration’ shall take place ‘in such 
Manner as’ Congress itself ‘shall by Law direct,’ thereby suggesting the breadth of congressional methodological 
authority, rather than its limitation.”)  
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to alter the meaning" of the draft Constitution submitted for its review and revision. Powell v. 
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 538-539, 23 L. Ed. 2d 491, 89 S. Ct. 1944 (1969); see 2 Farrand 
553; see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 231, 122 L. Ed. 2d 1, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993). 
Hence, the Framers would have intended the current phrase, "the actual Enumeration shall be 
made . . . in such Manner as [Congress] . . . shall by Law direct," as the substantive equivalent 
of the draft phrase, "which number [of inhabitants] shall . . . be taken in such manner as 
[Congress] shall direct." 2 Farrand 183. And the Committee of Style's phrase offers no linguistic 
temptation to limit census methodology in the manner that Utah proposes. 
 
Breyer is here all but reading the words “actual enumeration” out of the Constitution.  
Following Powell, he is holding that “the Committee of Style ‘had no authority from the 
Convention to alter the meaning’ of the draft Constitution submitted for its review and 
revision.”  He is then creating a strong presumption that the words used by the Committee of 
Style do not alter the meaning of the words used by the Committee of Detail (“this strongly 
suggests a similar meaning”).  The result is that the Committee of Style’s text, rather than 
being closely parsed by the Court, is understood as not changing the Committee of Detail’s text.  
(“Hence, the Framers would have intended the current phrase, ‘the actual Enumeration shall be 
made . . . in such Manner as [Congress] . . . shall by Law direct,’ as the substantive equivalent 
of the draft phrase, ‘which number [of inhabitants] shall . . . be taken in such manner as 
[Congress] shall direct.’”)  By invoking Powell, with its implication that any changes made by 
the Committee of Style were ultra vires, but then using a strong presumption as the basis of 
analysis, Breyer’s analysis leaves open the question as to what the rule should be when the 
Committee of Style’s text is simply inconsistent with the text referred to the Committee.  But, 
in the absence of such clear inconsistency, Breyer’s approach in Evans gives controlling effect 
to the words referred to the Committee of Style, rather than to the language proposed by the 
Committee and adopted by the convention. 
 
Justice Thomas, in dissent, attacks the idea that Committee of Style should be treated as 
having a limited mandate:  
 
The Court also places undue weight on the penultimate version of the Clause, the 
iteration that was given to the Committee of Detail and Committee of Style. See 153 L. Ed. 2d 
at 473. Whatever may be said of the earlier version, the Court rejected a similar reliance in 
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 231, 122 L. Ed. 2d 1, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993), because "we 
must presume that the Committee's reorganization or rephrasing accurately captured what the 
Framers meant in their unadorned language."  [*496]  Carrying the majority's "argument to 
its logical conclusion would constrain us to say that the second to last draft would govern in 
every instance where the Committee of Style added an arguable substantive word. Such a result 
is at odds with the fact that the Convention passed the Committee's version, and with the well-
established rule that the plain language of the enacted text is the best indicator of intent." Id., at 
231-232. Rather than rely on the draft, I focus on the words of the adopted Constitution.181 
 
Criticizing the Evans majority, Thomas is invoking the more nuanced approach of 
                                               
181Id. at 495-96 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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Nixon.  But the central thrust of his analysis implicitly rejects the entire Powell line (including 
Nixon).  Regardless of the details of drafting history rules of the drafting process, the text that 
matters is the text the Convention adopted and that was ratified by the state conventions. “I 
focus on the words of the adopted Constitution,” he writes. 
 
Justice Thomas, however, has not secured any other votes for his position. While Nixon 
has a different focus than the other three decisions in the line, the four cases share the core 
principle that the Committee of Style could not change constitutional meaning.  “It was 
appointed only ’to revise the stile of and arrange the articles which had been agreed to.’ 2 
Farrand 553. ²The Committee . . . had no authority from the Convention to make alterations of 
substance in the Constitution as voted by the Convention, nor did it purport to do so. . . .”182 
 
While the Court has taken a consistent position in cases in which there has been a claim 
that the Committee of Style altered the Constitution’s meaning, those cases are at tension with 
other elements of the Court’s jurisprudence and with modern originalist jurisprudence in two 
ways. 
 
First, there are important cases in which the Court has relied on the Committee of 
Style’s text, even though that text departed significantly (and in relevant ways) from the text 
referred to the Committee. For example, in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,183 the Court 
invalidated Sarbanes Oxley’s PCAOB removal provisions because they were inconsistent with 
Article II’s vesting clause.184 The clause’s language – which has been relied on since the first 
Congress to justify the President’s removal power and a broad understanding of executive 
power – was the product of the Committee of Style.185  In the landmark case of Myers v. 
United States,186 the Court invoked Hamilton’s distinction between the vesting clauses of 
Articles I and II to justify its understanding of the President’s removal power.187  The 
Committee of Style created the distinction between the two vesting clauses.188 In these cases, 
unlike the Powell line of cases, no one challenged the constitutional language on the grounds 
that the Committee of Style had departed from the convention’s prior decisions.  Thus, in cases 
where the Court has not been presented with the argument that the Committee of Style only had 
a limited mandate, the Court has given effect to the Committee of Style’s language.189   
                                               
182Powell, 395 U.S. at 538-39. 
183561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
184Id. at 492 (citing vesting clause); id. at 496 (“That arrangement is contrary to Article II's vesting of the 
executive power in the President.”) For discussion of PCAOB‘s vesting clause analysis, see Patricia Bellia, PCAOB 
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185See infra at ——. 
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187See id. at 138. 
188See infra at 
189It is also worth noting that the Court has also repeatedly applied the contracts clause, even though it 
could be argued that the clause’s inclusion in the Committee of Style’s draft was at odds with the drafting history.  
That is, however, a different situation than that involved in the other cases discussed in this section, since it, unlike 
the others cases, involve a tension between drafting history and the plain meaning of the text.  While some of the 
language in the decisions is broad enough to suggest that the text referred to the Committee of Style trumps the text 
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Second, the approach in Powell and the cases that follow it is at odds with modern 
originalist thought.  When Warren wrote Powell, originalists focused on drafters’ intent, and 
the decision reflects that approach.  The decision looks, in particular, to the conventions’ 
procedural rules to decide what the convention meant.  Warren’s analysis reflects 
intentionalism, the interpretive school that looks to drafters’ intent or ratifiers’ intent.  While 
once the dominant originalist approach, intentionalism has been largely supplanted as a school of 
thought by a focus on original public meaning.  To the extent that intentionalism retains 
influence, scholars focus on ratifiers’ intent, rather than drafters’ intent. The ratifiers were “We, 
the People” meeting in the state conventions.  In contrast, the drafters were operating in secret 
so their discussions did not influence ratifiers’ debate, their intent was not of legal consequence 
(since they were simply preparing a document for the consideration of the ratifying conventions, 
and the ratifying conventions were the legally empowered actors), and, it has been generally 
assumed since Jefferson Powell published his classic article, The Original Understanding of 
Original Understanding, that the founding generation considered drafters’ intent irrelevant.190  
 
Thus, Powell lines rejection of the work of the Committee of Style is very much 
inconsistent with other Supreme Court caselaw and with current originalist thought.  
Nonetheless, it is the approach that the Court has repeatedly taken, and it remains the settled 
approach of the Court. 
 
IV. Law Review Scholarship 
 
The law review scholarship on the work of the Committee of Style is limited. As is the 
case with the historical literature, there has been no systematic study of the changes Morris and 
the committee made.  There have been a handful of studies, discussed in the sections of this 
article focusing on individual clauses, that look at a particular clause, such as the general welfare 
clause, the new states clause or the debt clause, and suggest that Morris may have changed the 
text of the clause to advance his goals, but no studies that look at the work of the Committee of 
Style as a whole. There has also been little theoretical discussion of the question, raised by the 
Powell line of cases, of how to interpret the Constitution when the text of the Committee written 
by the Committee of Style departs from the text referred to the Committee. 
 
There is, however, a significant body of scholarship discussing the interpretation of two 
specific clauses where the text written by the Committee of Style departed from the text referred 
to the committee (although these articles rarely discuss the charges made against Morris): the 
impeachment clause and the presidential succession clause. 
 
The version of the impeachment clause referred to the Committee of Style stated: 
                                               
proposed by the Committee, the Powell line does not involve cases in which the plain meaning of the text is at odds 
with drafting history. 
190H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARVARD L. REV. 885 (1984). 
For a more complete discussion of the competing originalist schools, see Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 
NORTHWESTERN L. REV. 983 (2009); Solum.  On the evolution of originalism, see Vasan Kesavan and Michael 
Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 Geo. L.J. 1113, 1134-48 
(2003). 
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“He [the President] shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the House of 
Representatives, and conviction by the Senate, for treason or bribery or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors against the United States. . . .”191  
 
The Committee proposed the following clause: “The President, Vice President, and all 
civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and 
conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.”192 
 
In addition to bringing the Vice President and all civil officers into the same clause with 
the President, the Committee of Style dropped “against the United States”: “other high crimes 
and misdemeanors against the United States. . . .” became “other high crimes and misdemeanors. 
 
This change became of critical significance at the time of the impeachment of President 
Clinton.   
430 law professors and 400 historians signed open letters to the House contending that 
only wrongs involving “an attack on the state” were impeachable offenses.193  As Cass Sunstein 
put it, “[T]he clear trend of the discussion [at the convention] was towards allowing a narrow 
impeachment by which the President could be removed only for gross abuses of public 
authority.”194 Their argument was that the types of crimes that were the potential basis for 
President Clinton’s impeachment were not the types of offenses that the Constitution provided 
could be grounds for impeachment because they were private in nature.  This theory was known 
as the “executive function” theory of impeachment.195  The same issues may become relevant if 
there were a move to impeach him for actions that were not connected with his work as 
President.196 
        
A problem with the executive function theory is the text. If the Constitution had said 
“offenses against the United States” were grounds for impeachment, there would be a good 
argument that offenses that do not involve the president’s functions as president are not grounds 
for impeachment.  But the Committee of Style had changed the language to “offenses.”  
Defenders of the executive function thesis have had to come up with a way to overcome the 
Committee of Style’s change. 
 
Their solution has been to follow Powell and treat the language that the Convention had 
referred to the Committee of Style (rather than the language of the Constitution as ratified in 
state conventions) as the crucial language.  Historian Jack Rakove, for example, concluded that 
the Committee of Style cut the phrase “against the United States” because it “deemed the 
qualifying words redundant.”  The Committee of Style, Rakove argued, would not “have felt 
                                               
191Art. X, sec. 2. 
192Art. I, sec. 4, cl. 3. 
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195Turley. 
196See Ryan Goodman, Interview of Cass Sunstein, Newsweek, October 23, 2017. 
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empowered to make a substantive change in the meaning of the impeachment clause.”197 
“Offenses” was short-hand for “offenses against the United States.” Cass Sunstein took a similar 
approach.  “Was the deletion [of “offenses against the United States”] designed to broaden the 
legitimate grounds of impeachment?  This is extremely unlikely.  As its name suggests, the 
Committee on Style and Arrangement lacked substantive authority (which is not to deny that it 
made some substantive changes), and it is far more likely that the particular change was made on 
the grounds of redundancy.”198 
 
In contrast, advocates of a broad reading of the impeachment clause have followed an 
approach similar to that Justice Thomas was to employ in dissent in Evans: they rely on the 
Constitution’s text.  Gary McDowall observed that the language of the impeachment clause as 
adopted “seems to have a broader, less restricted meaning than merely a narrow interpretation of 
crimes against the government. . . .  [It] also seems to undermine the claim that impeachment is 
limited only to what one might call official duties and does not reach what Joseph Story would 
later call simply ‘personal misconduct.’”199 
 
In general, Morris does not figure in either side’s account.  There are a couple of 
exceptions, however.  Most significant, Professor Rakove has labeled Gouveneur Morris a 
staunch opponent of impeachment and contended that Morris’s hostility to impeachment 
supports Rakove’s narrow view of the clause’s reach: Morris would not have wanted to expand 
the scope of the impeachment clause.200  Professor Turley, an advocate of the broad reading, 
describes Morris as part of the “original extreme wing on impeachment, opposing any 
impeachment for the chief executive.”201 Turley then offers a range of different possibilities on 
why the phrase “offenses against the United States” might have been excluded – Morris might 
have cut it to appeal to people like Sherman who mistrusted him or he might have cut it because 
he thought it redundant.  As will be discussed, both approach miss a crucial fact: while he was 
initially opposed to impeachment, Morris had changed his mind before he served on the 
Committee of Style, and the text that the Committee of Style proposed reflects his views. 
 
The second clause that has received significant attention in current legal debates is the 
presidential succession clause.  As referred to the Committee of Style, the clause read: 
 
“The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the United States shall act as 
President in case of the death, resignation, or disability of the President and Vice President; and 
such Officer shall act accordingly, until such disability be removed, or a President shall be 
elected.202 
 
The Committee’s proposal was: 
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In case of the removal of the president from office, or of his death, resignation, or 
inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the vice-
president, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation or 
inability, both of the president and vice-president, declaring what officer shall then act as 
president, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or the period for 
chusing another president arrive.203 
 
The critical change here is that “officers” is substituted for “officers of the United 
States.”  “Officers of the United States” is understood elsewhere in the Constitution to refer to 
officers of the judicial and executive branches.204  “Officers” is understood to refer to officers 
of any branch.  The question raised by the Committee of Style’s change is whether it adds 
legislative officers (such as the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Temporare of the 
Senate) to the people who may be placed in the line of presidential succession. 
 
Again, the responses to this question are similar to the two approaches of the Justices to 
changes made by the Committee of Style and the two approaches scholars have taken in the 
context of the impeachment clause. 
 
One approach is to follow the Powell approach and privilege the language referred to the 
Committee of Style.  The leading article here is written by Professor Vic and Akhil Amar.  
They argue that the Committee of Style was only empowered “to revise the stile of and arrange 
the articles which had been agreed to.”  The clause could not be altered by a committee that had 
no power to change meaning.  As a result, the formulation that went to the committee- “officers 
of the United States”- is the governing text, and members of Congress cannot be placed in the 
line of presidential succession. 
 
Again, the competing approach looks at the text.  The leading proponent of this view is 
Dean John Manning.  Dean Manning argues, “[E]ven if the Committee of Style acted ultra vires 
by making substantive changes to the text, the Ratifiers accepted them.  The relevant fact is that 
the Ratifiers acted on the text submitted to the States, not on the sequence of ‘secret 
deliberations’ of the Constitutional Convention. . . . [T]he natural import of the text submitted to 
the States would be . . . that the unrestricted term ‘Officers’ is broader than the phrase ‘Officers 
of the United States.’  Thus, the drafting history does not provide a convincing textual argument 
for reading the Succession Clause to exclude members of Congress from the line of 
succession.”205 
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Neither group of scholars has referenced Morris, but, as will be shown, he did have a 
view on whether members of Congress should be in the line of presidential succession. 
 
Even as the question of how to treat text proposed by the Committee of Style has been 
central to four recent Supreme Court decisions and even though that text has been at issue in 
important debates about presidential succession and impeachment, there has been a dearth of 
critical thinking about the larger theoretical concerns that should govern a scholar or a court’s 
view of the legal significance of the text drafted by the committee.  Typically, scholars either 
follow the Powell approach or rely on text without reference to drafting history without 
explanation for why they are following a particular approach.   
 
There are, however, two exceptions, although the treatments are brief. 
    
Michael Paulsen and Vesan Kesavan, in their article “Secret Drafting History of the 
Constitution” have suggested a framework for using the proposals referred to the Committee on 
Style to interpret the Committee’s proposals.  They suggest “us[ing] the draft Constitution 
referred by the Framers to the Committee of Style and Arrangement as a sort of ‘committee 
report,’ which is recognized as the most authoritative source of legislative history in statutory 
interpretation.”206 The proposal referred to the committee is a guide for understanding 
ambiguous constitutional text:  
 
“[T]he draft of the Constitution referred by the Framers to the Committee of Style may 
have semantic value in clarifying the meaning of the text of the Constitution (unless, of course, 
the Committee of Style, acting ultra vires, altered the meaning of a clause).”207 
 
Kesavan and Paulsen offer a specific illustration of their approach: interpretation of the 
word “Officer” in the presidential succession clause: “There is good reason to believe that 
‘officer’ in the Committee of Style draft is shorthand for ‘officer of the United States’ in the draft 
referred by the Framers to the Committee of Style, especially in the absence of any additional 
recorded debate on the point.”208 
 
Kesavan and Paulsen embrace Nixon as reflecting their approach:  
 
“The Supreme Court has recently observed that because the Committee of Style ‘had no 
authority from the Convention to alter the meaning’ of a clause, the presumption is "that the 
Committee's reorganization or rephrasing accurately captured what the Framers meant in their 
unadorned language. . . . That is, we must presume that the Committee did its job.’ This 
presumption may be characterized as giving the draft of the Constitution referred by the Framers 
to the Committee of Style the status of a committee report--it is authoritative evidence of legal 
meaning, but not legal authority. Thus, when the text of the Constitution is unambiguous, it 
trumps the ‘second-to-last’ draft of the Constitution, as is the case in statutory interpretation; 443 
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but when the text of the Constitution is ambiguous, its meaning may be informed by the 
Constitution's ‘committee report.’”209 
 
Although they do not use this example, under the Kesavan and Paulsen approach, a court 
would give legal effect to the contracts clause, regardless of the drafting history and regardless of 
how it came to be in the constitution, because it is in the constitution. The early draft comes into 
play only in cases of ambiguity: the text referred to the Committee of Style should cause a court 
to follow one approach to ambiguous text (e.g., that “officers” means “officers of the United 
States”) rather than another plausible reading (e.g., that “officers” means officers in any of the 
three branches). But unambiguous text added by the Committee (e.g., the contract clause) should 
be given effect. 
 
In “Secret Drafting History,” Kesavan and Paulsen do not address the question raised by 
this article: How should the Constitution should be interpreted in cases where Morris 
surreptitiously departed from agreed on understanding?  While Kesavan and Paulsen do not 
address this problem in “Secret Drafting History,” however, they briefly treat it in “Is West 
Virginia Constitutional?”   
 
“Is West Virginia Constitutional?” is one of the handful of a law review articles to 
discuss the possibility that Morris changed a particular constitutional provision to advance his 
goals.  In this instance, the focus in on the new states clause.  The Committee of Style made 
various changes to the clause - including the insertion of a semicolon (the technique used in the 
general welfare clause) – that arguably allowed the free state of Vermont to become the 
fourteenth state, but would have barred Kentucky (and Maine and West Virginia) from becoming 
states because they were part of other states at the time of ratification.  Such a result – the 
admission of Vermont and exclusion of Kentucky - would have accorded with two of Morris’s 
core convictions: it would have curtailed the power of slave states in the national government 
and it would have also curtailed the power of new western states.   
 
After raising the issue of a surreptitious revision, Kesavan and Paulsen conclude that it is 
unlikely that Morris would have been able to slip language with a secret meaning into the 
Constitution since it would have meant “that the other members of the Committee of Style were 
sleeping at the constitutional switch.”210  Moreover, if the Committee’s language was intended 
to bar the admission of break-away states like Kentucky, Kesavan and Paulsen conclude that 
intent is irrelevant: 
 
“If somebody did pull a fast one, however, it was not fast enough. The Supreme Court 
has recently observed that because the Committee of Style "had no authority … to alter the 
meaning" of a clause, the presumption is "that the Committee's reorganization or rephrasing 
accurately captured what the Framers meant in their unadorned language … that the Committee 
did its job."  Given that the effect of the semicolon is ambiguous, any intended ruse did not 
succeed. At most it created an interpretive ambiguity in the text of Article IV, Section 3, for 
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which it is appropriate to repair to extratextual evidence of original public meaning, which in the 
end resolves the ambiguity. The better conclusion is that the admission into the Union of new 
breakaway States was contemplated in Article IV, Section 3 and permitted with the consent of 
parent States and of Congress.”211 
 
Kesavan and Paulsen again invoke Nixon‘s “presumption” that the Committee 
“accurately captured what the Framers meant in their unadorned language.”  They further 
indicate that, if there was some bad intent it is irrelevant because the language used was 
ambiguous, and all the extratextual evidence points the same way – in favor of the admission of 
break-away states like Kentucky.   
 
Indeed, they are right about the “new states” clause – all the evidence points the same 
way.  The drafters (other than Morris) favored admission of new states that were splitting away 
from old states, and when Kentucky was considered for admission to the Union, no one 
suggested that admission would be unconstitutional.   
 
But this leaves open the critical question of how to read the language when the 
extratextual evidence does not all point the same way.  When the text is ambiguous, does the 
fact that the ambiguity was created by Morris – who was departing from prior understanding of 
the other drafters – matter?  More broadly, how does one interpret ambiguous text fashioned by 
a dishonest scriviner?  Kesavan and Paulsen do not grapple with this question. 
 
The other theoretical discussion of how to treat text created comes from Dean Manning, 
and it has been previously quoted. Where Kesavan and Paulsen accord meaning to the drafting 
history, Manning’s approach is textualist, and, like Justice Thomas, he dismisses the idea that the 
drafting history is relevant:   
 
Relying on the limited mission of the Committee of Style "would constrain us to say that 
the second to last draft [of the Constitution] would govern in every instance where the 
Committee of Style added an arguably substantive word." We would be mistakenly discarding 
the ratified Constitution for a prior draft. The Constitution's legal force came from its ratification, 
not from its proposal by the Philadelphia Convention. Accordingly, even if the Committee of 
Style acted ultra vires by making substantive changes to the text, the ratifiers accepted them. The 
relevant fact is that the ratifiers acted on the text submitted to the States, not on the sequence of 
"secret deliberations" of the Constitutional Convention - deliberations that were not revealed 
until decades after ratification.212 
 
Quoting Max Farrand’s observation that “‘just a little suspicion attaches to the work’" of 
Gouverneur Morris and the Committee of Style, Manning acknowledges that the meaning of the 
Committee of Style’s text could be inconsistent with the text referred to the Committee: “Despite 
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its limited mission, the Committee of Style, whether inadvertently or by design, did make 
substantive changes to the document.” He offer the example of the Uniformity Clause,213 which 
the Committee eliminated but was reinserted by the Convention.  “If the Convention had never 
rectified that decidedly substantive omission, and the ratifiers had then adopted the text without 
knowing the pertinent drafting history, we would not think that the Uniformity Clause was 
nevertheless part of the Constitution because the Committee of Style's omission had been 
unauthorized.”  
 
Like Kesavan and Paulsen, Manning does not discuss the question of how to construe 
ambiguous text.  His analysis assumes that focus on the ratified text reveals constitutional 
meaning. 
 
To conclude: there is no work before this article that looks systematically at the changes 
Morris and the Committee made and their legal import.  Moreover, while there has been some 
focus in the scholarship of changes made by the Committee of Style in the context of particular 
clauses, with respect to the topics that have received the great analysis – the impeachment clause 
and the presidential succession clause – there has been almost no recognition of the fact that the 
changes were Morris’s handiwork and his integrity has been challenged. Commentators have 
simply followed a textualist approach (looking at the wording in the Constitution as ratified) or 
relied on drafting history, without grappling with the dishonest scrivener question.  The 
principal scholarly works discussing the dishonest drafter question – Kesavan and Paulsen; and 
Manning – have done so briefly, have taken competing positions, and have failed to discuss how 
to interpret the Committee’s text when it is ambiguous, which, as will be discussed, is the central 
problem.  
 
V. Gouverneur Morris’s Constitutional Vision 
 
In order to understand what Morris sought to achieve through his work the Committee of 
Style, it is important to understand his constitutional vision – a subject that has received little 
study – and the ways in which the draft Constitution, as it appeared before the Committee of 
Style began its work, was inconsistent with that vision.  
 
Although Morris was not a scholar like Madison or Wilson, he had a distinctive and 
coherent constitutional vision.  He was a strong nationalist.  He championed both a strong 
executive and a strong judiciary.  He stood apart from his fellow delegates in his devotion to the 
protection of private property, his opposition to slavery, and his belief that the addition of new 
western states posed serious problems. This section develops the basic elements of his 
constitutional philosophy and what the convention had decided on each of these points before the 
Committee of Style began its work. 
 
a. Nationalism 
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Along with James Wilson and Alexander Hamilton, Morris was one of the small group of 
strong and consistent nationalist voices at the convention.214  Morris’s belief in the need for a 
powerful national government had been evidenced in his statements early in the Revolutionary 
War.215  His experience as a member of the Continental Congress and as Assistant 
Superintendent of Finance – and his frustration, in particular, with Congress’s ability to raise 
funds needed to wage the war and pay the troops – had deepened that commitment.216  
 
Where other delegates at the convention spoke of themselves as representatives of their 
states, Morris (a New Yorker elected to represent Pennsylvania) was unambiguous that he came 
“as a representative of America –a representative in some degree of the whole human race.” He 
denounced those who “sought to truck and bargain for their respective states.”  “[S]tate 
attachments and state importance,” he declared, “had been the bane of the country.” “[I]f they 
[certain states] did not like the Union, no matter, --- they would have to come in, and that was all 
there was about it; for if persuasion did not unite the country, then the sword would.”  “It had 
been one of our great misfortunes [under the Confederation] that the great objects of the nation 
had been sacrificed constantly to local views. . . .”217 Addressing the argument that 
representation in the Senate by states was necessary “to keep the majority of the people from 
injuring particular States,” he responded “particular States ought to be injured for the sake of a 
majority of the people, in case their conduct should deserve it.”218 
 
From the beginning of the convention, Morris championed a supreme national 
government and opposed the idea that the constitution would be a compact among the states.  
When Randolph had proposed the Virginia Plan, he had framed it as a revision of the Articles of 
Confederation, with its first resolution being: “Resolved that the Articles of Confederation ought 
to be so corrected & enlarged, as to accomplish the objects proposed their institution.; namely 
common defence, security of liberty & general welfare.” 219 In his first speech at the 
convention, Morris offered three amendments to the Virginia Plan as substitutes for Randolph’s 
first resolution that would have profoundly reframed the document.  His amendments – only the 
third of which was considered and adopted220 - would have made clear that the Constitution was 
not an amendment to the Articles, that it was not the product of a confederation of states, and that 
it was creating a supreme national government:   
 
1. That a Union of the States merely federal (will not accomplish the objects  
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proposed by the articles of Condeferation [sic], namely common defence, security 
of liberty, & genl. Welfare.) 
2.   that no treaty or treaties among the whole or part of the States, as  individual      
sovereignties, would be sufficient 
3.   that a national Government (ought to be established consisting of a supreme 
Legislative, Executive & Judiciary.221 
 
Elaborating on his conception of the work of the convention, Morris was later to assert, 
“This Convention is unknown to the Confederation.”222 By the terms of the Articles, that 
agreement could not be amended “without the unanimous consent of the legislatures.”223  The 
convention’s eventual constitution would be subject to review and potential adoption by a 
different audience than the state legislatures: “[I]n case of an appeal to the people of the U.S., the 
federal compact [the Articles of Confederation] may be altered by a majority of them.”224  His 
vision was that the Convention was not to amend the Articles, but to begin the work of creating a 
new national government to be adopted by “the people of the U.S.” 
 
While Morris’s first two proposals were tabled, the third was adopted. Thus, because of 
Morris, at the start of the convention, the proposed Constitution proclaimed that each of the three 
branches of the “national” government (not the “federal” government) would be “supreme.”  As 
previously noted, after offering his amendments to the Virginia Plan, Morris “explained the 
distinction between a federal and national, supreme, Govt.; the former being a mere compact 
resting on the good faith of the parties; the latter having a compleat and compulsive operation. 
He contended that in all communities there must be one supreme power, and one only.”225  
Morris’s speech made clear that his selection of the words “national” and “supreme” was 
considered and that he favored a national government that had “compulsive operation” and that 
was the “only” supreme power. 
 
Randolph’s Virginia Plan had an expansive grant of power to Congress.  It provided: 
 
“that the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy the Legislative Rights 
vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to legislate in all cases to which the 
separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted 
by the exercise of individual Legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several States, 
contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union; and to call forth the 
force of the Union agst. any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles 
thereof.” 
 
The combination of this grant of power with Morris’s amendment proclaiming the 
supremacy of the three branches of the national government was striking. At the start of the 
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proceedings, the Virginia Plan, as modified by Morris, vested in the national government an 
authority that was close to plenary power. Scholars debate whether, for Virginians like Randolph 
and Madison, this grant should actually be read at face value or whether it is was instead more in 
the nature of a placeholder.226  But Morris was seeking plenary power, or something close.227  
 
Reflecting this strongly nationalist approach, Morris also proposed the creation of a 
cabinet post of “Secretary of Domestic Affairs” who would “attend to matters of general police, 
the State of Agriculture and manufactures, the opening of roads and navigations, and the 
facilitating communications thro’ the U. States.”228 This was a capacious conception of national 
power, particularly in its use of the word “police,” which meant, to quote Dr. Johnson’s 
Dictionary, “the regulation and government of a city or country, so far as regards the 
inhabitants.”229 No one else at the federal constitutional convention argued that the national 
government should have the “police” power.  Other delegates consistently spoke of the “police” 
power as a power of the states.      
 
The Virginia Plan as modified by Morris was, however, the high point of nationalism at 
the convention.  The critical moment in the move towards a more limited national government 
was the work of the Committee of Detail.  The Committee proposed a draft constitution that 
framed the discussion for the last month of the Convention.  The Committee abandoned the 
general grant of power featured in the Virginia Plan and proposed, instead, a list of enumerated 
that (with modifications) became the grant of powers in Article I, section 8 of our Constitution.  
Whereas the Virginia Plan with Morris’s revision envisioned the national government as 
“supreme,” the Committee of Detail’s Constitution was one of limited powers.230 
 
Reinforcing this concept of a federal government of limited powers was the Committee 
of Detail’s proposed preamble.  As the committee undertook its revisions, committee member 
Edmund Randolph drafted a “sketch of the constitution” to guide the committee in its work.231 
Randolph made clear that, while “[a] preamble seems proper”232 it was not to be an assertion of 
authority.  The preamble was ‘[n]ot for the purpose of designating the ends of government and 
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human polities.”233 It had to be consistent with “the rights of states.”234 Reflecting this 
approach, the Committee of Detail’s Preamble was both minimalist and framed the Constitution 
as a document created by the people of the individual states: 
 
We the People of the States of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode-Island and 
Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvani, Delaware, Maryland, 
Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare and establish the 
following Constitution for the Government of Ourselves and our Posterity. 235             
 
Thus, as the Committee of Style began its work, the draft Constitution was one that 
created a government of limited, enumerated national powers and that was framed, by its 
preamble, as a creation of the people of the thirteen states. 
 
b. The Presidency 
 
With Wilson, Morris was the principal voice for a strong executive at the Convention.   
 
Morris believed that “an active and vigorous executive” was essential to good 
government and that “the due Establishment of the executive Authority” was the “Key Stone in 
the great Arch of Empire.”236  His commitment to a strong executive was long-standing.  The 
New York Constitution of 1777, which he helped draft, vested more power in the governor than 
any other state constitution.  His war experience had strengthened his conviction that a strong 
executive was of vital importance, and his belief that Washington would be the first President 
reinforced that belief that the Constitution should entrust great authority to the President.  As he 
wrote in a letter shortly after the convention, “The Extent of our Country and the deliberative 
freedom of it’s legislative Authority require the Compensation of an active and vigorous 
Execution. Every subordinate Power should be tied to the Chief by those intermediate Links of 
Will and Pleasure which like the Elasticity of the arterial System under sensible the Pulsations of 
the Heart at the remotest Extremities.”237  
 
At the convention, there were deep conflicts about the Presidency. There was a move to 
create a Presidency shared by multiple people, rather than an individual.  There was wide 
support for vesting in Congress the power to select the President.  With Wilson, Morris was the 
primary force arguing for the election of the President by the people; Morris contended that 
selection by Congress would make the President dependent on the legislative branch.  Because 
of his concern about congressional power over the President, he proposed the electoral college as 
a compromise method of selection.238  Morris wanted an absolute presidential veto and opposed 
impeachment of the President (though he ultimately changed his mind).  He opposed 
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presidential term limits and argued for either lifetime tenure or unlimited eligibility for 
reelection.  He wanted the President alone to appoint judges and cabinet officials and argued for 
a broad executive power in military affairs.   
 
Morris’s principal speech on the presidency took place on July 19, and he outlined the 
case for a strong presidency.239 He began with the observation that a properly constituted 
presidency was crucial to “the efficacy & utility of the Union among the present and future 
States.” He then argued that a strong presidency was critical to the operations of a republic of the 
size of the United States:  
 
“It is necessary to take into one view all that relates to the establishment of the Executive; 
on the due formation of which must depend the efficacy & utility of the Union among the present 
and future States. It has been a maxim in political Science that Republican Government is not 
adapted to a large extent of Country, because the energy of the Executive Magistracy can not 
reach the extreme parts of it. Our Country is an extensive one. We must either then renounce the 
blessings of the Union, or provide an Executive with sufficient vigor to pervade every part of 
it.”  
 
In addition to arguing that a strong president was necessary for successful administration 
of a large republic, Morris argued that a strong executive was necessary to check the Congress 
and to protect “the lower classes”: 
 
“One great object of the Executive is to controul the Legislature. The Legislature will 
continually seek to aggrandize & perpetuate themselves; and will seize those critical moments 
produced by war, invasion or convulsion for that purpose. It is necessary then that the Executive 
Magistrate should be the guardian of the people, even of the lower classes, agst. Legislative 
tyranny, against the Great & the wealthy who in the course of things will necessarily compose--
the Legislative body. . . The Executive therefore ought to be so constituted as to be the great 
protector of the Mass of the people.”240 
 
He argued that the President should have the power to appoint both executive and judicial 
officers and to control the military: “It is the duty of the Executive to appoint the officers & to 
command the forces of the Republic: to appoint 1. ministerial officers for the administration of 
public affairs. 2. Officers for the dispensation of Justice--.”  Morris linked giving the President 
these powers with his argument for popular election of the President: “Who will be the best 
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Judges whether these appointments be well made? The people at large, who will know, will see, 
will feel the effects of them--Again who can judge so well of the discharge of military duties for 
the protection & security of the people, as the people themselves who are to be protected & 
secured?”   
 
Thus, Morris’s vision embraced a broad grant of executive power to the President.  The 
President was to command the military and unilaterally appoint judicial and executive branch 
officers.  Morris’s emphasis was not, however, on these specific grants, but on the overarching 
principle that the nation needed a strong executive for the effective administration of the 
government of an “extended republic” and for the protection of the people, including the “lower 
classes.”     
 
As with national powers, the crucial decisions about the scope of presidential power 
(prior to the Committee of Style) were made in the Committee of Detail, which drafted the 
enumeration of presidential powers.   
At one level, the Committee’s proposal did not depart dramatically from Morris’s vision 
(although they did not go as far as he would have wanted).  As Morris envisioned, the President 
was to be Commander-in-Chief, according with his position that the President should “command 
the forces of the Republic.” Morris’s desire to give the President the power to name officers had 
become the power to nominate principal officers of the executive and judicial branches – subject 
to Senate confirmation. The Committee of Detail’s draft also reflected the Convention’s decision 
(which Morris enthusiastically supported) that there should be one person heading the executive 
branch, rather than multiple office-holders working as a council.  The vesting clause for the 
Executive Branch stated: “The Executive power of the United States shall be vested in a single 
person.”241  
 
As willl be discussed in the next section, Morris’s changes in presidential powers were 
subtle.  He did not alter the enumeration.  But he created text to provide an argument for a 
broad grant of powers beyond the specific enumerations in line with his goals of creating a 
presidency “with sufficient vigor to pervade every part of” the country and “to controul the 
Legislature.” 
 
c. Judiciary 
 
Morris was one of the principal advocates at the convention of the creation of a strong 
national judiciary.  Two areas in which the Constitution, as it went into the Committee of Style, 
did not reflect his views were with respect to whether Congress was required to establish lower 
federal courts and whether federal courts would have the power of judicial review. 
 
i. Lower federal courts 
 
The Virginia Plan, which, as previously noted, Morris helped draft, mandated the creation 
of lower federal courts: 
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9. Resd. that a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or more supreme 
tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature, to hold their 
offices during good behavior . . .242 
 
John Rutledge, supported by Roger Sherman, moved to strike “and of inferior tribunals,” 
contending that lower federal courts were an infringement on state authority.  Rutledge argued:  
 
[T]he State Tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases to decide in the first instance 
the right of appeal to the supreme national tribunal being sufficient to secure the national rights 
& uniformity of Judgmts: that it was making an unnecessary encroachment on the jurisdiction of 
the States, and creating unnecessary obstacles to their adoption of the new system.243 
 
Madison, Wilson, and Dickinson all responded, defending the Virginia Plan.244  
Madison stressed that lower federal courts were necessary to avoid “improper Verdicts in State 
tribunals obtained under the biassed directions of a dependent Judge, or the local prejudices of an 
undirected jury.”245 
 
The Rutledge-Sherman proposal narrowly carried, five votes in favor, four against, and 
two state delegations divided.   
 
Wilson and Madison then proposed a compromise under which Congress would have 
authority to establish lower federal courts, but was not required to do so: 
 
Mr. Wilson & Mr. Madison then moved . . . to add to Resol: 9. the words following "that 
the National Legislature be empowered to institute inferior tribunals". They observed that there 
was a distinction between establishing such tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the 
Legislature to establish or not establish them. They repeated the necessity of some such 
provision.246 
 
This proposal – which has come to be known in both the scholarly literature and the case 
law as the “Madisonian Compromise” – was adopted, eight delegations in favor, two opposed, 
and one divided.247   
 
Morris did not speak in this initial debate.  When, however, there was a subsequent 
move by Pierce Butler and Luther Martin to revisit the Madisonian Compromise and strip 
Congress of the power to create lower federal courts, Morris responded.  He “urged the 
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necessity of such a provision” giving Congress the ability to create lower federal courts.248 The 
delegates reaffirmed the Madisonian compromise, with no delegation voting against it.249  
 
Thus, as the Committee of Style began its work, the Constitution gave Congress the 
power to create lower federal courts, but did not require it to do so. 
 
ii. Judicial Review 
 
During the revolutionary era, there had been a handful of state court cases invalidating 
statutes, although in a number of cases the exercise of the power had been controversial.  
Although judicial review was not yet well-established, the Virginia Plan did not have a textual 
provision giving federal courts the power of judicial review.   
 
The Plan, instead, had two textual provisions for overriding legislation (neither of which 
were eventually adopted).  As a check on congressional legislation, it proposed the creation of a 
Council of Revision, which was, to quote historian Richard Beeman, one of Madison’s “pet 
ideas.”250 The council would have been made up of “the Executive and a convenient number of 
the National Judiciary.”251  It would have had the power to review and veto federal legislation, 
subject to congressional override.252  In addition, Congress would have had the power “to 
negative all laws passed by several States, contravening in the opinion of the National 
Legislature the articles of Union. . . .” 253 
 
The delegates at the constitutional convention allocated little time for the discussion of 
judicial powers, and the comments on judicial review were scattered and were largely (although 
not exclusively) made in the context of the arguments over these two proposals.   
 
Morris spoke in favor of judicial review three times.   
 
Morris’s first statement in support of judicial review was made in the context of a speech 
opposing the grant to Congress of a power to invalidate state legislation.  Morris declared that 
he “[w]as more and more opposed to the negative. The proposal of it would disgust all the States.  
A law that ought to be negative will be set aside in the Judiciary departmt. and if that security 
should fail; may be repealed by a Nationl. Law.”254 
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Morris is here simply assuming that federal courts will have the power of judicial review 
over state legislation – “A law that ought to be negative will be set aside in the Judiciary 
departmt.”   
 
In the course of the convention’s discussion of the ratification process, Morris again 
assumed that courts had the power of judicial review.  Ellsworth had proposed that the final 
document be ratified (or not) by the state legislatures.  In arguing that the Constitution should 
be submitted to state conventions, Morris said that submission to state legislatures would reflect 
the view that the Constitution was to be regarded as an amendment to the Articles of 
Confederation, and under the terms of the Articles, amendments required unanimous consent of 
the state legislatures.  If the Constitution were ratified by anything less than all state 
legislatures, courts would find it invalid under the Articles of Confederation:  “If the 
Confederation is to be pursue no alteration can be made without the unanimous consent of the 
Legislatures: Legislative alterations not conformable to the federal compact, would clearly not be 
valid.  The Judges would consider them as null & void.”255    
 
In this speech, Morris is positing that, unless state legislatures unanimously adopted the 
Constitution, both the state legislative acts ratifying the Constitution and the Constitution itself 
would be rejected by courts because of inconsistency with the amendment process required 
under the Articles of Confederation. 
 
Morris returned to the topic of judicial review a third time in the context of the debate 
over the executive veto.  Arguing for a presidential veto that could not be overridden, Morris 
asserted that both such a veto and judicial review were necessary checks on Congress:  
 
Mr. Govr. Morris, suggested the expedient of an absolute negative in the Executive.  He 
could not agree that the Judiciary which was part of the Executive, should not be bound to say 
that a direct violation of the Constitution was law.  A control over the legislature might have its 
inconveniences.  But view the danger on the other side.256 
 
Here, Morris is assuming that there will be judicial review of federal legislation by 
federal courts.  He is envisioning two checks: the President should have power to veto 
congressional legislation and federal courts can “say that a [statute that was] a direct violation of 
the Constiution” is not “law.” 
     
During the course of the proceedings, six delegates spoke in favor of judicial review, and 
two spoke against it.  Morris’s three comments place him as at the extreme end of supporters of 
the doctrine.  Like Morris, Madison spoke on behalf of the doctrine three times.  Wilson spoke 
in support of it twice.  The other three proponents of the doctrine only mentioned it once 
each.257 
 
                                               
2552 Farrand 299. 
2562 Farrand 299.  See also Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Lewis R. Morris in 3 Sparks 192, 195 
(“[T]he judges would, it was forseen [at the convention], resist assaults on the Constitution by acts of legislation.”). 
257Get cites from my Stanford article, Klarman at 160. 
 67 
Despite the fact that there was more support for judicial review than opposition to it (at 
least among those who mentioned it) and despite the fact that the three leading voices of the 
nationalist delegates all favored it,  as the Constitution went to the Committee of Style, there 
was no provision that provided textual support for the practice. 
 
d. Contract Clause and Property 
 
Morris was one of the great defenders of the rights of property at the Convention.  
Nonetheless, he opposed the contract clause when it was first proposed on the convention floor, 
and the clause was voted down. Neither Madison’s notes of the debates nor the record of 
convention votes indicates that there were further discussion about the clause until the clause 
somehow emerged in the Committee of Style’s draft (despite having been voted down the one 
time it was subject to debate). Thus, the clause’s appearance in the Committee of Style draft and 
Morris’s apparent reversal of his position have puzzled historians. But a close look at the 
historical record indicates that, through informal discussions, the clause had gained general 
support prior to the Committee of Style and that Morris, rather than simply opposing a contract 
clause, wanted a clause that was, in critical ways, broader than the one he opposed on the 
convention floor. 
 
Morris’s dedication to property rights was evident early in his career.  In an essay from 
1776, he stressed the importance of property and its protections. He distinguished between 
political liberty, the right of the people to participate in governance of the polity, and civil 
liberty, the right to be free from governmental constraint and to use one’s property without 
governmental interference.  While he thought a measure of political liberty was necessary for 
civil liberty, unless it were constrained, political liberty would threaten civil liberty, and a strong 
executive and strong judiciary were necessary to constrain political liberty.  “Where political 
Liberty is in Excess,” he wrote, “Property must be insecure and where Property is not secure 
Society cannot advance.”258 “A nation of Politicians, neglecting their own Business for that of 
the State, would be the most weak miserable and contemptible Nation on Earth.” He celebrated 
commerce, which “requires not only the perfect security of property but perfect good faith.”  To 
protect commerce it was necessary to “increase civil and to diminish political liberty.” But the 
balance was valuable because promoting commerce was “the best Means of Promoting human 
Happiness.”259  Similarly, in a published essay from 1780, he declared, “[I]f the rights of 
property are invaded, order and justice will at once take their flight, and perhaps forever.”260    
 
At the convention, Morris was a champion of the protection of private property.  Unlike 
fellow nationalists, Madison and Wilson, he believed that the principal purpose of the state was 
the protection of property.261  “Life and liberty were generally said to be of more value, than 
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property.  An accurate view of the matter would nonetheless prove that property was the main 
object of the State,”262 he declared. He argued that only freeholders should have the vote and 
that Senators should serve for life, not be paid, and represent property interests. In a letter written 
to Morris’s biographer Jared Sparks in 1831, Madison accurately captured Morris’s commitment 
to the protection of property at the convention.  Morris, Madison wrote with understatement, 
did not “incline to the democratic side.” He “contended for certain Articles (a Senate for life 
particularly) which he held essential to the stability and energy of a Government capable of 
protecting the rights of property against the spirit of democracy.  He wished to make the weight 
of wealth to balance that of numbers, which he pronounced to be the only effectual security to 
each, against the encroachments of the others.”263  
 
In accordance with his concern about protecting property rights, one month before Rufus 
King proposed the contract clause, Morris had given a speech that seems to call for a 
constitutional bar on interference with contract rights: 
 
He concurred in thinking the public liberty in greater danger from Legislative usurpations 
than from any other source. It had been said that the Legislature ought to be relied on as the 
proper Guardians of liberty. The answer was short and conclusive. Either bad laws will be 
pushed or not. On the latter supposition no check will be wanted. On the former a strong check 
will be necessary: And this is the proper supposition. Emissions of paper money, largesses to the 
people — a remission of debts and similar measures, will at sometimes be popular, and will be 
pushed for that reason At other times such measures will coincide with the interests of the 
Legislature themselves, & that will be a reason not less cogent for pushing them. It might be 
thought that the people will not be deluded and misled in the latter case. But experience teaches 
another lesson.264 
 
He is arguing here for a “strong check” on legislation that provides for “a remission of 
debts.” This speech would appear to be a call for a contract clause. Moreover, in 1814, reflecting 
on his role at the convention, he remembered that “[p]ropositions to countenance the issuance of 
paper money, and the subsequent violation of contracts, must have met with all the opposition I 
could make.”265  Again, this statement suggests that he favored a contract clause. 
 
Nonetheless, when Rufus King proposed a contract clause, Morris spoke in opposition. 
 
According to Madison’s notes, on August 28, as the Convention debated the provisions 
restricting state governments, “Mr King moved to add, in the words used in the Ordinance of 
Congs establishing new States, a prohibition on the States to interfere in private contracts.”266   
He was apparently referring to the contract clause of the Northwest Ordinance, which provided: 
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And, in the just preservation of rights and property, it is understood and declared, that no 
law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said territory, that shall, in any manner whatever, 
interfere with or affect private contracts or engagements, bona fide, and without fraud, 
previously formed.267 
 
Morris responded: 
 
This would be going too far. There are a thousand laws relating to bringing actions — 
limitations of actions & which affect contracts— The Judicial power of the U— S— will be a 
protection in cases within their jurisdiction; and within the State itself a majority must rule, 
whatever may be the mischief done among themselves.268 
 
Wilson and Madison then spoke in behalf.  Mason voiced opposition, echoing Morris: 
 
This is carrying the restraint too far. Cases will happen that can not be foreseen, where 
some kind of interference will be proper, & essential— He mentioned the case of limiting the 
period for bringing actions on open account — that of bonds after a certain (lapse of time,) — 
asking whether it was proper to tie the hands of the States from making provision in such 
cases?269  
 
Madison then records a brief series of speeches, concluding with a substitution for King’s 
motion: 
 
Mr. Wilson. The answer to these objections is that retrospective interferences only are to 
be prohibited.  
 
Mr. Madison. Is not that already done by the prohibition of ex post facto laws, which will 
oblige the Judges to declare such interferences null & void.  
 
Mr. Rutlidge moved instead of Mr. King’s Motion to insert — “nor pass bills of attainder 
nor retrospective* laws” . . .270  
 
Rutledge’s motion passed, seven states in favor and three opposed, and thus the 
prohibition on bills of attainder and retrospective laws replaced the contract clause.  The 
contract clause was not discussed on the floor of the convention again until the Committee of 
Style submitted its draft where the contract clause somehow reemerged.   
 
Historians have struggled with this turn of events.  It has been suggested that, in 
Committee of Style meetings, Hamilton or Wilson convinced Morris to insert in his draft a 
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clause he had opposed on the floor of the Convention and that had been rejected by the delegates 
or that the Committee of Style somehow forgot that the clause had been voted down.271  
 
Those explanations do not, however, comport with the other activities of the Committee 
of Style.  As will be discussed later in this paper, the changes in the Committee’s draft were all 
subtle.  There was nothing as “audacious”272 as attempting to slip through a clause that had 
been voted down. And it is hard to believe that, when the delegates debated the Committee of 
Style’s draft, they would all have missed the fact that a provision that had been voted down was 
now in the Constitution.  Moreover, they modified the Committee’s proposal and considered 
expanding its reach to the national government.  The claim that the delegates overlooked the 
fact that the provision had been voted down is not tenable.   
 
The explanation for the clause’s reemergence seems to lie in discussions held off the 
convention floor.  In the debate on King’s proposal, Madison had asserted that ex post facto 
clause covered contracts.  The following day, Dickinson announced that this position was 
incorrect: 
 
Mr. Dickenson mentioned to the House that on examining Blackstone’s Commentaries, 
he found that the terms “ex post facto” related to criminal cases only;4 that they would not 
consequently restrain the States from retrospective laws in civil cases, and that some further 
provision for this purpose would be requisite.273  
 
Dickinson’s research suggested that the ex post facto clause was only limited to criminal 
cases, and he called for adoption a “provision” applying to civil cases.  Although the historical 
record is not complete, Dickinson’s call and the limited type of changes the Committee of Style 
made in other contexts suggest that, prior to the beginning of the work of the Committee, a 
decision had been informally reached to add a contract clause.274      
 
With respect to Morris, the argument that Hamilton or King convinced him in the 
committee to re-insert the clause275 misses the nature of his objection. He was not objecting to a 
contract clause per se (although the standard view among scholars is that he was arguing against 
the inclusion of a contract clause in the Constitution).  He was arguing, instead, that the 
Northwest Ordinance went “too far.” His specific concern – and Mason’s as well – seems to 
have been with legislation that affected statutes of limitations.  And the relevant text of the 
Northwest Ordinance is broad in scope, covering legislation which “shall, in any manner 
whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts or engagements, bona fide, and without fraud, 
previously formed.”  Morris’s speech earlier in the convention reflects concern with statutes 
that involved “remission of debts.”276 His concern with King’s proposal – and its coverage of 
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state statutes that “in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts or 
engagements in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts or 
engagements”277 - was that it went beyond this core to and called into question “a thousand laws 
relating to bringing actions.”  
 
Even more significant than their overlooking Morris’s view that the contract clause went 
“too far,” scholars have overlooked the area in which Morris would have thought the cause did 
not go “far enough.”  The Northwest Ordinance, by its terms, only applied to “private contracts 
or engagements.” The historical record indicates that Morris would have wanted the contract 
clause to reach beyond contracts between private parties. In particular, while there was no 
discussion at the convention of the applicability of the contract clause to bar revocation of state 
grants of corporate charters, Morris had previously suggested that, as a matter of constitutional 
law, a state should not be able to revoke a corporate charter. 
 
The context of his suggestion was his argument to the Pennsylvania Assembly when it 
was considering repealing the statute incorporating the Bank of North America.  The Bank was 
the brainchild of the two Morrises.  It was privately funded (and Gouverneur Morris was a 
stockholder), but created pursuant to statutes of the Continental Congress and the Pennsylvania 
legislature.  It was, in effect, the first national bank, and its notes circulated as currency.278  It 
was controversial, and in 1785, there was a move in the Pennsylvania Assembly to repeal that 
statute of incorporation.  Morris responded with an address that defended the bank as playing a 
crucial role in the economy. In addition to his prudential defense of the bank, he also forcefully 
argued that the legislature should not test whether it had the constitutional power to revoke the 
statute.  He began by suggesting that, even though judicial review was still novel,  a court 
might review the revoking statute for constitutionality: 
An inquiry whether the law would be effectual involves a doubt of your power, and may, 
therefore, offend the weak or illiberal, but wise representatives of free citizens will listen candor 
and form a dispassionate judgment. They know that the boasted omnipotence of legislative 
authority is but a jingle of words. In the literal meaning it is impious. And whatever 
interpretation lawyers may give, free-men must feel it to be absurd and unconstitutional. Absurd, 
because laws cannot alter the nature of things; unconstitutional, because the Constitution is no 
more, if it can be changed by the Legislature. A law was once passed in New Jersey, which the 
judges pronounced to be unconstitutional, and therefore void. Surely no good citizen can wish to 
see this point decided in the tribunals of Pennsylvania. Such power in judges is dangerous; but 
unless it somewhere exists, the time employed in framing a bill of rights and form of government 
was merely thrown away.279 
Turning to the substance of the constitutional issue, he suggested that a court might 
conclude that the legislature lacked the power to extinguish a right it had created: 
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The doubt which arises on this occasion, as to the extent of your authority, is not founded 
on the charter granted by Congress; but supposing the incorporation of the Bank to have been the 
same in its origin as that of a church, we ask whether the existence and the rights acquired by law 
can be destroyed by law. Negroes have by law acquired the right of citizens; would a subsequent 
law take that right away? It is not true that the right to give involves the right to take. A father, 
for instance, has no power over the life of his child, nor can a felon or traitor, pardoned by act of 
grace, be by repeal of that act condemned and executed. Should an act be passed to cancel the 
public debts, would that act be valid? Where an estate has been granted by law, can it be revoked 
by a subsequent law? Could the lands forfeited and sold be resumed and conveyed to the original 
owners? Many such questions might be put, and a judicial decision, either affirmative or 
negative, would be inconvenient and dangerous. Look then to the end ere you commence the 
labor.280 
Morris is urging the legislature to avoid presenting a court with the question whether a 
contractual “right[] acquired by law can be destroyed by law.”  More fundamentally, the 
analogies he offers indicate that a court should find such a statute unconstitutional. Each involves 
a clear injustice. In pressing this position, Morris did not point to any particular provision in the 
state constitution (and the Pennsylvania constitution did not have either a contract clause or a 
takings clause).  Rather, he is arguing from first principles.  
 
As will be discussed, the standard view among scholars is that the original understanding 
of the contract clause is that it did not apply to public statutes, such as corporate charters, and 
that, when the Supreme Court in the landmark decision in Fletcher v. Peck applied the contract 
clause to the legislative repeal of an incorporating statute it departed from the original 
understanding.  Scholars, however, have failed to recognize that the person who actually wrote 
the contract clause wanted constitutional protection for corporate charters.  The section below 
that discusses the contract clause will show how Morris revised the Northwest Ordinance in a 
way that provided a basis for the argument that it covered corporate charters and that Federalists 
had relied on that argument before Fletcher. 
 
e. Slavery and New States 
 
Two areas in which Morris’s stood alone at the convention were slavery and the 
admission of new states.  Morris was the leading voice denouncing slavery, and he was the only 
voice urging limits to the political power of new states.  The two positions were linked. 
Although one reason Morris was concerned about giving new states equality with the original 
states was his elitism, he was also concerned that the new states would predominantly be slave 
states and shift the balance of national power in favor of slavery. 
 
Slavery:  Long before the federal constitutional convention, Morris was an opponent of 
slavery.  Notably, when helping draft the New York State constitution of 1777, he fought 
(unsuccessfully) for a provision that would have ended slavery in the state.281  At the 
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convention, he was the outspoken critic of slavery.  “[D]omestic slavery,’ he declared, “. .. . 
was a nefarious institution --- It was the curse of heaven on the states where it prevailed.”282 He 
bitterly denounced the 3/5 clause, and he said he could not accept the clause, even if the failure 
to include it the Constitution would lead the southern states to leave the convention. Madison 
reports: “Mr. Govr. MORRIS was compelled to declare himself reduced to the dilemma of 
doing injustice to the Southern States or to human nature, and he must therefore do it to the 
former. For he could never agree to give such encouragement to the slave trade as would be 
given by allowing them a representation for their negroes, and he did not believe those States 
would ever confederate on terms that would deprive them of that trade.”283 He sought to insert 
the word “free” in a clause that would have provided one representative “for every 40,000 
inhabitants.”284 Attacking the unamended provision, he declared: “The admission of slaves into 
the Representation when fairly explained comes to this: that the inhabitant of Georgia and S. C. 
who goes to the Coast of Africa, and in defiance of the most sacred laws of humanity tears away 
his fellow creatures from their dearest connections & damns them to the most cruel 
bondages, shall have more votes in a Govt. instituted for protection of the rights of mankind, 
than the Citizen of Pa. or N. Jersey who views with a laudable horror, so nefarious a practice.”285 
 
While Morris’s initial speeches were forceful, ultimately, he decided that there could be 
“a bargain among the Northern & Southern States” on the provisions involving the slave trade, 
taxes on exports, and regulation of navigation.286  And, despite his claim that he could not 
accept the 3/5 clause, he did accept it when he supported the Constitution.  Nonetheless, no 
delegate had spoken as forcibly to denounce slavery’s immorality.   
 
New States: Alone among the delegates, Morris fought against giving new states full 
political equality with the original thirteen.  “He [Morris] thought the rule of representation 
ought to be so fixed as to secure to Atlantic States a prevalence in the National Councils.”287  
He argued for “irrevocably fixing the number of representatives which the Atlantic States should 
respectively have, and the number which each new State will have. “288 “He dwelt much on the 
danger of throwing such a preponderancy [of representation in Congress] into the Western Scale, 
suggesting that in time the Western people wd. outnumber the Atlantic States. He wished 
therefore to put it in the power of the latter to keep a majority of votes in their own 
hands.”289 When the convention considered the Committee of Detail’s proposal that “new States 
shall be admitted on the same terms with the original states,”290 Morris successfully urged that 
the language should be struck because “[h]e did not wish to bind down the Legislature to admit 
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Western States on the terms here stated.”291 
 
In justifying his position, he voiced concern about the quality of the leaders the new 
states would have:  
 
Among other objections it must be apparent they would not be able to furnish men 
equally enlightened, to share in the administration of our common interests. The Busy 
haunts of men not the remote wilderness, was the proper School of political Talents. If 
the Western people get the power into their hands they will ruin the Atlantic interests. 
The Back members are always most averse to the best measures.292 
 
Madison sarcastically responded that Morris’s argument suggested that he “determined 
the human character by the points of the compass.”293  
 
Focusing on the consequences of giving full representation to western states, Morris also 
argued that it would lead to ill-advised military conflict: “The new States will know less of the 
public interest than these [the original thirteen states], will have an interest in many respects 
different, in particular will be little scrupulous of involving the Community in wars the burdens 
& operations of which would fall chiefly on the maritime States. 294 
  
Critically, however, Morris was concerned, not just that the new states would align 
against the original thirteen, but that they would align with the southern states against the 
northern states. Thus his concern about the new states was linked to his opposition to slavery. He 
decried the fact that “Southn. Gentleman will not be satisfied unless they see the way open to 
their gaining a majority in the public Councils.”295  “There can be no end of demands for 
security if every particular interest is to be entitled to it,”296 and the “interest” Southern 
demanded protection for was slavery: “[T]he Southn. States claim it [security] for their peculiar 
objects.”297 He envisioned that the Southern states and the new states would form a coalition 
that would dominate the national government and threaten the interests of Northern states: “If the 
Southn. States get the power into their hands, and be joined as they will be with the interior 
Country they will inevitably bring on a war with Spain for the Mississippi. . .  The interior 
Country having no property nor interest exposed to the sea, will be little affected by such a war.  
He wished to know what security the Northn. & middle States will have agst. this danger.”298 
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The stakes of the new states’ issue were high both for an opponent of slavery like Morris 
and for slavery’s defenders because of the demographic change that Morris and his fellow 
delegates – both from the north and the south - envisioned.   
 
In the wake of the three-fifths clause and the Connecticut Compromise, the North would 
have a slight advantage in both houses of Congress immediately after ratification. At the outset 
of government under the Constitution, there would be seven northern states and six southern.299 
The seven northern states would have 35 delegates, and the southern states 31.300  Even though 
the North had a slight edge, Morris was unhappy with this allocation, which was the product of 
the three-fifths clause.  “[T]he Southern States have by the report more than their share of 
representation.”301   In contrast, Madison, expressing the views of the South, voiced concern 
that southern representatives would be in the minority.  He said that he “always conceived that 
the difference of interest in the U. States lay not between the large & small, but the N. & Southn. 
States.”302 Madison was unhappy with the initial allocation of representatives in the House 
because the “members allotted to the N. States was greatly superior.”303   
 
But the North’s advantage in the House was seen as temporary. It was generally thought 
that the Southern states would grow in population more rapidly than the Northern states and that 
population growth in the territories would also be more in the South than the North.  As South 
Carolina’s Pierce Butler observed, “The people & strength of America are evidently bearing 
Southwardly & S. westwdly.”304 Morris’s unsuccessful arguments that majority of 
representation should remain in the original thirteen states had been a counter to these 
demographic trends.  Similarly, he argued (again unsuccessfully) against the constitutional 
provision that there be a census and that representation in the House be adjusted in accordance 
with its findings about population.305        
 
The North’s slight advantage in the Senate might prove more enduring, so long as the 
 number of new southern states to be admitted did not exceed the number of new 
northern states.  Strikingly, in the wake of adoption of the three-fifths clause, Morris, who had 
been one of the strongest critics of equal representation of the states, came to support the 
Connecticut Compromise, declaring “he shall be obliged to vote for ye. vicious principle of 
equality in the 2d. branch in order to provide some defence for the N. states.”306 The Senate 
would be the bulwark against the South.  
 
Morris’s fight on the floor against provisions that he saw as leading to an increase in the 
political power of the South and the West had been repeatedly unsuccessful.  He had, however, 
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achieved a significant victory, although he achieved it through deception, rather than the force of 
argument.    
 
Towards the end of the convention, the Committee of Detail had put together a draft 
Constitution, which the delegates worked through provision by provision. When they turned to 
the Committee of Detail’s provision on new states, Morris rose to propose the addition of a new 
provision.  Madison’s notes report:   
 
Mr Govr Morris moved to postpone this [discussion of the new states provision] in order 
to take up the following. "The Legislature shall have power to dispose of and make all needful 
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the U. States; and 
nothing in this constitution contained, shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims either of 
the U-- S-- or of any particular State."307 
 
There was no substantive discussion of the meaning of the clause, except that Maryland’s 
Luther Martin proposed the addition of a provision that any claims could be litigated in the 
Supreme Court, which Morris responded was “unnecessary, as all suits to which the U.S. – are 
parties – are already to be decided by the supreme Court of the U – States.”308 Without further 
debate, Morris’s addition of this clause on territorial governance was adopted, with Maryland 
alone dissenting.309 
  
While the clause was thus adopted without discussion of its import, Morris saw it as 
profoundly consequential.  Writing a letter to Henry Livingston in 1803, at the time of the 
Louisiana Purchase, he boasted that he had crafted the territories clause in such a way that it 
would bar newly-acquired territories from becoming states, but that he had hidden the clause’s 
meaning so that his fellow framers would fail to realize what the clause meant: “I always thought 
that, when we should acquire Canada and Louisiana it would be proper to govern them as 
provinces, and allow them no voice in our councils. In wording the third section of the fourth 
article [of the Constitution], I went as far as circumstances would permit to establish the 
exclusion. Candor obliges me to add my belief, that, had it been more pointedly expressed, a 
strong opposition would have been made.”310 
 
As he predicted, Morris’s language was to prove important, although the territories 
acquired by the United States in the first hundred years of the republic all became states.  But 
Puerto Rico and Guam – territories acquired in by the United States as a result of the Spanish 
American War – have been governed as territories, rather than being admitted as states, and 
courts and the executive branch have justified this treatment by relying on the language Morris 
added from the floor.311 
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Morris’s amendment to the territories clause foreshadowed his work on the Committee of 
Style. Morris’s fellow delegates were uniformly in favor of political equality for the territories, 
enabling them to become states on an equal footing with the original thirteen.  Morris alone was 
not.  Having failed to persuade others in substantive debates, he crafted language designed to 
reverse that outcome.  He is making it possible for Congress to govern territories permanently, 
rather than moving them to statehood.  At the same time, he masked his intent and, because any 
clearer language would been rejected, he used language that, rather than explicitly vesting 
Congress with the power to govern territories permanently as territories, was ambiguous. “I went 
as far as circumstances would permit to establish the exclusion. Candor obliges me to add my 
belief, that, had it been more pointedly expressed, a strong opposition would have been made.”  
He slipped language into the Constitution that future political actors could draw on. He acted in 
precisely the same way repeatedly as he crafted the Committee of Style’s draft. 
 
Conclusion 
This section has surveyed Morris’s positions at the constitutional convention before the 
Committee of Style began its work on the areas of central importance to him.  He was a 
champion of the power of the national government.  He fought for a strong executive. He 
believed in the necessity of judicial review and a strong federal judiciary.  He saw the 
protection of private property as the fundamental reason for government’s existence.  He 
opposed slavery and wanted to constrain the admission of new states.  While he achieved 
substantial successes during the floor debates, the Constitution was the work of compromise.  
As the Committee of Style began its work, the Constitution fell short of his vision in each critical 
dimension. 
 
VI. The Work of the Committee of Style 
 
This section examines the provisions of the Constitution whose substantive meaning was 
changed by the Committee of Style.  There were other provisions of the Constitution whose text 
was changed by the Committee, but this section only discusses the provisions where the changes 
had substantive consequence.312 
 
These provisions typically follow a pattern.  Morris was reversing a loss he had suffered 
during the convention proceedings or, at the least, advancing a position that the prior draft of the 
Constitution had not reflected.  Morris’s changes reflected not only his vision of the 
Constitution but positions that the Federalists would champion in the early republic. He was, in 
effect, creating a Federalist constitutional playbook.  At the same time, the changes were subtle 
and often so ambiguous that Republicans could offer an alternative reading.  Finally, in many 
cases, Hamilton and Wilson, with whom Morris had worked on the committee, were fighting for 
the reading of the text Morris would have wanted.   
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a. The Preamble 
 
Proceedings of the Convention Referred to the Committee of Style and Arrangement  
Preamble: We the People of the States of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode-Island 
and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare and 
establish the following Constitution for the Government of Ourselves and our Posterity. 
 
Report of Committee of Style Preamble: We, the People of the United States, in order to 
form a more perfect union, to establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the 
common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves 
and our posterity, do ordain and establish the Constitution for the United States of America.   
 
The changes in the Preamble reframed the document, converting it from a document 
establishing a confederation without overarching purpose, to a document creating a nation 
animated by powerful goals.  It not only represented a new statement of the nation and its 
purposes, it had significant legal consequence: in the early Republic, Federalists repeatedly relied 
on the Preamble as a grant of power, although Republicans rejected this view. 
 
It is, however, orthodoxy today among legal scholars and courts that the Preamble is not 
a grant of power and that it has “little or no legal value or judicial usefulness.”313  This 
approach has consequences of the greatest significance.  Most significantly, it means that the 
grants of power to Congress set forth in Article I (or related powers implicit in those grants) are 
the only arguable basis for assertions of national authority in cases like National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius.314  This approach has consequence beyond the construction 
of the Preamble itself.  It supports Justice Scalia’s view for the Court in Heller, in interpreting 
the Second Amendment’s Preamble, that “apart from [a] clarifying function, a prefatory clause 
does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause.”315   It also accords with the Court’s 
conclusion in Eldred v. Ashcroft in upholding the Copyright Term Extension Act that the 
Copyright Clause’s Preamble - "promote the Progress of Science" 316 “is [not] an independently 
enforceable limit on Congress' power.”317  
 
The central authority for the proposition that the Constitution’s Preamble does not confer 
powers is Joseph Story, who wrote in his Commentaries: 
 
The preamble never can be resorted to, to enlarge the powers confided to the general 
government, or any of its departments. It cannot confer any power per se; it can never amount, 
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by implication, to an enlargement of any power expressly given. It can never be the legitimate 
source of any implied power, when otherwise withdrawn from the constitution. Its true office is 
to expound the nature, and extent, and application of the powers actually conferred by the 
constitution, and not substantively to create them.318 
 
In 1905, the Supreme Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,319 citing Justice Story, held 
that the Preamble was not a grant of authority: 
 
Although that Preamble indicates the general purposes for which the people ordained and 
established the Constitution, it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power 
conferred on the government of the United States, or on of any of its departments. Such powers 
embrace only those expressly granted in the body of the Constitution, and such as may be 
implied from those so granted. Although, therefore, one of the declared objects of the 
Constitution was to secure the blessings of liberty to all under the sovereign jurisdiction and 
authority of the United States, no power can be exerted to that end by the United States, unless, 
apart from the preamble, it be found in some express delegation of power, or in some power to 
be properly implied therefrom.  1 Story's Const. § 462. 320 
 
At least since Jacobson, the standard view has been that the Preamble is not a grant of 
power, and when it has been discussed in the law review literature, it has typically been treated 
as aspirational. With the exception of Professor Mikhail’s work and that of Professor William 
Crosskey, where the Preamble has been accorded interpretive weight, it has been seen as a gloss 
on other powers.321 
 
But the history of the Preamble in the early Republic reflect a very different view. 
 
Strikingly, and surprisingly, the notes of the convention do not report any discussion 
about the Committee of Style’s revised Preamble. But Antifederalists bitterly attacked the phrase 
“We, the People” in the state ratifying conventions. Since the debates in Philadelphia were 
secret, non-participants did not know about the enumeration of states in the Committee of 
Detail’s Preamble, but they were aware of the opening provision of the Articles of 
Confederation, which declared the document to be the “Articles of Confederation and perpetual 
Union between the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts-bay Rhode Island and Providence 
Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, 
North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.” The Constitution’s formulation was dramatically 
different. “What right had they to say, We, the people?” Patrick Henry angrily demanded.  “My 
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political curiousity, exclusive of my anxious solicitude for the public welfare, leads me to ask, 
Who authorized them to speak the language of We, the people, instead of We, the states?”322 
 
Scholars, have, however, repeatedly argued that, as Clinton Rossiter put it, “[w]e ought 
not attach too much significance to this change.”323 On August 31, shortly before the Committee 
of Style began its work, the Convention had decided that the new government would come into 
being if nine states ratified the Constitution. Rossiter writes, “Since no one could tell for certain 
which states would ratify and which would stall or even refuse flatly to join, the sensible course 
was to leave out any mention at all of New Hampshire and her twelve sisters.”324    
 
As a matter of drafting, however, one can easily frame options other than “We, the 
People” that account for the possibility that one or more states might not have ratified the 
document. For example, the essential formulation of the Committee of Detail’s Preamble could 
have been preserved by beginning the Constitution: “We the People of the States of the United 
States . . . “The selection of “We, the People,” rather than such a plausible alternative text 
suggests that Morris’s phrasing “We, the People” reflects a substantive vision.      
 
Indeed, as previously discussed, Morris’s statements at the Convention reflect his belief 
that the Constitution should create a government for a unified nation, rather than for a 
confederation of states.  Rather than being a representative of Pennsylvania, he was “a 
representative of America.”325 His aim was to “form a compact for the good of America.”326  
As he expressed his view of the framing in a speech in the Senate in 1802: 
 
Never, in the flow of time, was there a moment so propitious, as that in which the 
Convention assembled.  The States had been convinced, by melancholy experience, how 
inadequate they were to the management of our national concerns. The passions of the 
people were lulled to sleep; State pride slumbered; the Constitution was promulgated; and 
then it awoke, and opposition was formed; but it was in vain. The people of America 
bound the states down by this compact.327 
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As the last sentence suggests, for Morris, the opening words of the Preamble reflected his 
conception of who the sovereign creators of the Constitution were: the Constitution was the 
creation, not of the people of the various states acting in concert, but of “[t]he people of 
America.”  
 
Morris’s preamble not only changed who the authors of the Constitution were, it 
announced their goals: “to form a more perfect union, to establish justice, insure domestic 
tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the 
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.”  The Committee of Detail’s preamble, in 
contrast, had not offered any statement of goals. 
 
Again, Rossiter minimizes the significance of Morris’s enumeration. It is a “polished 
statement of the purposes of the Constitution, for which Morris had drawn on traditional 
sources.”328   
 
Brookhiser is more celebratory - Morris’s Preamble “showed creativity, and condensed 
thought”329 - but he finds the Preamble’s significant contribution in “We, the People,” not in the 
enumeration. 
 
But, in assessing the significance of the Preamble, it is important to see the ways in which 
(contrary to Rossiter’s statement), Morris departed from the other statements of goals available 
to him.  The Articles of Confederation “proclaimed itself a firm league of friendship” entered 
into by the States for “their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and 
general welfare.”330  Following the Articles of Confederation, the Virginia Plan’s first article 
asserted that the “objects” of “Confederation” should be “common defence, security of liberty 
and general welfare.”331  The first article of the New Jersey Plan announced its goals to be “to 
render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government, and the preservation 
of the Union.”332  The third plan presented to the Constitution, Charles Pinckney’s, was like the 
Committee of Detail’s plan in not framing goals in its introductory article.333 
 
The final three goals of Morris’s Preamble – “provide for the common defence, promote 
the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty” - track both Madison’s list and the list in 
the Articles of Confederation.  But the first three goals – “to form a more perfect union, to 
establish justice, insure domestic tranquility” - are not included in any of the predecessor 
documents. The New Jersey Plan also speaks of “union”, but the focus is dramatically different. 
The New Jersey Plan’s end is maintaining the current arrangement - the “preservation of the 
Union.” Morris’s goal is, very literally, reformulation: “to form a more perfect union.”  
 
John Mikhail has recently suggested that Morris and other strong nationalists among the 
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Founders understood the specification of goals in the Preamble as expanding the powers of the 
national government.334 The goals’ enumeration in the Preamble made them “Powers vested by 
this Constitution in the Government of the United States” under the “necessary and proper” 
clause; because that clause gave Congress the authority “[t]o make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution [those] Powers”, the Preamble became, 
indirectly, a grant of authority to Congress.335 Examination of the early history supports this 
view and highlights the significance of Morris’s additions. 
 
The Preamble figured in the first significant debate in Congress about the meaning of the 
Constitution – the debate about whether the President alone had the power to remove principal 
officers.  Congressman Laurence invoked the preamble as a basis for presidential power. 
“Would a regulation” that reflected the view that Congress had removal authority “be effectual to 
carry into effect the great objects of the constitution?” the Congressman asked.336 He responded 
that it would not. Invoking the Preamble’s “general welfare” clause, he said that measures 
inconsistent with “carrying of the constitution into effect . . . must be rejected as dangerous and 
incompatible with the general welfare.” Thus, in Laurence’s view the Preamble granted authority 
to the President to remove executive officers.   
 
The Preamble played a central role in the first great debate in Congress that involving the 
scope of congressional authority – the debate about the constitutionality of the legislation 
creating the Bank of the United States.  Most Congressman who spoke in favor of the bill and 
its constitutionality invoked the Preamble.   
 
Congressman Elbridge Gerry employed the argument discussed by Mikhail in contending 
that Congress had the power under the Constitution to create a Bank of the United States: 
 
“The causes which produced the Constitution were an imperfect union, want of public 
and private justice, internal commotions, a defenseless community, neglect of the public welfare, 
and danger to our liberties.  These are known to be the causes not only by the preamble of the 
Constitution, but also from our own knowledge of the history of the times that preceded the 
establishment of it.  If these weighty causes produced the Constitution, and it not only gives 
power for removing them, but also authorizes Congress to make all laws necessary and proper 
for carrying these powers into effect, shall we listen to the assertions that these words have no 
meaning, and that this Constitution shall have no more energy than the old.”337 
 
Gerry thus linked the Preamble and the necessary and proper clause in arguing for the 
Bank’s constitutionality.  Congress has the power under the necessary and proper clause for 
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“carrying these powers [the powers specified in the Preamble] into effect.” 
 
Similarly, the Federal Gazette, a Philadelphia newspaper, reported that Congressman 
Fisher Ames, in arguing in support of the Bank’s constitutionality, “adverted to the preamble of 
the constitution, which declares that it was established for the general welfare of the Union; 
[that] this vested Congress with the authority over all objects of national concern or of a general 
nature; [that] a national bank undoubtedly came within this idea.”338  For Ames, the Preamble 
was a grant of power. 
 
Similarly, the Annals of Congress report that Congressman Laurence (who had appealed 
to the Preamble in the removal debate) declared: “The great objects of this Government are 
contained in the context of the Constitution.  He recapitulated these objects and inferred that 
every power necessary to secure these objects must necessarily follow. . . .”339   
 
Congressman Boudinot also relied on the Preamble as providing authority for 
establishing the Bank: 
 
Mr. B. then took up the Constitution, to see if this simple power [the power to incorporate 
a bank] was not fairly to be drawn by necessary implication from those vested by this instrument 
in the legislative authority of the United States.  It sets out in the preamble with declaring the 
general purposes for which it was formed: “the insurance of domestic tranquility, provision for 
the common defence, and promotion of the general welfare.” These are the prominent features of 
this instrument, and are confirmed and enlarged by the specific grants in the body of it. . . .”340   
  
Opponents of the Bank denounced this reliance on the Preamble.  Madison’s attack was 
forceful:  
 
The preamble to the Constitution, said he, has produced a new mine of power; but this is 
the first instance he had heard of, in which the preamble had been adduced for such a 
purpose. In his opinion, the preamble only states the objects of the Confederation, and the 
subsequent clauses designate the express powers by which those objects are to be 
obtained; and a mean is proposed through which to acquire those that may be found still 
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requisite, more fully to effect the purposes of the Confederation.”341 
 
 Other opponents of the Bank similarly attacked the view that the Preamble was a grant 
of power.  Congressman Giles stated: 
 
“To establish the affirmative of this proposition, arguments have been drawn from 
several parts of the Constitution; the context has been resorted to.  “We, the People of 
the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic 
tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the 
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity,” &c.  It has been remarked, that here 
the the ends for which the government was established are clearly pointed out; the means 
to produce the ends are left to the choice of the Legislature, and that the incorporation of 
a bank is one necessary means to produce these general ends.  It may be observed, in 
reply, that the context contemplates every general object of Government whatever . . . 
“342   
 
Congressman Stone crisply made the same point, “I would ask if there is any power 
under Heaven which could not be exercised within the extensive limits of this preamble.”343  
 
In his opinion on the Bank bill, Attorney General Randolph similarly argued that the 
Preamble was hortatory: 
 
“The Preamble to the Constitution has also been relied on as a source of power. 
 
“To this, it will be here remarked, once for all, that the Preamble if it be operative is a full 
constitution of itself, and the body of the Constitution is useless; but that it is declarative only of 
the views of the convention, which they supposed would be best fulfilled by the powers 
delineated; and that such is the legitimate nature of preambles.” 
 
The debate about the Bank of the United States thus prominently featured a fight about 
whether the preamble was a grant of power.  Most of the Federalists who spoke in the House 
relied on the Preamble (among other grounds), and the Republicans argued that the Preamble 
was not a grant of power.  The Federalists prevailed, which provides originalist support for 
reading the Preamble as a grant of power.  At the same time, the position was contested.   
 
It should be noted, however, that Hamilton’s defense of the bank, unlike the defenses of 
many Federalist Congressman, did not explicitly draw on the Preamble.  Hamilton argued that 
the Bank was constitutional by appealing to the sovereign power of the government – without an 
invocation of the Preamble – and the necessary and proper clause.344       
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Hamilton had referenced the Preamble in the Federalist, although, again, not as a grant of 
power.  In Federalist 84, he wrote: 
 
Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing, and as they retain every thing, they have 
no need of particular reservations. "We the people of the United States, to secure the blessings of 
liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution for the United 
States of America." Here is a better recognition of popular rights than volumes of those 
aphorisms which make the principal figure in several of our state bills of rights, and which would 
sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government.345 
 
Hamilton is construing the Preamble as a statement of “popular rights.”  “[T]he people” 
are creating the national government for particular ends, but he is not reading the Preamble as a 
grant of authority.  The closest Hamilton came to reading the Preamble as a grant of authority 
came in his 1791 Report on Manufactures, where he justified the use of the taxing authority to 
provide funding for bounties for manufacturers.  In discussing the use of “general welfare” in 
Article I, section 8’s grant to Congress of a taxing and spending authority, Hamilton wrote: “The 
phrase [‘General Welfare’] is as comprehensive as any that could be used; because it was not fit 
that the constitutional authority of the Union, to appropriate its revenue shou’d have been 
restricted within narrower limits than the ‘General Welfare’ and because this necessarily 
embraces a vast variety of particulars, which are susceptible neither of specification nor of 
definition.”346  Peter Charles Hoffer has argued that, in making this argument, Hamilton was 
seeking to read Article I’s “general welfare” clause expansively, in light of the Preamble.347 
Even, here, however, Hamilton is not reading the Preamble as a separate grant of authority.  
Rather, it is serving as a gloss on the way the phrase “general welfare” is used elsewhere in the 
document.                           
      
The congressional debates in 1798 about the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition 
Acts, however, echoed the debates in the Bank controversy in the use of the Preamble and 
criticism of that use.  Congressman Gallatin argued that Congress lacked authority to pass the 
Sedition Act. Congressman Sewell responded “with three different arguments . . . why he 
supposed Congress had the power of making the proposed regulation.  And the first thing he 
referred to was the general nature of the Constitution itself, which he drew from the preamble, in 
the following words: “We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, 
establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the 
general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our prosperity, do ordain” 
&C. The Constitution, therefore, he said, in the outset, establishes the sovereignty of the United 
States, and that sovereignty must reside in the government of the United States.”348  
 
Congressman Williams, an opponent of the Sedition Act, responded with a forceful 
rejection of Sewell’s view of the Preamble as a grant to Congress of broad powers.  “If the 
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principle which the gentlemen from Massachusetts have drawn from the preamble of the 
Constitution, of providing for the common defence and welfare of the Union, be correct, it 
appeared to him unnecessary to have any other provision in the Constitution beside the preamble, 
as it may be inferred from that, that Congress has all power whatever.”349    
 
The debate about the Preamble occurred again when Jeffersonian Republicans acted to 
repeal the Judiciary Act of 1801, which had established circuit courts.  Morris, now a Senator 
from New York, argued that the proposed legislation was unconstitutional.  His argument began 
with an invocation of the Preamble. “To form, therefore, a more perfect union, and to ensure 
domestic tranquillity,” he declared, “the Constitution has said there shall be courts of the Union 
to try causes, by the wrongful decision of which the Union might be endangered or domestic 
tranquility be disturbed.”350  In addition to the preamble, Morris relied on the judicial powers 
clause (which he had also re-written when on the Committee of Style)351 as he made the case 
that Congress had a constitutional obligation to establish lower federal courts.  Morris 
contended that federal courts strengthened union and promoted tranquility, and the elimination of 
courts that had been established was unconstitutional.  He closed his argument by invoking 
Framers’ intent and implicitly invoking the goal of “ensur[ing] domestic tranquility.” 
 
The Convention contemplated the very act you now attempt. They knew also the 
jealousy and power of the States; and they established for your and for their 
protection this most important department. I beg gentlemen to hear and remember 
what I say: It is this department alone, and it is the independence of this 
department, which can save you from civil war.352 
 
Thus, Morris was using the Preamble as grant of power to Congress mandating 
the establishment of lower federal courts.   
 
Arguing for repeal, Congressman Baldwin dismissed Morris’s reliance on the 
Preamble:  “It had been contended in the early years of the Government, repeatedly, and 
with much earnestness, that the preamble of the Constitution was a grant of powers, and 
when a measure was proposed, if it could be shown to have a tendency ‘to form a more 
perfect union, establish justice, and insure domestic tranquillity, &c., it was 
Constitutional . . . “353  “Many questions of this kind have already been so far settled by 
practice on our Constitution that they have rarely been stirred of late,” he asserted.   He 
concluded, “It was some reward, he said, for the trouble they had on similar occasions, 
that the greater part appeared now to have been settled, as such instances occurred much 
less frequently than formerly: the one which presents itself now is new; he expressed his 
confidence that a result as proper and satisfactory would take place on this, as on former 
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occasions.”354   
 
 The other primary use of the Preamble in the early republic was in Chisholm v. 
Georgia. Both Justice Wilson and Chief Justice Jay relied on the Preamble as justifying 
the Court’s holding that it had jurisdiction over Georgia.  Chief Justice Jay found the 
Court’s jurisdiction grounded in the Preamble’s assertion that the federal government was 
“‘to establish justice.’”355   Wilson construed the Preamble at length: 
 
“Fair and conclusive deduction, then, evinces that the people of the United States 
did vest this Court with jurisdiction over the State of Georgia. The same truth may 
be deduced from the declared objects, and the general texture of the Constitution 
of the United States. One of its declared objects is, to form an union more perfect, 
than, before that time, had been formed. . . .  Another declared object is, "to 
establish justice." This points, in a particular manner, to the Judicial authority. 
And when we view this object in conjunction with the declaration, "that no State 
shall pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts;" we shall probably think, 
that this object points, in a particular manner to the jurisdiction of the Court over 
the several States. What good purpose could this Constitutional provision secure, 
if a State might pass a law impairing the obligation of its own contracts; and be 
amenable, for such a violation of right, to no controuling judiciary power? . . . A 
third declared object is -- "to ensure domestic tranquillity." This tranquillity is 
most likely to be disturbed by controversies between States. These consequences 
will be most peaceably and effectually decided by the establishment and by the 
exercise of a superintending judicial authority.”356 
 
Thus, the early history of the Republic show that the Preamble was not only a powerful 
statement of nationhood, but a provision of real legal consequence.   The debates about the 
Bank and the Sedition Act show that Morris had added language to the Constitution that 
Federalists viewed as a grant of authority (although Republicans disagreed and Hamilton was an 
exception to the standard Federalist view).  Moreover, his language was used (by Morris 
himself) to support the position that Congress had to create lower federal courts and in Chisholm 
to support the assertion of jurisdiction over the states.  At the same time, Republicans argued 
that the Preamble did not increase national power. So, the meaning of the clause was contested, 
but those who saw it as a grant of power were on the winning side: both the Bank Bill and the 
Sedition Act passed. 
 
b. Three Articles for Three Branches and Three Vesting Clauses 
 
Proceedings of the Convention Referred to the Committee of Style and Arrangement 
 
Article II: The Government shall consist of supreme legislative, executive and judicial 
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powers.   
Article III: The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress, to consist of two separate 
and distinct bodies of men, a House of Representatives, and a Senate. The Legislature shall meet 
at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December unless a 
different day shall be a appointed by law. . . . 
 
Article X: The Executive power of the United States shall be vested in a single person. 
His stile shall be, “The President of the United States of America;” and his title shall be, “His 
Excellency.” He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and together with the Vice 
President, Chosen for the same term, be electing in the following manner. . . . 
 
Article XI: The Judicial Power of the United States both in law and equity shall be vested 
in one Supreme Court, and in such Inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time to time, 
be constituted by the Legislature of the United States.   
 
Report of Committee of Style: 
Article I, section 1:  ALL legislative power herein granted shall be vested in a Congress 
of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. 
. . . . 
Article II, section 1: The executive power shall be vested in a president of the United 
States of America.  He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the 
vice-president, chosen for the same term, be elected in the following manner:  
. . . .  
Article III, section 1: The judicial power of the United States, both in law and equity, 
shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time 
to time ordain and establish.  The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold 
their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a 
compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.  
 
Alongside the changes to the Preamble and the contract clause, the most obvious change 
made by the Committee of Style is its restructuring of the provisions concerning the branches 
into three parallel articles, and one of the most legally consequential has been its alteration of the 
vesting clauses of Articles I and II.  
 
One of the most familiar aspects of the Constitution is its treatment of the three branches 
in three parallel articles: Article I (Congress), Article II (the Executive), and Article III (the 
Federal Judiciary). That division is wholly the work of the Committee of Style. None of the state 
constitutions had that framework. None of the various plans presented to the Convention (the 
Virginia Plan, the New Jersey Plan, Pinckney’s Plan) had that framework. The Committee of 
Detail’s draft Constitution began with an article stating that the “stile” of the government should 
be “The United States of America,” followed it with a separation of powers article that was 
Article II (reprinted above), then wended its way through the powers of Congress in a long series 
of articles (Article III through IX), before treating the Executive in Article X and the Judiciary in 
Article XI.     
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The parallel structuring of the three articles connotes parallel stature and authority.  
While that idea may strike us today as a commonplace of the United States constitutional system, 
it was not orthodoxy at the time of the founding.  The first state constitutions had placed 
overwhelming authority in the legislatures, and the revolutionary era document of national 
governance – the Articles of Confederation - was a document of legislative governance (without 
separate judiciary or executive). Moreover, the idea of the judiciary as a separate branch was 
contested: in British constitutional theory, the judiciary was part of the executive, and that 
position had adherents in the United States (including John Adams).  While the arc of 
constitutional development during the revolutionary era had been towards greater authority for 
the executive and the judiciary than they had in the first state constitutions, the notion that the 
other two branches were co-equal with the legislature was controversial.  The Committee of 
Detail’s structuring – with eight articles about the Congress appearing before the article and the 
executive and the article on the judiciary – accords with the view that Congress was preeminent 
and the other branches almost an after thought. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, at the convention, Morris had been, with Wilson, 
the greatest champion of a strong executive, and he also had been one of the principal advocates 
of a strong judiciary.  While there is certainly a stylistic element to the simplification of ten 
articles into three, it also reflected Morris’s vision of elevating the Presidency and the federal 
courts.  The re-structuring supports the view that the three branches are co-equal and 
independent of each other.  The textual change conveys a powerful vision. 
 
If the structuring of three parallel articles for three branches has largely symbolic import, 
the revisions to the vesting clauses have had a direct impact.   
 
Morris made two changes to the vesting clauses that merit highlighting. 
 
First, he dramatically, if subtly, reworked the executive branch vesting clause.   
 
The version referred to the Committee read: 
 
“The Executive power of the United States shall be vested in a single person. . . .”   
 
This clause focuses on who has the executive power.  “[A] single person” has “[t]he 
Executive power.”  Again, this may seem totally unremarkable today that one person should 
have the executive authority, but one of the major debates at the convention had been over who 
should have the executive authority – whether it would be multiple people or one person.  The 
convention ultimately decided it would be one person, and the version sent to the Committee 
(which had been crafted in the Committee of Detail) underscores that decision.  “[A] single 
person” has “[t]he Executive power.”   
 
The Committee of Style’s version shifts focus, and in shifting focus, it shifts meaning. As 
it emerges from the committee, the clause has become: “The executive power shall be vested in a 
president of the United States of America.”  The clause reads now, not as a definition of who 
the executive is, but as a grant of executive power to the President.  The “president of the 
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United States of America” has “[t]he executive power.”  As will be seen, the provision as 
revised has been read since the early republic as a broad grant of power to the President.  It 
would have been much harder, as a textual matter, to read the earlier version as a broad grant of 
power.   
 
Second, Morris qualified the grant of authority to the Congress in a way that he did not 
qualify the grant of authority to the President.  The vesting provisions for the legislature and the 
executive sent to the Committee of Style are parallel: “The legislative power shall be vested in a 
Congress . . .”; “The Executive power of the United States shall be vested in a single person . . . 
.”  The vesting clauses produced by the Committee are not: “ALL legislative power herein 
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . .,”; “The executive power shall be 
vested in a president of the United States of America.”  Congress receives the legislative 
powers “herein granted”; the President receives executive powers, without limitation. 
 
Some commentators have argued that the Committee’s addition of “herein granted” 
should be read as a limitation of legislative powers.357  That reading, however, would be 
inconsistent with Morris’s nationalism, and I do not know of anyone in the early republic who 
advanced such a reading. 
 
But the distinction between the two grants of power can be read, not as a limitation on the 
legislative power, but as a statement that the executive power is capacious, and such a reading is 
consistent with Morris’s constitutional vision, and it was advanced in one of the critical debates 
of the early republic, the debate about whether President Washington had the power to issue a 
neutrality proclamation. 
 
Close reading of the vesting clauses, resting on Morris’s two changes, has played a 
critical role in modern constitutional jurisprudence, providing the textual support for the unitary 
executive theory, in which the President has all executive powers and that grant is broadly 
understood.   
 
The landmark case modern case is Myers, where Chief Justice Taft declared: 
 
“It would not consist with the rules of sound construction, to consider this enumeration of 
particular authorities as  derogating from the more comprehensive grant in the general 
clause, further than as it may be coupled with express restrictions or limitations; as in 
regard to the cooperation of the Senate in the appointment of officers and the making of 
treaties; which are plainly qualifications of the general executive powers of appointing 
officers and making treaties. The difficulty of a complete enumeration of all the cases of 
executive authority, would naturally dictate the use of general terms, and would render it 
improbable that a specification of certain particulars was designed as a substitute for 
those terms, when antecedently used. The different mode of expression employed in the 
Constitution, in regard to the two powers, the legislative and the executive, serves to 
confirm this inference. In the article which gives the legislative powers of the 
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government, the expressions are 'All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
congress of the United States.' In that which grants the executive power, the expressions 
are 'The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States.'358 
 
Thus, in finding that the President’s removal power cannot be limited by Congress, Taft 
is both reading the text of the Article II vesting clause to grant the President all executive powers 
(“It would not consist with the rules of sound construction, to consider this enumeration of 
particular authorities as  derogating from the more comprehensive grant in the general clause . . 
.”) and contending that the difference between the two vesting clauses reinforces that reading 
(“The different mode of expression employed in the Constitution, in regard to the two powers, 
the legislative and the executive, serves to confirm this inference.”). Taft’s approach has a range 
of modern analogues, including Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson359 the OLC torture 
memo of 2003,360 the substantial body of unitary executive scholarship,361 the opinion for the 
Court in Free Enterprises Fund v.PCAOB362and Justice Thomas’s recent dissent in Zivitofsky v. 
Kerry.363     
 
The first argument – that the text of the Article II vesting clause gives the President all 
executive powers – made its appearance in the first great constitutional debate, the 1789 debate 
in the House about whether the President had a constitutional right to remove executive officers, 
even though the Constitution did not explicitly provide that right.  As with the Preamble, Fisher 
Ames, Morris’s good friend, invoked Morris’s text to support an outcome that Morris would 
have favored. Arguing that the President had the removal power, Ames observed that the 
Constitution declares "that the executive power shall be vested in the president" and added that 
"under these terms all the powers properly belonging to the executive department of the 
government are given, and such only taken away as are expressly excepted."364              
John Vining of Delaware similarly declared that "there was a strong presumption that [the 
President] was invested with [the removal power]; because, it was declared, that all executive 
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power should be vested in him, except in cases where it is otherwise qualified."365 George 
Clymer of Pennsylvania argued that "the power of removal was an executive power, and as such 
belonged to the president alone, by the express words of the constitution, ‘the executive power 
shall be vested in a president of the United States of America.' "366  
 
While he believed that the President had the removal power, Madison did not, initially, 
embrace the vesting clause argument to support his position.  Instead, he at first advanced 
functional arguments.367  A requirement of senatorial advice and consent for removal "would be 
found very inconvenient in practice" and would "tend[] to lessen [the] responsibility" of the 
President over his subordinates,"368 he asserted.  He, ultimately, however, advanced the vesting 
clause argument, after others had previously made it. He first advanced the vesting clause 
argument on June 17, a month into the debate and a month after he first argued that the President 
had the removal power under the Constitution [ck], when he noted the clause and contended that 
the requirement of senatorial advice and consent for appointments was "an exception to this 
general principle; and exceptions to general rules are ever taken strictly."369 
 
But while the argument that the vesting clause conferred all executive powers on the 
President was made, it was controversial.  Most of the Congressman who argued that the 
President had the removal power under the Constitution did not mention the vesting clause and 
either relied on other constitutional provisions or made structural arguments.370    
 
Moreover, the votes of a substantial number of the members of Congress reflect the view 
that the President did not have the removal power.371  And several Congressman explicitly 
rejected the vesting clause argument.   Congressman William Smith said that the Vesting 
Clause argument "proves too much, and therefore proves nothing; because it implies that powers 
which are expressly given by the constitution would have been in the president without the 
express grant."372  Alexander White contended that "the [only] executive powers [that are] 
vested, are those enumerated in the constitution."373 James Jackson argued, even if removal were 
an executive function "it does not follow that it vests in the president alone because [the 
President] alone does not possess all executive powers."374 
 
Thus, “the great constitutional debate of 1789” does not reflect a consensus about 
whether the vesting clause conferred a broad power on the President that ran beyond his 
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enumerated powers. 
The vesting clause thesis had substantial support, but a significant number of 
Congressman did not accept it. 
 
The disagreement about the meaning of the vesting clause was also central to the first 
great debate about the President’s foreign affairs powers: the 1793 debate between Hamilton and 
Madison about the constitutionality of the Neutrality Proclamation. 
 
Hamilton, writing as Pacificus, relied on the vesting clause thesis to justify President 
Washington’s issuance of the Neutrality Proclamation.  Like the adherents in 1789 of the view 
that there was a presidential power to remove officers, he argued that the vesting clause gave the 
President all executive powers, except where specific constitutional provisions took that power 
away.  In his first Pacificus letter, he began by quoting the vesting clause and then the 
Constitution’s enumeration of executive powers.  He argued that, under standard principles of 
construction, the enumeration did not imply that the President was not fully vested with the 
executive power:   
 
“It would not consist with the rules of sound construction to consider this enumeration of 
particular authorities as derogating from the more comprehensive grant contained in the general 
clause, further than as it may be coupled with express restrictions or qualifications; as in regard 
to the cooperation of the Senate in the appointment of Officers and the making of treaties; which 
are qualifica<tions> of the general executive powers of appointing officers and making treaties: 
Because the difficulty of a complete and perfect specification of all the cases of Executive 
authority would naturally dictate the use of general terms—and would render it improbable that a 
specification of certain particulars was designd as a substitute for those terms, when antecedently 
used.”375   
 
Thus, the only limits on the President’s possession of executive powers were the specific 
limitations specified in the document (such as with the making of treaties). 
 
Hamilton then advance a second vesting clause argument (one not advanced in the 
removal debate): 
 
“The different mode of expression employed in the constitution in regard to the two 
powers the Legislative and the Executive serves to confirm this inference. In the article which 
grants the legislative powers of the Governt. the expressions are—“All Legislative powers herein 
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the UStates”; in that which grants the Executive Power 
the expressions are, as already quoted “The Executive Po<wer> shall be vested in a President of 
the UStates of America.”   
 
Hamilton is here relying on the difference between the Article I and Article II vesting 
clauses  as a basis for reading the President’s power broadly.  Morris’s phrasing – and, to be 
specific, his insertion of “herein granted” into the Article I vesting clause – become the basis of 
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Hamilton’s argument for a broad understanding of the President’s powers, a constitutional goal 
that both Hamilton and Morris shared. Hamilton concludes:  “The general doctrine then of our 
constitution is, that the Executive Power of the Nation is vested in the President; subject only to 
the exceptions and qu[a]lifications which are expressed in the instrument.”376 
 
“The different mode of expression employed in the constitution in regard to the two 
powers the Legislative and the Executive serves to confirm this inference. In the article which 
grants the legislative powers of the Governt. the expressions are—“All Legislative powers herein 
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the UStates”; in that which grants the Executive Power 
the expressions are, as already quoted “The Executive Po<wer> shall be vested in a President of 
the UStates of America.”377 
 
Madison’s response as Helvidius was sharp.  He begins: 
 
“Several pieces with the signature of Pacificus were lately published, which have been 
read with singular pleasure and applause, by the foreigners and degenerate citizens among us, 
who hate our republican government, and the French revolution . . .” 378 
 
Helvidius reflects a different view of the vesting clause than Pacificus.  Madison 
observes that Pacificus’s vision of executive power accords with the views of Locke and 
Montesquieu, but dismisses them and the English precedent, declaring, “Both of them [Locke 
and Montesquieu] too are evidently warped by a regard to the particular government of England, 
to which one of them owed allegiance;* and the other professed an admiration bordering on 
idolatry.”379 Madison argues that the power to proclaim neutrality falls within the legislative 
sphere because it follows from the power to make war and to make treaties, both legislative 
powers.380 
 
There is a “tension” between Madison’s broad conception of the scope of executive 
power in the removal debates and the narrow view in his Helvidius essays.381  At the same time, 
Madison in Helvidius explicitly embraces his earlier position in the removal debate. He argues 
that removal is an executive power, but that neutrality is not.382 The Helvidius-Pacificus debate 
thus involves two different views of the meaning of the scope of the grant in the vesting clause, 
rather than a debate between a proponent who reads it to be a grant of power and one who does 
not. 
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To sum up: Morris’s reformulation of the vesting clauses of Article I and II was 
consequential and played a critical role in the first two great debates about the scope of executive 
power.  His language provided the basis for a broad reading of the executive power in the 
removal debate and by Pacificus in the fight over the Neutrality Proclamation.  At the same 
time, there was not a consensus about how to read the constitutional language.  The removal 
debate shows that here was a disagreement about whether the Article II vesting clause provided 
the President with powers greater than those in the specific enumerated grants, and the 
Helvidius-Pacificus debate shows that, while both Hamilton and Madison used the unitary 
executive theory, there was disagreement between them as to the scope of executive power.  
 
c. The Qualifications Clause 
 
Report of the Committee on Detail: 
Article IV, Section 2: “Every member of the House of Representatives shall be of the age 
of twenty five years at least; shall have been a citizen of the United States for at least three years 
before his election; and shall be, at the time of this election, a resident of the State in which he 
shall be chosen.”  
 
Article VI, section 2: “The Legislature of the United States shall have authority to 
establish such uniform qualifications of the members of each House, with regard to property, as 
to the said Legislature shall seem expedient.”383 
 
Proceedings of the Convention Referred to the Committee of Style and Arrangement: 
Article IV, Section 2: Every Member of the House of Representatives shall be of the age of 
twenty-five years at least; shall have been a citizen of the United States for at least seven years 
before his election; and shall be at the time of his election, an inhabitant of the State in which he 
shall be chosen.384 
 
Report of Committee of Style: 
Article I, section 2, clause 2: No person shall be a representative who shall not have 
attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and 
who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state in which he shall be chosen.385 
 
The Committee of Detail’s proposals – the first versions of the qualifications clause 
quoted above - gave Congress the power to establish property requirements for membership 
(along with the age, citizenship and residency requirements).  Reviewing the Committee of 
Detail’s draft of Article VI, section 2, the delegates at the convention debated whether Congress 
should have such a power to impose property requirements.  Madison stated that he “was 
opposed to the Section as vesting an improper & dangerous power in the Legislature,”386 and 
Franklin objected to the provision because it “betray[ed] a great partiality to the rich.”387  
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While Madison and Franklin would have removed the one grant of power to Congress in 
the Committee of Detail’s proposal – the grant to limit membership on the basis of property 
ownership - Morris took a diametrically opposite position.  He “moved to strike out ‘with 
regard to property’ in order to leave the Legislature entirely at large.”388  Morris would have 
given Congress the power to add whatever limitations it wanted: “The Legislature of the United 
States shall have authority to establish such uniform qualifications of the members of each House 
as to the said Legislature shall seem expedient.” 
 
No one spoke in favor of Morris’s proposal, and Madison and Williamson spoke against 
it. It was rejected by a vote of 4 states in favor (including Morris’s Pennsylvania) and 7 against 
(including Madison’s Virginia).389  
 
Agreeing with Madison, Wilson then moved that the provision in the Committee of 
Detail’s proposed Constitution giving Congress the power to impose property qualifications for 
membership be removed. That motion carried, with seven states agreeing with Wilson (including 
Pennsylvania and Virginia) and three (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Georgia) favoring 
retention of the provision.390   
 
Thus, the qualifications provisions referred to the Committee of Style reflected the first 
proposal from the Committee of Detail (concerning the fixed requirements of age, citizenship, 
and residency), but not the second proposal (which would have given the Houses the opportunity 
to add property requirement) and not Morris’s proposal (which would have given the Houses to 
ability to add any additional requirements they thought appropriate). The only substantive 
change in the first proposal was that the citizenship requirement was increased from three years 
to seven years, in response to a successful motion by Mason and Morris.391 
 
When the convention turned to the Committee of Detail’s proposed expulsion clause, 
Morris again unsuccessfully pressed for broad legislative control over its membership.  The 
                                               
3882 Farrand 250. Morris’s view that Congress should have the ability to add whatever qualifications it 
wanted was a departure from his view earlier in the convention.  Mason had proposed "that the Committee of detail 
be instructed to receive a clause requiring certain qualifications of landed property & citizenship of the U. States in 
members of the Legislature, and disqualifying persons having unsettled Accts. with or being indebted to the U. S. 
from being members of the Natl. Legislature."  2 Farrand 121. Morris responded, “If qualifications are proper, he 
wd. prefer them in the electors rather than the elected. As to debtors of the U. S. they are but few. As to persons 
having unsettled accounts he believed them to be pretty many. He thought however that such a discrimination would 
be both odious & useless. and in many instances unjust & cruel. The delay of settlemt. had been more the fault of the 
public than of the individuals. What will be done with those patriotic Citizens who have lent money, or services or 
property to their Country, without having been yet able to obtain a liquidation of their claims? Are they to be 
excluded?”  2 Farrand 121. But the Morris’s objection in this context was to the qualifications Mason was 
proposing – Mason would have barred those to whom the United States owed money from Congress and used only 
landed property, rather than other monetary assets, to meet the property qualification – rather than to the idea of 
qualifications for service. 
3892 Farrand at 250.  The printed journal recorded a slightly different vote: 4 Ayes and 6 Noes.  Madison 
recorded Delaware as voting against the Morris plan; the journal records Delaware as not voting.  2 Farrand 250*. 
3902 Farrand 251. 
3912 Farrand 216. 
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Committee of Detail had proposed: “Each House . . . may punish its members for disorderly 
behaviour; and may expel a member.”392  Madison thought “the right of expulsion . . . was too 
important to be exercised by a bare majority of a quorum”393 and proposed a requirement that 
2/3 of the members have to vote in favor of expulsion. Morris was the lone opponent of the 
proposal, declaring, “This power may be safely trusted to a majority.  To require more may 
produce abuses on the side of the minority.”394  No delegation agreed with Morris, and 
Madison’s proposal passed, 10 delegations in favor, none against, and Morris’s Pennsylvania 
delegation divided evenly.395 
 
The Committee of Style did not change the expulsion clause, but it did change the 
qualifications clause, but in a subtle way.  The Committee of Style converted a series of 
positive requirements (“Every Member of the House of Representatives shall be … ) into a series 
of disqualifying attributes (“No person shall be a representative who shall not …).   
 
As noted above, in Powell v. McCormack, the Court rejected the House’s argument that 
the negative framing meant that it could add additional requirements and that the House therefore 
had the power to refuse to seat Congressman Powell for reasons other than those enumerated in 
the qualifications clause.  Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Warren found that the 
Committee of Style had no power to change the meaning of the text, and he ruled that the text 
referred to the Committee (rather than the text adopted by the convention and subsequently 
ratified) was controlling.     
 
Strikingly, in its review of the drafting history, the Court simply dismisses Morris as the 
outlier. The Chief Justice observes that “the Convention rejected . . . Gouverneur Morris' 
motion”396 to empower Congress to add whatever requirements it wanted. The Court follows the 
historian Charles Warren in concluding that the convention was rejecting Morris’s view that the 
Houses should have discretion in favor of the Madisonian view that the qualifications should be 
fixed by the Constitution. Chief Justice Warren stated: 
 
Charles Warren . . . concluded that the Convention's decision to reject Gouverneur 
Morris' proposal and the more limited proposal of the Committee of Detail was an implicit 
adoption of Madison's position that the qualifications of the elected ‘were fundamental articles in 
a Republican Govt. and ought to be fixed by the Constitution.’ 2 Farrand 249-250. See Warren, 
supra, at 420-421. Certainly, Warren argued, ‘such action would seem to make it clear that the 
Convention did not intend to grant to a single branch of Congress . . . the right to establish any 
qualifications for its members, other than those qualifications established by the Constitution 
itself . . . . For certainly it did not intend that a single branch of Congress should possess a power 
                                               
3922 Farrand 254, n. 15 (quoting Committee of Detail’s proposal). 
3932 Farrand 254. 
3942 Farrand 254. 
3952 Farrand 254.  The final version of the expulsion clause as adopted by the convention reflects 
Madison’s motion: “Each House [of Congress] may determine the Rules of its proceedings, punish its members for 
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member." Article I, Section 5(a). 
396395 U.S. at 536. 
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which the Convention had expressly refused to vest in the whole Congress.’ Id., at 421.397 
 
Similarly, the Court gives weight to the acceptance of Madison’s motion on the expulsion 
clause and portrays Morris an irrelevant dissenter.  “One other decision made the same day [as 
the vote on the qualifications clause] is very important to determining the meaning of Art. I, § 
5,”398 Chief Justice Warren writes.  Warren notes that Madison proposed that expulsion 
required a 2/3 vote, rather than a majority.  “With the exception of one State, whose delegation 
was divided, the motion was unanimously approved without debate, although Gouverneur Morris 
noted his opposition.”399 Warren concludes that “the Convention's decision to increase the vote 
required to expel, because that power was ‘too important to be exercised by a bare majority,’ 
while at the same time not similarly restricting the power to judge qualifications, is compelling 
evidence that they considered the latter already limited by the standing qualifications previously 
adopted.”400    
 
The Court overlooks one important fact: it never notes that Morris – the outlier in its view 
– wrote the text. 
 
It is Morris’s text, and Morris’s qualifications clause falls into a pattern that we see 
repeatedly: as he wrote the Committee of Style draft, he was make a subtle change that reversed 
a loss on the convention floor.  The framing – a negative, rather than a positive, construction of 
qualifications for congressional service – is ambiguous, but it permits the argument (the one 
unsuccessfully made in Powell) that the House can add requirements. 
 
d. The Federal Judiciary 
 
As has been noted, Morris wrote, “On that subject [the judiciary], conflicting opinions 
had been maintained with so much professional astuteness, that it became necessary to select 
phrases, which expressing my own notions would not alarm others, nor shock their selflove. . .”   
Using words that did not highlight what he was doing, he was able to create a textual basis for 
judicial review and to provide text that could be used to argue that Congress’ was required to 
lower federal courts.   
   
i. Judicial Power clause 
 
Proceedings of the Convention Referred to the Committee of Style and Arrangement 
Article XI: The Judicial Power of the United States both in law and equity shall be vested 
in one Supreme Court, and in such Inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time to time, 
be constituted by the Legislature of the United States.   
 
Report of Committee of Style: 
                                               
397395 U.S. at 536, n. 69. 
398395 U.S. at 536. 
399395 U.S. at 536. 
400395 U.S. at 536. 
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Article III, section 1: The judicial power of the United States, both in law and equity, 
shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time 
to time ordain and establish.  The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold 
their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a 
compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.  
 
As noted above, the question whether to empower Congress to create lower federal courts 
divided the convention. In the face of a vote that would have taken from the Congress the power 
to create such federal courts, Wilson and Madison successfully offered a compromise proposal 
“that the National Legislature be empowered to institute inferior tribunals.” The proposal has 
become known as the “Madisonian Compromise,” and, as it emerged from the Committee of 
Detail, it gave Congress the power to create inferior courts “when necessary, from time to time.” 
While Morris did not participate in the debate that led to the Madisonian controversy, in a 
subsequent debate about the provision “that Natl. <Legislature> be empowered to appoint 
inferior tribunals,”401 Morris weighed in on behalf of the necessity for lower federal courts.402 
 
Consistent with his commitment to a strong judiciary and national power, when Morris 
revised the vesting clause for the judiciary as a member of the Committee of Style, he removed 
the threshold barrier imposed in the Committee of Detail’s draft for the creation of lower courts. 
Congress’ power to create lower courts “when necessary” because language that can be read as a 
mandate to create inferior courts “from time to time.”   
 
This leading exponent of reading the text as requiring lower federal courts was the 
constitutional historian Julius Goebel. “[T]he Committee of Style robbed Congress of discretion 
whether or not to create inferior federal courts and left only discretion as to what courts were to 
be set up and make changes,”403 Goebel wrote in his 1971 account of the historical antecedents 
of the Supreme Court.  Focusing on the constitutional text, he observed: 
 
The effect of eliminating the words "as shall, when necessary" was to deprive Congress 
of power to decide upon the need for inferior courts and so to give full imperative effect to the 
declaration that "The judicial power . . . shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such 
inferior courts . . . ." That the Committee intended to convey the sense of an imperative is 
apparent from the choice of the most forceful words in the contemporary constitutional 
vocabulary -- "ordain and establish" -- to direct what Congress was to do.404 
                                               
4012 Farrand 45. 
4022 Farrand 46. 
403Goebel, History of the Supreme Court, at 243, n.228. 
 404Goebel, History of the Supreme Court at 247.  
 
Two well-known arguments that appear similar to Goebel’s, but that are in fact dissimilar should be noted.  
Justice Story in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee finds a constitutional mandate to establish lower federal courts, but Story 
does not base his position on the language Goebel (“may from time to time”) is construing. Story stated: 
 
It is manifest that a supreme court must be established; but whether it be equally obligatory to establish 
inferior courts, is a question of some difficulty. If congress may lawfully omit to establish inferior courts, it might 
follow, that in some of the enumerated cases the judicial power could nowhere exist. The supreme court can have 
 100 
 
Goebel’s argument that Congress had a constitutional obligation to create lower federal 
courts under the judicial powers clause has been the subject of overwhelming criticism.  
 
Some scholars have disagreed with Goebel because they read the text of the clause 
differently. "[I]t remains to be seen that the words 'ordain and establish' are significantly more 
imperative than the phrasing of the original draft," Professors Redish and Woods have 
contended.405  But the principal criticism of the Goebel reading is that it is inconsistent with the 
Madisonian Compromise. For example, Professor Robert Clinton has written, “Goebel's claim 
seems insupportable insofar as it suggests the tacit adoption by the Committee of a mandatory 
obligation by Congress to establish inferior federal courts. Such a conclusion is contradicted by 
the almost unquestioned adherence of the Convention to the Madisonian compromise and the 
limited charge of the Committee of Style "to revise the style of and arrange the articles agreed to 
by the House. . . ."406 “Goebel's attribution of deft sleight-of-hand to subvert the June 5th 
compromise dishonors the Style Committee members and supposes the other delegates fools,” 
Professor David Engdahl asserts.407  
 
What this criticism misses is the fact that here and elsewhere Morris’s goal was, not to 
comply with the Convention’s decisions, but to overturn them.  Indeed, even Goebel, in arguing 
that the clause was inconsistent with the Convention’s prior decision, fails to see that it is part of 
                                               
original jurisdiction in two classes of cases only, viz. in cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and 
consuls, and in cases in which a state is a party. Congress cannot vest any portion of the judicial power of the United 
States, except in courts ordained and established by itself; and if in any of the cases enumerated in the constitution, 
the state courts did not then possess jurisdiction, the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court (admitting that it 
could act on state courts) could not reach those cases, and, consequently, the injunction of the constitution, that the 
judicial power "shall be vested," would be disobeyed. It would seem, therefore, to follow, that congress are bound to 
create some inferior courts, in which to vest all that jurisdiction which, under the constitution, is exclusively vested 
in the United States, and of which the supreme court cannot take original cognizance. They might establish one or 
more inferior courts; they might parcel out the jurisdiction among such courts, from time to time, at their own 
pleasure. But the whole judicial power of the United States should be, at all times, vested either in an original or 
appellate form, in some courts created under its authority. 
 
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 330-31(1816).   
 
Similarly, Professor Amar in his classic A Neo-Federalist View of Article III, 65 B.U. 205 (1985) argues 
for a broad range of cases in which federal jurisdiction is mandated, but, unlike Goebel, he argues that there is no 
mandate for Congress to create lower federal courts.  Id. At 206   (“Thus, following Hart, I seek to establish that 
the Framers did not intend to require the creation of lower federal courts; but, following Story, I shall show that they 
did require that some federal court -- supreme or inferior -- be open, at trial or on appeal, to hear and resolve finally 
any given federal question, admiralty, or public ambassador case.”) 
 
405Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical 
Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45, 61 (1975).  See also Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term -- 
Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 
Harv.L. Rev. 17, 34 n. 47 (1981);  
406Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original 
Understanding of Article III, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741, 794 n.169 (1984). 
407David Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding the Judicial Branch, 1999 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 
75, 102 n. 106. 
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a larger pattern of revision by Morris.  
 
Undoubtedly, the revised language is ambiguous, and its meaning can be debated. Thus, 
in the debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789, Madison (consistent with the Madisonian 
Compromise) contended that the Constitution permitted Congress to empower state courts to act 
as federal courts (although he also argued that this was unwise).408  But, undermining the 
Madisonian Compromise, Morris had created text that supporters of the creation of lower federal 
courts could turn to support their view that Congress was constitutionally mandated to create 
lower federal courts.  In the debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789, they repeatedly did so. 
Congressman William Smith, the “primary spokesperson for the federalists”409 argued that the 
word “shall” and the text as a whole mandated creation of lower federal courts.  "The words, 
'shall be vested,' have great energy, they are words of command; they leave no discretion to 
Congress to parcel out the Judicial powers of the Union to State judicatures . . . . Does not, then, 
the constitution, in the plainest and most unequivocal language, preclude us from allocating any 
part of the Judicial authority of the Union to the State Judicature. . .”410 Congressman Benson 
denounced a proposal that would have given lower federal courts only the admiralty jurisdiction 
as inconsistent with the Constitution’s text. “It is not left to the election of the legislature of the 
United States whether we adopt or not a judicial system like the one before us; the words in the 
constitution are plain and full and must be carried into operation.”411 Congressman Gerry 
declared, “You cannot make Federal courts of the State courts, because the constitution is an 
insuperable bar . .. We are to administer this constitution, and therefore we are bound to establish 
these courts, let what will be the consequence.”412  And Congressman Fisher Ames, Morris’s 
good friend, once again read Morris’s text in accordance with their shared constitutional vision.  
Opposing a motion that would have barred the creation of lower federal courts, Ames stated, 
“His wish was to establish this conclusion, that offences against statutes of the United States, and 
actions, the cognizance whereof is created de novo, are exclusively of Federal jurisdiction … . 
These, with the admiralty jurisdiction, which it is agreed must be provided for, constitute the 
principal powers of the district courts.”413 
 
Most probatively, Morris read his own text to require establishment of lower federal 
courts.  In 1802, when he was a Senator, during the debate over the repeal of the Judiciary Act 
of 1801, he read the judicial powers clause and then stated: 
 
“This, therefore, amounts to a declaration, that the inferior courts shall exist. . . . In 
declaring then that these tribunals shall exist, it equally declares that the Congress shall ordain 
and establish them. I say they shall; this is the evident intention, if not the express words, of the 
Constitution. The Convention in framing, the American people in adopting, that compact, did 
                                               
408See 1 Annals 812-13.  For discussion, see Fletcher at 942-43. 
409William Fletcher, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: The Meaning of the 
Word “All” in Article III, 59 Duke L.J. 929, 941 (2010). 
4101 Annals at 850. 
4111 Annals at 835. 
4121 Annals at 860. 
4131 Annals at 808. 
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not, could not presume, that the Congress would omit to do what they were thus bound to do.”414   
 
The delegates had agreed to a compromise under which Congress did not have to create 
lower federal courts. As Morris’s view of the text indicates, however, he had written language  
that could be read, and was read by a range of political leaders (including himself), to mandate 
the creation of lower federal courts. 
 
ii. Law of the Land Clause 
 
Proceedings of the Convention Referred to the Committee of Style and Arrangement 
Article VIII:  This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made under the authority of the 
United States shall be the supreme law of the several States, and of their citizens and inhabitants; 
and the judges in the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions; any thing in the 
constitutions or laws of the several States to the contrary notwithstanding.   
 
Report of Committee of Style 
Article VI: . . . .  This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be 
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be 
bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.  
 
While judicial review is not explicitly provided for in the Constitution in so many words, 
scholars have argued that the law of the land provision authorizes federal court review of statutes 
for constitutionality415 and the clause was relied on in the landmark judicial review case, 
Hayburn’s Case, as well as Marbury.416 The pattern with respect to the history of the language 
providing the basis for judicial review should be familiar by now.  As we have seen, Morris 
(and others who would be on the Committee of Style) had supported judicial review on the 
Convention floor but the text referred to the Committee did not explicitly provide for judicial 
review; Morris and the Committee revised the text in a way that advanced their ends (adding the 
“law of the land” formulation); committee members (Hamilton and Wilson) subsequently drew 
on this language in contending that the Constitution provided for judicial review. The Committee 
of Style’s introduction of the law of the land language accorded with the support for judicial 
review already advanced by most of its members and provided for the first time in the 
convention’s proceedings a textual basis for federal court review of the constitutionality of 
federal statutes.    
 
The relevant clause in the Committee of Detail’s draft had mandated state court review of 
state statutes for consistency with the federal constitution: “This Constitution . . . shall be the 
                                               
41411 Annals of Congress 79.  For discussion, see Michael Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, 
and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 Wisconsin 39, 63. 
415See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 91, 91 (2003): Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 887, 
907 (2003). 
416Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. at 137, 176, 180 (1803). 
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supreme law of the several States, and of their citizens and inhabitants; and the judges in the 
several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions. . . .” The exclusive focus is on the states 
and their courts.  The Constitution is “the supreme law of the several States.” “[T]he judges in 
the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions. . . .”    
 
By providing that “[t]his constitution . . . shall be the supreme law of the land,” the 
Committee of Style dramatically altered the sentence’s import. In substituting “the supreme law 
of the land,” for “the supreme law of the several States,” the Committee of Style made the 
Constitution binding on federal officials, as well as state officials. The back half of the sentence 
is essentially unchanged.  In the Committee of Detail’s version it was: “and the judges in the 
several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions; any thing in the constitutions or laws of 
the several States to the contrary notwithstanding.” In the Committee of Style’s version it 
becomes: “and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or 
laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.” But because of the front half of the sentence’s 
declaration that the Constitution is the “supreme law of the land,” federal, as well as state, judges 
are now required to review statutes for consistency with the federal constitution. 
 
There is, however, one complication. Washington, D.C. is not in a state, so Supreme 
Court justices do not fall into the category of “judges in the several states” if the words are 
literally read. At the same time, a literal leading would not exempt all federal judges. Acting 
pursuant to the Constitution, the first Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, establishing 
Circuit Courts comprised of a Supreme Court Justice and a district court judge and which heard 
cases around the nation. So, under a literal parsing of the law of the land provision, when the 
Justices heard cases sitting as Circuit Court Justices, they were bound to disregard a statute that 
was inconsistent with the federal constitution, but they were not so bound when the case was 
appealed to the Supreme Court.    
 
Such a result would not make sense and the law of the land provision was not so 
construed (as the embrace of judicial review in Marbury indicates). The question then becomes 
why the second half of the provision was not revised to read to encompass judges sitting in the 
district where the nation’s capital was to be located, as well as the states. 
 
One answer that has been suggested is that the problem was one of sloppy drafting. At 
the time of the Committee of Detail’s report, it had been contemplated that the seat of 
government would be located in one of the states. The decision to create a separate district for 
the seat of government was not arrived at until September 5, shortly before the Committee of 
Style began its work. As Morris and his fellow committee members rapidly rewrote much of the 
Constitution, they missed the need to revise what became the “law of the land” clause so as to 
make it applicable to judges sitting in the nation’s capital.417 
 
This explanation may be right - the record is too thin for one to know definitively - but an 
alternate explanation is that Morris did not make the change because he did not want to call 
attention to the more important change that he was making in the provision. The change from 
“supreme law of the several states” to “supreme law of the land” has great legal consequences, 
                                               
417See, e.g., McDonald at 255. 
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but is a small change textually and could easily be overlooked by members of the convention as 
they rapidly ran through the Committee of Style’s draft. But if he were to also make the 
provision binding on judges sitting in the nation’s capital by adding language to that effect, it 
would be more likely that members of the convention might focus on the provision as one being 
revised and, attending to the provision, they might object to the “law of the land language.” Only 
making the more important, and easily overlooked, change to the provision would be consistent 
with Morris’s statement to Pickering that, in drafting provisions of the Constitution concerning 
the judiciary, he “select[ed] phrases, which expressing my own notions would not alarm 
others.”418     
 
In any event, the provision soon provided the basis for judicial review, with Committee 
of Style members playing a crucial role.  In Federalist 16, Hamilton stated that judges "would 
pronounce the resolutions" “[of] a factious majority in the Legislature” "to be contrary to the 
supreme law of the land, unconstitutional and void."419 In Federalist 33, he stated that 
congressional statutes "which are not pursuant to its constitutional powers . . . will [not] become 
the supreme law of the land."420 "These will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve to be 
treated as such."421 
 
In his lectures on the law, James Wilson also invoked the “law of the land” provision as 
the basis for judicial review.  He stated that, when a congressional statute was "manifestly 
repugnant to some part of the constitution," a federal court would have "the right and … the 
duty" to invalidate it because the "supreme power in the United States has given one rule: a 
subordinate power in the United States has given a contradictory rule: the former is the law of 
the land: as a necessary consequence, the latter is void, and has no operation."422 Similarly, in 
the first case in which Supreme Court justices confronted the question whether to enforce an 
unconstitutional statute, the 1792 Hayburn’s Case, when riding Circuit, Wilson, along with 
Justice Blair and Judge Peters, invoked the law of the land provision as support for their decision 
to refuse to follow the Invalid Pensioners Act.423 
                                               
4183 Farrand 420. 
419Federalist 16 (Hamilton) at 79.  See also Federalist 33 (“Though a law, therefore, for laying a tax for 
the use of the United States would be supreme in its nature and could not legally be opposed or controlled, yet a law 
for abrogating or preventing the collection of a tax laid by the authority of a State (unless upon imports and exports) 
would not be the supreme law of the land, but a usurpation of power not granted by the Constitution.”)   For 
discussion, see Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 Yale L.J. 502, 554-55 (2006). 
420Federalist 33 (Hamilton) at 158(emphasis in original).  While Hamilton in Federalist 33 does not 
explicitly invoke judicial review to invalidate unconstitutional statutes, it is implicit, particularly in light of his 
embrace of judicial review of congressional statutes in Federalist 78. See Bradford Clark, The Constitutional Origins 
of Judicial Review:Unitary Judicial Review, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 319, 331& n.84 (2003) 
421Federalist 33 (Hamilton) at 158. 
4221 The Works of James Wilson 329-30 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 1967).  See also Arthur E. Wilmarth, 
Jr.,  Elusive Foundation: John Marshall, James Wilson, and the Problem of Reconciling Popular Sovereignty and 
Natural Law Jurisprudence in the New Federal Republic, 72 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 113,  
 
December, 2003 164-65. 
423See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 409, 410 n.2 (1792) ("This Constitution is ‘the Supreme Law of the Land.’ 
This supreme law ‘all judicial officers of the United States are bound, by oath or affirmation, or support.’").  For 
discussion of Justice Wilson’s opinion in Hayburn’s Case, see Maeva Marcus and Robert Teir, Hayburn’s Case: A 
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Although no committee member was involved, the “law of land” provision also was 
critical to another important pre-Marbury judicial review case, the 1795 case of Van Horne’s 
Lessee v. Dorrance.  Justice Paterson, a former convention delegate,  told the jury that "the 
form of government, delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first 
principles of fundamental laws are established … . It contains the permanent will of the people, 
and is the supreme law of the land; it is paramount to the power of the Legislature … . If a 
legislative act oppugns a constitutional principle … in such case, it will be the duty of the Court 
to adhere to the Constitution, and to declare the act null and void."424  Similarly, although it 
does not play a central role in the decision, Chief Justice Marshall invoked the law of provision 
as his final argument in Marbury:  
 
“It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the 
supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United 
States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that 
rank. 
 
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and 
strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law 
repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by 
that instrument.”425 
 
The Committee of Style’s revision to the law of the land clause and the interpretations of 
the clause by committee members, therefore, played a critical role in the establishment of judicial 
review.  
 
e. The Contract Clause 
 
Northwest Ordinance (1787): Article II: . . .  And, in the just preservation of rights and 
property, it is understood and declared, that no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the 
said territory, that shall, in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts or 
engagements, bona fide, and without fraud, previously formed. 
 
Proceedings of the Convention Referred to the Committee of Style and Arrangement 
Article XII: No State shall coin money; nor emit bills of credit, nor make anything but 
gold or silver coin a tender in payment of debts; nor pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto 
laws; nor grant letters of marque and reprisal, nor enter into any treaty, alliance, or 
confederation; nor grant any title of nobility. 
 
                                               
Misinterpretation of Precedent, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 527, 533-34; Treanor, Stanford, 533-38. 
 
424Van Horne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 28 F. Cas. 1012, 1014-15 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16,857) (jury 
instructions by Paterson). 
425Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803). 
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Report of Committee of Style   
Article I, Sect. 10: No state shall coin money, nor emit bills of credit, nor make any thing 
but gold or silver coin a tender in payment of debts, nor pass any bill of attainder, nor ex post 
facto law, nor laws altering or impairing the obligation of contracts; nor grant letters of marque 
and reprisal, nor enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, nor grant any title of nobility.  
 
The backstory of the contracts clause, prior to the work of the Committee of Style, has 
already been told.  King proposed that a clause like the contracts clause of the Northwest 
Ordinance be adopted.  Mason and Morris opposed it.  While the basis of Morris’s objection is 
not clear – he spoke of the proposal as going “too far” – it appears that his principal concern is 
that the language would have altered statute of limitations.  King’s proposal failed.  It is not 
clear how the clause was resurrected in the Committee of Style’s proposal and there is nothing in 
Madison’s notes that answers the question, but Madison’s notes were increasingly inadequate as 
the convention proceeded, so there may have been some floor discussion or there might have 
been an agreement reached informally through discussions off the convention floor.  Since 
Morris spoke against King’s proposal, scholars have suggested that King or Hamilton might have 
been responsible for the clause’s return, but the scholarship has failed to see that Morris 
opposition was likely only to a particular aspect of the clause’s reach (i.e., to statute of 
limitations) rather than to the idea of a contract clause itself and that, as an attorney arguing 
before the Pennsylvania legislature against the end of the Bank of North America’s corporate 
charter, he had suggested that it might be unconstitutional for a state legislature to repeal a 
corporate charter. 
 
In light of this history, it is interesting to note that Morris (or the Committee) departed 
from the Northwest Ordinance in three ways. First, in one way, it is arguably narrower in its 
scope: “in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts” becomes “laws 
altering or impairing the obligation of contracts.” The language of the Northwest Ordinance is so 
broad that it affect statutes of limitations, which was apparently Morris’s concern.  While there 
is an ambiguity to the Committee’s language, “altering or impairing the obligation of contracts” 
seems less absolute and enabled the Court and state courts to uphold state statutes involving 
statutes of limitations on the grounds that they affected “remedies,” rather than the “obligation” 
of contracts.426 
 
Second, and more significantly, Morris (or the Committee) removed the word “private.” 
“[I]nterfere with or affect private contracts or engagements” becomes “altering or impairing the 
obligation of contracts.” “[P]rivate” has disappeared.  The change would appear intentional: A 
decision that the clause applied to public contracts would have been consistent with the position 
that Morris took in suggesting that the Pennsylvania legislature could not constitutionally revoke 
the charter of the Bank of North America. 
 
Third, the Northwest Ordinance by its terms applies only to “previously formed” 
                                               
426See Hawkins v. Barney's Lessee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 457 (1831). The Court in Hawkins upheld a state 
statute Kentucky statute of limitations that restricted to seven years the time period during which landowners could 
sue to recover possession of their property from occupying claimants.  For further discussion, see Michael 
Klarman, How Great Were the “Great” Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 Va. L. Rev. 1111, 1151-52 (2001). 
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contracts; the contract clause does not have text limiting it to previously formed contracts. 
 
There was almost no discussion of the clause on the convention floor after it was 
proposed by the Committee.  The words “altering or” were dropped without recorded 
discussion.  Gerry, the only speaker to discuss the clause, moved that the clause apply to the 
federal government, as well as the states, but no one seconded his motion.  No one seconded his 
motion, the convention adjourned, and when they reconvened the following day, they moved on 
to other topics. That is only record we have of the Convention’s consideration of the Committee 
of Style’s proposal.427 
 
There was also little discussion of the clause during the ratification debates.  While 
Anti-Federalists Patrick Henry of Virginia and James Galloway suggested that the clause might 
reach contracts between the states and private individuals, the few Federalists who addressed the 
issue and Antifederalist convention delegates Martin and Mason all maintained that it only 
applied to private contracts.428  As convention delegate William Davie put it in the North 
Carolina ratification debates, “The clause refers merely to contracts between individuals.”429  In 
light of this history, the standard view among historians and legal scholars is that, when Chief 
Justice Marshall in Fletcher v. Peck applied the contracts clause to a public contract, his opinion 
was inconsistent with the original understanding.430 
 
However, a countervailing (if still minority) view of the original understanding of the 
clause has emerged in recent years.  Douglas Kmiec and John McGinnis have focused on the 
absence of the word “private” in the clause to argue that, pursuant to the original understanding 
of the clause, it applies to public, as well as private, contracts.431 
 
While it is inconsistent with the position Federalists took during ratification, the Kmiec-
McGinnis view is consistent with Morris’s position in the debate about the Bank of North 
America.   
 
It is also consistent with the position that two committee members prominently took in 
the years immediately after ratification.  In Chisholm, Justice Wilson opined that the contract 
clause applied to public contracts: “What good purpose could this Constitutional provision 
secure, if a State might pass a law impairing the obligation of its own contracts; and be 
                                               
427See 2 Farrand 619. 
428See Benjamin Wright, The Contract Clause 12-16 (1938). 
4293 Farrand 350. 
430See, e.g., William Wiecek, Liberty Under Law 43-44 (1978); James E. Ely, The Marshall Court and 
Property Rights, 33 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1023, 1031 (2000); Michael Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review, 85 Geo. 
L.J. 491, 545 & n. 257 (1997).  The classic study finding Fletcher inconsistent with the original understanding is 
Benjamin Wright, The Contract Clause of the Constitution 27-34 (1938). 
431Douglas Kmiec and John McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original Understanding, 14 
Hastings Const. L. Q. 529, 539 (1987).  Accord, James E. Ely, The Marshall Court and Property Rights, 33 J. 
Marshall L. Rev. 1023, 1031 (2000). See also Richard Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 703, 705 (1984) (textual analysis of contracts clause leading to the conclusion that it “a sharp 
restriction of the power of the state to regulate economic affairs”). 
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amenable, for such a violation of right, to no controuling judiciary power? We have seen, that on 
the principles of general jurisprudence, a State, for the breach of a contract, may be liable for 
damages.”432  
 
Alexander Hamilton, in the opinion he wrote for property owners who held land pursuant 
to the contested Yazoo land grant from Georgia, took the same position.  Hamilton argued that 
the Georgia legislature’s statute overturning its prior land grant was unconstitutional under the 
contract clause because public contracts fell within the ambit of the clause: 
 
“Every grant from one to another, whether the grantor be a state or an individual, is 
virtually a contract that the grantee shall hold and enjoy the thing granted against the grantor, and 
his representatives. It, therefore, appears to me that taking the terms of the Constitution in their 
large sense, and giving them effect according to the general spirit and policy of the provisions, 
the revocation of the grant by the act of the legislature of Georgia may justly be considered as 
contrary to the Constitution of the United States, and, therefore null.”433 
  
The contract clause, then, fits into the pattern we have seen previously: The Committee of 
Style’s draft departed from prior language (the Northwest Ordinance Clause’s contract clause) in 
ways that reflected Morris’s views; in the years after ratification, members of the Committee 
(and, once again, Wilson and Hamilton) drew on the language of the clause as adopted to 
advance views that they shared with Morris and that were at odds with the standard views of the 
delegates (represented, in this case, by the delegates’ arguments in state conventions). 
 
f. Engagements Clause 
 
Proceedings of the Convention Referred to the Committee of Style and Arrangement 
Article VII, Sect. I . . . All debts contracted and engagements entered into, by or under 
the authority of Congress shall be as valid against the United States under this constitution as 
under the confederation. 
 
Report of Committee of Style 
Article VI.  All debates contracted and engagements entered into before the adoption of 
this Constitution shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution as under the 
confederation. 
 
Morris was a forceful advocate for federal assumption of all revolutionary war debts.  
On August 22, he proposed a provision stating, “The Legislature shall discharge the debts & 
fulfil the engagements <of the United States>.”434  While his motion was successful, the 
convention soon backtracked.  Mason objected to the provision’s imposition of an obligation to 
repay all debts.  “The use of the term shall will beget speculations and increase the pestilential 
                                               
432Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 465 (1793) (Wilson, J.). 
433Hamilton opinion, excerpted in Wright at 22. 
4342 Farrand 377. 
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practice of stock-jobbing.”435 Supporting Mason, Randolph proposed the language noted above. 
(“All debts contracted and engagements entered into, by or under the authority of Congress shall 
be as valid against the United States under this constitution as under the confederation.”). It 
passed, 10 states in favor and one against, with only Morris speaking against the proposal and 
with only Morris’s Pennsylvania voting against Randolph’s proposal.436 
 
Morris’s language for the Committee did not overturn the Convention’s decision that 
repayment was not mandatory.  He did, however, neatly expand the scope of the clause in an 
important way.  The previously adopted language authorized assumption only of debts incurred 
“by or under the authority of Congress.” Implicitly, that language did not allow assumption of 
state debts that had not been authorized by Congress.  However, the Committee of Style’s 
language -covering debts incurred “before the adoption of this Constitution” – allowed Congress 
to assume state debts, regardless of whether those debts had been previously authorized by 
Congress.437 As Secretary of Treasury, Alexander Hamilton used this power to assume state 
revolutionary war debts, regardless of whether they had been authorized by Congress, and 
Federalist members of Congress agreed that the Constitution gave the national government this 
power.438 
 
g. Slavery 
 
Proceedings of the Convention Referred to the Committee of Style and Arrangement 
Article XV: . . . . If any Person bound to service or labor in any of the United States shall 
escape into another State, He or She shall not be discharged from such service or labor in 
consequence of any regulations subsisting in the State to which they escape; but shall be 
delivered up to the person justly claiming their service or labor.  
 
Report of Committee of Style 
Article IV, Sect. 2 . . . :  No person legally held to service or labour in one state, 
escaping into another, shall in consequence of regulations subsisting therein be discharged from 
such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or 
labour may be due.   
 
As previously discussed, no delegate at the convention expressed opposition to slavery 
more forcefully than Morris (and no one came close, although King and Hamilton were both 
deeply opposed to slavery). It was, he declared, “the curse of heaven.” The 3/5 clause rewards 
“the inhabitants of Georgia and South Carolina who goes to the coast of Africa and, in defiance 
of the most sacred laws of humanity, tears away his fellow creatures from their dearest 
connections and damns them to the most cruel bondages.” 
                                               
4352 Farrand 413 (emphasis in original). 
4362 Farrand 414. 
437See Pfander, Cornell, at 1291-93. 
438See McDonald at —- (scope of assumption); 2 Annals at 1363 (Clymer) (“assumption of the state debts 
appeared to him a matter of a federal complexion”); 2 Annals at 1365 (Sherman) (assumption is constitutional 
because state debts “are to be looked at as the absolute debts of the Union”); 2 Annals at 1371 (Gerry) (arguing for 
the constitutionality of assumption of the state debts). 
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Morris had little room to edit in confronting the clauses of the Constitution which 
(although the word “slave” was never used) concerned slavery439 because the provisions 
concerning slavery were the subject of fierce scrutiny by pro-slavery delegates. However, he did 
make one small, but significant change. As the fugitive slave clause emerged from the 
Committee of Detail, it provided that the captured slave “shall be delivered up to the person 
justly claiming their service or labor.” As it emerged from the Committee of Style, the clause 
provided that the captured slave “shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such 
service or labour may be due.”  Morris had eliminated the word “justly.” 
 
The change was profound.  As historian Sean Willentz has recently written, “To 
describe a person’s claim as just could also imply that the state laws establishing such a claim 
were just. To say that the person may or may not be due the fugitive’s service or labor avoided 
that implication while it conveyed uncertainty about the justice of the state law or laws in 
question.”440 Removing the word “justly” from the fugitive slave clause, the Committee of 
Style. . . . had gone out of its way to ensure that the fugitive slave clause did not acknowledge 
property in man, let alone slaveholders’ rights to such property.”441  During the antebellum 
period, abolitionists argued that the Constitution did not sanction slavery. Morris’s elimination of 
the word “justly” made that argument possible.   
  
h. New States Clause 
 
Proceedings of the Convention Referred to the Committee of Style and Arrangement 
Article XVII: New States may be admitted by the Legislature into this Union: but no new 
State shall be hereafter formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any of the present States, 
without the consent of the Legislature or such State as well as of the general Legislature. Nor 
shall any State be formed by the junction of two or more States or parts thereof without the 
consent of the Legislatures of such States as well as of the Legislature of the United States. 
 
Report of Committee of Style 
Article IV, Sect. 3: New states may be admitted by the Congress into this union; but no 
new state shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state; nor any state be 
formed by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states, without the consent of the 
legislatures concerned as well as of Congress. 
 
As previously noted, Morris believed that the new states should not be created in the 
west. The west, he asserted could not produce “enlightened” legislators because “the busy haunts 
of men, not the remote wilderness, were the proper school of political talents.”442   
 
As we have also seen, at the time of the Louisiana Purchase, Morris claimed that the 
                                               
439See 3 Farrand at 436 (Madison’s statement that the word “slave’ did not appear in the Constitution 
because “some of the States . . . had scruples against admitting the terms ‘slaves’ into the instrument”). 
440Willentz, No Property in Man at 1865 (kindle cite) 
441Willentz at 2423 (Kindle cite). 
442Madison 261. 
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Territories Clause, which he had drafted, barred the creation of new states from territories, but 
that he had written it in such a way that the others framers had not realized the clause’s meaning 
when they adopted it.   
 
As he revised it as part of his work on the Committee of Style, the new states clause 
advanced a similar end.  The Committee of Detail’s version of the New States Clause permitted 
new states to be created within the territory of existing states if the State legislature and Congress 
approved. Morris revised the provision so that the language about permission from the state 
legislature and Congress did not apply to the creation of a new state from land within the 
boundary of a current state. Morris’s version flatly prohibits creation of a new state in such 
circumstances, regardless of what the affected State or Congress want.   
 
In addition to reflecting Morris’s concern about new states generally, his text was also 
consistent with his opposition to slavery.  A literal reading of his text would have barred the 
admission of the two new slave states on the horizon in 1787: Kentucky (which was split from 
Virginia) and Tennessee (which had been part of North Carolina). But the free state whose 
admission was on the horizon – Vermont – was not, as of 1787, a part of another state. It was an 
independent republic.  Thus, Kentucky and North Carolina, but not Vermont, were not “within 
the jurisdiction of any other state.”  It was remarkably elegant. 
 
No one, however, read the constitutional text closely.  In reviewing the congressional 
debates about the admission of Kentucky and North Carolina, I did not find anyone who 
grappled with the question whether they were barred from admission because they were “within 
the jurisdiction of [another] state.” The new states were simply admitted.  When there was a 
relevant controversy in the early republic, the other clauses discussed here had someone who 
argued for the reading of the text that Morris would have favored.  For whatever reason, the 
new states clause is the exception.443 
 
i. Impeachment Clause 
 
Proceedings of the Convention Referred to the Committee of Style and Arrangement: 
Article X, sec. 2: “He [the President] shall be removed from his office on impeachment 
by the House of Representatives, and conviction by the Senate, for treason or bribery or other 
high crimes and misdemeanors against the United States. . . .”  
 
Report of Committee of Style: 
Article III, sec. 4: “The President, Vice President, and all civil officers of the United 
States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or 
other high crimes and misdemeanors.” 
 
The Committee of Style dropped “against the United States”: “other high crimes and 
misdemeanors against the United States. . . .” became “other high crimes and misdemeanors.” 
                                               
443I believe Kesavan and Paulsen were the first to advance the reading of the new states clause discussed 
here, see Kesavan and Paulsen, Is West Virginia Unconstitutional?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 291 (2002), although, as 
previously discussed, they opposed giving the clause the reading that Morris would have favored.   
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As previously discussed, the question whether this change was legally consequential 
played a central role in the debate about whether the impeachment of President Clinton was 
constitutionally permissible, and it has appeared in early debates about possible impeachment of 
President Trump.  Reflecting an approach similar to that in Powell, the dominant view is that 
the change in language should be ignored and the clause should be read as if it still contained the 
“against the United States” language.  Jack Rakove, advocating this view, has argued that 
Morris (as well as other members of the Committee) was a champion of a strong executive and 
would not have wanted to expand the scope of impeachment.444 A leading voice on the other 
side of the originalist debate, Jonathan Turley struggled with the fact that Morris “represented 
the original extreme wing on impeachment, opposing any impeachment for the chief 
executive”445 and was unable to offer a clear theory on what the Committee was trying to do in 
changing the language. 
 
What these accounts both miss is that Morris changed his mind about impeachment.  In 
the critical debate, the debate of July 20, he began by arguing against impeachment for the 
President because “it will render the Executive dependent on those who will impeach.”446  But, 
then, after listening to Mason and Franklin’s arguments for impeachment, he decided 
impeachment was appropriate.  “[C]orruption & some other offences to be such as ought to be 
impeachable; but thought the cases ought to be enumerated & defined.”447  But as the debate 
continued, he changed his position yet again, adopting a more expansive view of impeachment: 
 
Mr. Govr. Morris,’s opinion had been changed by the arguments used in the discussion. 
He was now sensible of the necessity of impeachments, if the Executive was to continue for any 
time in office. Our Executive was not like a Magistrate having a life interest, much less like one 
having an hereditary interest in his office. He may be bribed by a greater interest to betray his 
trust; and no one would say that we ought to expose ourselves to the danger of seeing the first 
Magistrate in foreign pay without being able to guard agst it by displacing him. . . . The 
Executive ought therefore to be impeachable for treachery; Corrupting his electors, and 
incapacity were other causes of impeachment.448 
 
Morris’s final statement about impeachment suggests that his removal of “against the 
United States” did not indicate that he thought the phrase redundant.  Rather, he had a 
capacious view on when impeachment was appropriate, including circumstances like 
“incapacity” and being in “foreign pay” and the modification was consistent with that view. 
 
j. Presidential Succession Clauses (section to be added)  
 
h. Conclusion 
                                               
444Rakove, [GW], at 687 n.25. 
445Turley at 1814. 
4462 Farrand 65. 
4472 Farrand 65. 
4482 Farrand 68-69. 
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This section has shown that, while the mandate of the Committee of Style was limited, as 
drafter for the Committee Gouverneur Morris covertly challenged the results of the convention’s 
prior proceedings and revised a striking number of fundamentally important constitutional 
provisions in order to advance his constitutional agenda.  He wrote text that could be read to, 
among other things, expand national authority, provide the basis for judicial review, mandate the 
establishment of lower federal courts, bar states from interfering with their own contracts, 
expand the range of the presidential impeachment clause, block the admission of the slave states 
of Kentucky and Tennessee, and remove the Constitution’s recognition of the ownership of 
enslaved people as “just[].”  A prior section has shown that he also wrote text that gave 
Congress the power to enact legislation to promote the general welfare (although his “trick” was 
discovered and the earlier language restored) and the power to create crimes against the law of 
nations (and here he convinced the convention to keep his language).   
 
Morris placed in the Constitution language that Federalists (including Alexander 
Hamilton and James Wilson) repeatedly relied on in the great constitutional debates of the early 
republic. At the same time, Republicans also made textualist arguments, drawing, like 
Federalists, on Morris’s text, as they fought the Federalists.  Morris did not write text that 
clearly transformed constitutional meaning.  His changes were subtle, and his text appropriately 
subject to competing interpretations.  As drafter, working with text that reflected victories at the 
convention for positions he opposed, he created ambiguity, inserting into the Constitution 
language that provide the basis for constitutional arguments in accordance with his constitutional 
vision. 
 
VII. The Committee of Style and Constitutional Interpretation 
 
When he denounced Gouverneur Morris on the floor of Congress, Albert Gallatin had 
more reason to be angry than he knew.  Morris had not simply attempted one “trick” and been 
caught by a suspicious Roger Sherman. Rather, the brilliant craftsmen had devised a whole series 
of “trick[s]” and, with one exception, he had gotten away with it.  Working with a document 
that reflected a series of compromises and many lost arguments, Morris in a matter of days 
created a Federalist constitution.  He transformed a document that began with a wearying roll 
call of the states and no goal beyond the creation of the Constitution itself into a document that 
proudly announced itself as the work of “We, the People of the United States” animated by a 
grand vision for the nation, and “We, the People of the United States” then ratified Morris’s 
words. 
 
From the perspective of the modern constitutional decision maker or theorist, the 
question then becomes what the significance of this history is. Or, to quote Bernard Bailyn, the 
eminent historian of eighteenth century America, so what? 
 
The Supreme Court’s answer, if it follows the approach in Powell, would be that Morris’s 
changes should be disregarded.  The Committee, the Chief Justice writes, was created by the 
convention ²to revise the stile of and arrange the articles which had been agreed to.² “The 
Committee . . . had no authority from the Convention to make alterations of substance in the 
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Constitution as voted by the Convention . . .” This statement indicates that, had the Committee 
sought to change the Constitution’s meaning, such an act would have been ultra vires.  Warren 
then bolsters his position by observing that the Committee had not informed the Convention that 
it was “purport[ing] to change the meaning of the clause and that the Convention members did 
not intend to change the clause’s meaning (“and certainly the Convention had no belief . . . that 
any important change was, in fact, made”).   
 
The Chief Justice might contend that the history revealed in this article reinforces his 
position: the Committee’s changes did not reflect bad drafting; they reflected bad intent.  
Respect for drafters’ intent mandates wholesale rejection of the Committee’s work (except, 
perhaps, with the offences against the law of nations clause, which was carefully reviewed by the 
Convention). 
 
Warren’s approach is a product of a period in which drafting history (and legislative 
history) were accorded particular weight.  It would not be too much of a caricature of the 
argument to say that it reflects the view that, because the drafting history is clear, the text can be 
disregarded. His analysis reflects intentionalism, the interpretive school that looks to drafters’ 
intent or ratifiers’ intent.  While once the dominant originalist approach, intentionalism has 
been largely supplanted as a school of thought.  To the extent that intentionalism retains 
influence, scholars focus on ratifiers’ intent, rather than drafters’ intent. The ratifiers were “We, 
the People” meeting in the state conventions.  In contrast, the drafters were operating in secret 
so their discussions did not influence ratifiers’ debate, their intent was not of legal consequence 
(since they were simply preparing a document for the consideration of the ratifying conventions, 
and the ratifying conventions were the legally empowered actors), and, it has been generally 
assumed since Jefferson Powell published his classic article, The Original Understanding of 
Original Understanding, that the founding generation considered drafters’ intent irrelevant.449 
 
The principal argument advanced in support of originalism sounds in majoritarian 
theory: We the People ratified the Constitution; respect for majoritarian decisionmaking means 
that courts (and other governmental actors) should give effect to that decision and to the original 
understanding of the document that informed We the People’s decision to ratify.  Originalists 
recognize the significant limitations to their majoritarian claims (and, in particular, both the 
dead hand problem and the serious process problem because women, enslaved people, Native 
Americans, and, to a limited extent, people without property were excluded from participating 
in the ratification process) but argue that, nonetheless, ratification has a stronger majoritarian 
basis than any other jurisprudential approach. 
 
Recent scholarly rejection of intentionalism – and particularly intentionalism that looks 
to the drafters’ intent - reflects the fact that it is not grounded in majoritarian decisionmaking.   
Warren’s approach in Powell is a particularly striking example of the problems with 
drafters’ intent originalism.  A number of the provisions that reflected the Committee of 
Style’s changes were extensively discussed in the state ratifying conventions and in the popular 
                                               
449H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARVARD L. REV. 885 (1984). 
For a more complete discussion of the competing originalist schools, see Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 
NORTHWESTERN L. REV. 983 (2009). 
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press during the ratification process. In particular, the Preamble,450 the law of the land 
provision,451 the clause concerning creation of inferior courts,452 and the contract clause453 
received significant attention.  The approach in Powell would replace language that ratifiers 
specifically considered and debated – and that was part of their decision whether to support the 
Constitution - with language they never saw. While the Committee of Style did not act in 
accordance with the convention’s charge to simply make stylistic changes, the text the 
committee proposed was the text adopted by the convention and ratifiers.  As Dean Manning 
has argued, to disregard the ratifiers’ decision is to disregard what We the People decided. If 
rigorously followed, the Powell approach would read out of the Constitution salient language 
(like the final versions of the vesting clauses and the contract clause) in favor of text only 
known to the drafters participating in their secret meetings. 
 
Indeed, Warren’s approach is problematic even from the perspective of discerning the 
drafters’ intent. Warren’s approach would mean, for example, that the contract clause would be 
deleted from the Constitution, but it is unknowable whether there were backroom discussions 
about this change (or some other of this committee’s changes). As noted above, historians have 
suggested a consensus might have emerged to add the clause even though that consensus was 
not evidenced by the debates.  The approach in Powell thus relies on drafting history that may 
be incomplete in critical ways.  Moreover, the history of the Committee’s addition of the word 
“punish” to the offenses against the law of nations clause shows that changes made by the 
committee potentially commanded the support of a majority of the states.  There, by a narrow 
margin, a majority of the states favored the word added in the Committee’s draft.  Morris may, 
at least in some instances, have been risk averse, rather than acting contrary to the will of the 
majority.  He may have been importing changes into the text because he did not want to risk 
the end result that debate would produce, not because he was confident the convention would 
reject his text.  The debates about the law of nations clause indicates that it would be a mistake 
for modern courts to assume that all of the substantive changes made by the committee would 
have been rejected by the convention had they been subject to debate and vote.   
 
The history of the Committee of Style also gives particular force to the objection to 
intentionalism first voiced by Paul Brest in “The Misconceived Quest for the Original 
Understanding,” a work written at the dawn of modern originalism: the people involved in 
drafting and ratifying a document do not share a collective intent; they have different 
conceptions of what the text means.454 Morris’s goals were different from those of many of his 
fellow delegates.  His comments about the provision involving the judiciary is generally 
applicable: he “select[ed] phrases, which expressing my own notions would not alarm others, nor 
shock their selflove. . .”  The debates in the early republic about the meaning of the text he 
wrote show that there was no collective intent about how to understand the Constitution’s words.      
 
                                               
4502 The Founders’ Constitution, Preamble, Documents 8-16. 
4514 The Founders’ Constitution 597-606 
4524 The Founders’ Constitution 139-145 
4532 Founders’ Constitution, Contract Clause, Documents 4-9.   
454Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204, 213-17, 222-
34 (1980). 
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The approach taken by Kevasan and Paulsen and by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Nixon 
avoids certain of the problems of the Powell approach.  Under the Kesavan/Paulsen/Rehnquist 
approach, the text referred to the Committee of Style glosses the text written by the Committee.  
The earlier text is evidence of original public meaning.  This approach avoids the difficulty of 
ignoring the text adopted by the ratifiers (e.g., the contract clause or the vesting clauses).  The 
earlier text does not override the adopted text.  Rather, when there is ambiguity, it helps 
resolve it. 
 
From the perspective of majoritarian-originalist theory, one problem with this approach 
is that it strongly privileges usages in the convention over other contemporary uses.  The way 
in which people in the convention might have read the text is only one source of original public 
meaning, and it should not outweigh other evidence of public meaning.   
 
But, apart from this general theoretical concern, this approach is particularly flawed with 
respect to the construction of Morris’s text.  The Kesavan/Paulsen/Rehnquist approach 
assumes an honest scrivener – one who was trying to write text that reflected previous 
discussions.  And that was, very precisely, what Morris was not doing.  He was choosing 
language that departed from the previous understanding.  The prior text cannot be used to gloss 
his text.  In fact, it is important to focus on the differences between the previously agreed to 
text and Morris’s text because the differences are a useful guide to how Morris intended the text 
be read.  He was writing language that would have a different meaning than the previous 
version. 
 
This recognition also reveals the problem with the approach taken by Dean Manning and 
Justice Thomas. In accordance with original public meaning theory, both “focus on the words of 
the adopted Constitution.”455  From a majoritarian/originalist perspective, that is the correct 
analytic approach: the people ratified the text sent to them by the Convention, and that is the 
language to be interpreted.  But, critically, Morris’s language does not have one meaning.  In 
order to get his text through the convention, Morris was intentionally using language that would 
escape notice and that was, as a result, ambiguous.  Examination of the early history of debates 
about how to interpret the Constitution shows that there was both a Republican and a Federalist 
reading of his text.  Morris created a Federalist Constitution, but he could not displace the 
Republican Constitution.   
 
Thus, focus on original public meaning does not yield one way to read Morris’s text.  It 
reveals two.  The modern originalist therefore cannot simply rely on text to answer whether the 
Preamble is a grant of power, whether the vesting clauses are a broad grant to power to the 
President, whether the contract clause covers public contracts, whether Congress can eliminate 
lower federal courts, or a host of other questions.  Professor Solum’s idea of a construction 
zone necessarily comes into play.  The modern interpretive must move beyond text and 
employ other sources of constitutional meaning as she chooses between competing versions of 
original public meaning.   
 
                                               
455 Evans. 
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Conclusion 
 
Early in the new republic, a Congressman charged on the floor of the House that 
Gouverneur Morris, the drafter for the Committee of Style, had tried to revise the general welfare 
clause in order to expand the powers of Congress, but that a fellow delegate had caught the 
“trick” and restored the original constitutional text.  Despite the fact that this charge was made 
more than two hundred years ago and despite Morris’s reputation as lacking integrity, no 
previous work of scholarship has compared the constitutional provisions referred to the 
Committee of Style with the Committee of Style’s proposals in order to assess whether he altered 
text in order to advance his constitutional vision.  This article undertakes that comparison. It 
shows that Morris, a committed nationalist who favored a strong executive and judiciary and 
protection for private property, who opposed slavery and the grant of political power to the West, 
subtly revised the text of a breathtaking range of clauses in order to advance his constitutional 
vision, repeatedly seeking to gain victory in crucial areas where he had been unable to obtain the 
result he desired during earlier convention debates. He wrote text that expanded the power of the 
national government (the Preamble), strengthened the executive (the vesting clauses of Articles I 
and II), mandated the creation of lower federal courts (judicial power clause), provided a textual 
basis for judicial review (the law of the land clause), elevated the constitutional position of both 
the executive and federal courts (the basic structure of Article I, Article II, and Article III), 
barred state interference with public contracts (the contract clause), blocked the admission to the 
Union of slave states Kentucky and Tennessee while permitting the admission of the free state of 
Vermont (new states clause), removed constitutional text suggesting that slavery was “just[]” 
(the fugitive slaves clause), empowered the national government to assume state debts (the 
engagements clause), allowed Congress to add qualifications to membership (the qualifications 
clause), expanded the grounds for impeachment (impeachment clause), and expanded 
congressional jurisdiction over criminal law |(the offenses against the law of nations clause).  It 
is a remarkable list of some of the fundamentally important parts of the Constitution. 
 
Morris’s text provided Hamiltonian Federalists with language that they repeatedly relied 
on in the major constitutional debates of the early republic, as they argued for presidential power 
to remove executive branch officers, the presidential ability to issue a Neutrality Proclamation, 
Congress’s power to create the Bank of the United States and to enact the Sedition Act, federal 
courts’ right to hold congressional and state statutes unconstitutional, and Congress’ obligation 
to create lower federal courts.  Morris’s text provided a playbook for Federalist 
constitutionalists, including Alexander Hamilton and James Wilson, who had both worked with 
him on the Committee of Style.   
 
At the same time, Morris’s changes were subtle. Rather than creating clear constitutional 
meaning, he created ambiguity. In the great debates of the early republic, Republicans fought 
Federalists with their own readings of the text. 
 
Morris’s language has had a major effect on constitutional law in areas where courts have 
not recognized that relevant language was inserted by the Committee of Style – such as cases 
involving the significance of the vesting clause to executive power and the applicability of the 
contract clause to public contracts.  At the same time, in those cases where the work of the 
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Committee of Style has been highlighted, the Court has consistently ruled that the Committee of 
Style had no power to change constitutional meaning.  Only Justice Thomas has dissented from 
this position. 
 
The Court’s position reflects a reliance on drafters’ intent that is at odds with the basic 
modern originalist principle that the ratifiers, not the drafters, were “We the People.” For an 
originalist, the constitutional text adopted by the ratifiers (rather than the text produced prior to 
the work of the Committee of Style) is controlling because that it is the text adopted in 
ratification.   
 
At the same time, Morris’s constitutional text is consistently ambiguous.  He created 
Federalist readings but did not extinguish Republican readings.  Thus, for a public meaning 
originalist, the text has legitimate alternate readings.  In construing Morris’s text, a 
constitutional decision maker is in the construction zone and must seek sources of meaning 
beyond text to resolve controversy.  
 
_________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
